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I. INTRODUCTION
Year in Review contains brief summaries of selected decisions
by the Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska Court of Appeals.
The primary purpose of this review is to familiarize practitioners
with significant decisions handed down by these courts in 1996.
The summaries focus on the substantive areas of the law ad-
dressed, the statutes or common law principles interpreted and the
essence of each of the holdings. Space does not permit review of
all cases decided by the courts this year, but the authors have at-
tempted to highlight decisions signaling a departure from prior law
or resolving issues of first impression. The cases that were omitted
applied well-settled principles of law or involved narrow holdings
of limited import. The appendix lists the omitted cases and in-
cludes a brief parenthetical synopsis. Attorneys are advised not to
rely upon the information contained in this review without further
reference to the cases cited.
The opinions have been grouped according to general subject
matter rather than by the nature of the underlying claims. The
summaries are presented alphabetically in the following thirteen
areas of the law: administrative, business, civil procedure, constitu-
tional, criminal, election, employment, family, insurance, property,
tax, torts, and trusts and estates.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In 1996, in the area of administrative law, the Alaska Supreme
Court addressed, among other topics, issues of how to determine if
a construction project can be considered "public construction,"
whether the Department of Natural Resources has implied statu-
tory authority to regulate royalty rates in state coal leases, and
what constitutes an unresponsive bid in a state contract setting. In
the land use and management area, the court considered whether
state administrative agencies had made sufficient independent de-
terminations before awarding contracts and leases and if differen-
tiating between recreational and residential users of land in
awarding purchase preferences raised constitutional concerns. Fi-
nally, in the administrative procedure area, the court addressed is-
sues of availability of public documents and applicability of sub-
stantive due process rights in attorney disciplinary proceedings.
A. Public Contracting
In Western Alaska Building & Construction Trades Council v.
Inn-Vestment Associates of Alaska,' the Alaska Supreme Court
Copyright © 1997 Alaska Law Review
1997]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
held that five factors should be weighed in determining whether
state involvement in a construction project is significant enough
that the project constitutes "public construction" or a "public
work" under the provisions of Alaska's Little Davis-Bacon Act.2
This Act requires that wages paid on public construction projects
not fall below a statutory prevailing rate.3 The five factors are the
following: (1) the nature of the contract in which the state was a
party (whether it was for construction or only for financing); (2)
whether the structure under construction was to be used for a pub-
lic purpose; (3) whether the state would control the structure after
construction; (4) whether the state would continue to fund the
project after construction; and (5) the relative portion of financing
that the state would provide.4 The court held that these factors,
while not exclusive or necessarily of equal weight, should be
weighed together rather than individually.
Applying these factors, the court found that the actions of the
Alaska Railroad Company ("AARC") in joining a partnership for
the construction of a Comfort Inn on its property and by investing
in the project constituted state involvement significant enough to
invoke the Little Davis-Bacon Act. Although factors (4) and (5)
weighed against a finding of state involvement, AARC's assump-
tion of significant liability, its desire to augment its rail passenger
business, its continuing participation and investment in hotel de-
velopment, and its substantial power in the partnership led to the
conclusion that state involvement in the project was significant
In Usibelli Coal Mine, Inc. v. Department of Natural Re-
sources,8 the supreme court held that the Department of Natural
Resources ("DNR") has implied statutory authority to regulate
royalty rates in state coal leases.9 Usibelli Coal Mine ("UCM")
had entered three noncompetitive state coal leases under which a
fixed royalty was to be paid to the state per ton of coal. Prior to
the expiration of any of the leases' initial twenty-year royalty
terms, DNR promulgated new regulations establishing a standard
royalty rate of 5% of adjusted gross value.0
1. 909 P.2d 330 (Alaska 1996) (interpreting Alaska State Federation of La-
bor v. State, 713 P.2d 1208 (Alaska 1986)).
2. ALASKA STAT. § 36.05 (Michie 1996).
3. See id. at 36.05.010.
4. See Inn-Vestment, 909 P.2d at 333-34 (citing Alaska State Federation, 713
P.2d at 1208).
5. See id. at 333-34 n.9.
6. See id. at 337.
7. See id. at 334-37.
8. 921 P.2d 1134 (Alaska 1996).
9. See id. at 1145.
10. See id. at 1138.
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Challenging the validity of the new regulations, UCM re-
quested royalty relief pursuant to Alaska Statutes section
38.05.140(d)." In addressing UCM's claim that DNR had no leg-
islatively granted authority to promulgate the regulations, the su-
preme court found implied authorization in Alaska Statutes sec-
tions 38.05.020(b)(1), 38.05.145(a) and 38.05.150(d). 2 The court
further found "sufficient standards and procedural safeguards to
ensure the valid exercise of agency authority.
1 3
In Danco Exploration, Inc. v. Department of Natural Re-
sources,1 4 the supreme court held that a plaintiff was not entitled to
recover interest from the state where the plaintiff was unable to
maintain an action under the statute governing claims against the
state.15 Danco Exploration, which had been declared the high bid-
der in a state lease sale of seven state oil and gas tracts, put down a
bid deposit the state held for a year and a half.16 Because Danco
was one day late in filing certain paperwork, the state declared the
deposit forfeited.' The superior court reversed the state's decision
and ordered the state to issue the leases upon receipt of certain of
the funds which had been refunded to Danco, plus interest."
However, Danco's motion for an award of interest on the deposit
from the time of the date of the forfeiture until the date of the su-
perior court's decision was denied. 9
On appeal, the supreme court held that "except where the
constitution directs otherwise, interest may not be assessed against
the state except where interest is specifically authorized by the
legislature."2 Danco argued that Alaska Statutes section
09.50.2801 authorized an award of interest with respect to its bid
deposit, but the court held that this only applied where Alaska
Statutes section 09.50.250" (allowing for tort or contract claims
against the state) established a substantive cause of action.'
11. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.140(d) (Michie 1996).
12. ALASKA STAT. §§ 38.05.020(b)(1), .145(a), .150(d).
13. Usibelli, 921 P.2d at 1145.
14. 924 P.2d 432 (Alaska 1996).
15. See id.
16. See id. at 433.
17. See icL
18. See id. at 434.
19. See id.
20. Id. (citing Stewart & Grindle, Inc. v. State, 524 P.2d 1242, 1245 (Alaska
1974)).
21. ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.280 (Michie 1996). The statute provides that "[i]f
judgment is rendered for the plaintiff, it shall be for the legal amount found due
from the state with legal interest from the date it became due." Id.
22. Id. at § 09.50.250.
23. See Danco, 924 P.2d at 434 (citing Stewart, 524 P.2d at 1245).
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Danco could not have maintained such an action for the interest
since "[a] party who brings an appeal from a commissioner's deci-
sion to the superior court is bound by the result of such an appeal
and may not maintain a separate action under [section
09.50.250]."24
In Neal & Company, Inc. v. City of Dillingham,2 the supreme
court held that a city contractor had not given sufficient notice to
the city of problems at a construction site to support the contrac-
tor's Differing Site Conditions claims.' The contract between
Neal and the city, under which Neal was to excavate two lagoons
for a sewage treatment facility, contained a Differing Site Condi-
tions clause in compliance with Environmental Protection Agency
requirements for projects that receive Agency funding.' This
clause allowed Neal to assert a claim against the city for money it
spent because the site conditions were different than expected.2
In analyzing the sufficiency of notice required to recover
higher costs under the clause, the supreme court relied on federal
case law dealing with such clauses and determined that, in spite of
an express requirement of written notice under the clause, notice
could be sufficient "if it was clear and it alerted or should have
alerted the [contracting party] to the fact that [the contractor] had
encountered differing site conditions." 29 Neal claimed that a city
engineer's observations regarding the conditions in question, made
when he was researching other aspects of the site, constituted suf-
ficient notice." Applying the above standard, the court rejected
the argument that these observations constituted "clear non-
written notice of a differing site condition."31
In Peninsula Correctional Health Care v. Department of Cor-
rections,32 the supreme court adopted verbatim a decision of the
superior court upholding a contract award by the Department of
Administration based on its findings that the winning bid was not
non-responsive to the requested proposal or based on misrepresen-
tation or fraud.3 The losing contractor had claimed that the win-
ner failed to obtain letters of commitment-as required by the re-
quest for proposal ("RFP") issued by the Department of
24. I- (citing ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, 5 02.010(d) (1996)).
25. 923 P.2d 89 (Alaska 1996).
26. See id. at 93-94.
27. See id. at 92.
28. See id. at 90.
29. Id. at 90, 93.
30. See id. at 90-91.
31. Id. at 94.
32. 924 P.2d 425 (Alaska 1996).
33. See id. at 427-29.
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Corrections-from the loser's employees who were staffing the
current contract and who the winner proposed to employ to staff
the contract after transition3' The supreme court held that it was
unrealistic to expect the winner to obtain letters of commitment
from a competitor's employees and that the contractor had com-
piled with the language of the RFP, which called for letters of
commitment from individuals "known" to the bidder to be com-
mitted to the contract.35
In Lower Kuskokwim School District v. Foundation Services,
Inc.,36 the supreme court held that a corporation's failure to file a
state-required biennial corporate report or to pay a nominal cor-
poration tax did not render non-responsive the corporation's bid to
provide transportation services to the District.' The court ruled
that the state Department of Education did not abuse its discretion
in approving the contract.3 ' The court also noted that in order for a
variance from the response required to invalidate the contract, the
variance must provide the bidder with an unfair advantage.3 ' The
court ruled that Transnorth's failure either to file the report or to
pay the nominal corporation tax did not provide it with an unfair
advantage over other bidders.4
In reviewing the Department of Education's approval of the
contract, the court examined whether the Department abused its
discretion by being arbitrary or unreasonable.4' The court found
that since the Department's review was meant primarily to ensure
that the proposed contract was reasonably priced and in the best
interests of the District, the Department was not required to in-
quire into technicalities such as Transnorth's failure to file the re-
port and pay the tax in a timely manner, particularly since the Dis-
trict had already certified the bid as responsive.'
B. Land Use and Resource Management
In Ninilchik Traditional Council v. Noah,43 the Alaska Su-
preme Court held that the Department of Natural Resources
34. See id. at 427.
35. See id. at 429.
36. 909 P.2d 1383 (Alaska 1996).
37. See id. at 1389-90.
38. See icL
39. See id. at 1386 (citing Chris Berg, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Transp., 680 P.2d
93, 94 (Alaska 1984)).
40. See icL at 1387.
41. See iL at 1388 (citing Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, Inc. v.
State, 665 P.2d 544,548 (Alaska 1983)).
42. See id at 1389.
43. 928 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1996).
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("DNR") had a duty to independently determine that a proposed
lease of lands subject to the Alaska Coastal Management Program
("ACMP") 4 was consistent with locally defined District Coastal
Management Programs ("DCMP") as required under the ACMP. 45
The court ruled that the DNR could not rely solely on local assur-
ances that the proposed land uses complied with the local pro-
grams.4 The Ninilchik Traditional Council ("NTC"), along with
several environmental groups, challenged the DNR's decision to
proceed with the sale of an oil and gas exploration lease for land in
the Upper Cook Inlet and uplands on the Kenai Peninsula and in
the lower Susitna Valley.4
The court found that the DNR's determination was invalid
because it failed to certify that the proposed lease met the re-
quirements of affected DCMPs.4' The determination had been is-
sued based on three local districts' certification that the proposed
lease met their local standards. 49 The court held that, although
DNR could give deference to findings by local bodies that pro-
posed uses were in conformance with the local plans, such defer-
ence "[did] not, however, relieve DNR of the duty to independ-
ently determine that a sale is consistent with the affected
DCMPs."-' The court went on to find that, in the case of each of
the districts, the proposed lease, as approved in the conclusive con-
sistency determination ("CCD"), failed to conform to local
DCMPs and that the CCD was therefore invalid as written.51 The
court remanded the lease to DNR to address the failings of the
CCD in this area.52
In Kelso v. Rybachek,53 the supreme court upheld the validity
of the new Alaska Administrative Code title 18 section 70.055,
which had been adopted by the Alaska Department of Environ-
mental Conservation ("DEC") to specify procedures for water us-
age reclassification.55 DEC had formulated the new regulation to
44. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.40.010-.210 (Michie 1996).
45. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 80.010(b) (1995). The ACMP requires
that the proposed lease be consistent with the ACMP as well as the incorporated
standards of the affected DCMPs. See Ninilchik Traditional Council, 928 P.2d at
1209.
46. See Ninilchik Traditional Council, 928 P.2d at 1215.
47. See id. at 1209.
48. See id. at 1215.
49. See id at 1215-17.
50. Id. at 1215.
51. See id. at 1215-17.
52. See id
53. 912 P.2d 536 (Alaska 1996).
54. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 70.055 (1994).
55. See Rybachek, 912 P.2d at 541
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comply with requirements of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency that any reclassification of water usage that eliminated cer-
tain protected uses (recreation, fish, shellfish and wildlife) be made
only after the completion of a use attainability analysis, which is an
assessment of the factors that will affect the existing use. 6 The
court used the standard of review set forth in Department of Reve-
nue v. Cosio,l which specified that in order for a regulation to be
valid it must be consistent with the authorizing legislation, be rea-
sonable and not be arbitrary. s It held that the regulation was con-
sistent with the broad discretion of the agency to "'adopt regula-
tions ... providing for control, prevention, and abatement of air,
water, or land or subsurface land pollution ....""' The supreme
court further held that since the regulation conformed to federal
requirements for the state, it was reasonable and not arbitrary.60
In Reichmann v. Department of Natural Resources,61 the su-
preme court held that disparity in treatment between recreational
and residential users of land by the Director of the DNR in ruling
on requests for preference rights to purchase land from the state
pursuant to Alaska Statutes section 38.05.035(b)(5) 62 did not vio-
late either federal or state constitutional guarantees of equal pro-
tection.63 Reichmann's request to purchase land her family had
used for recreational purposes was denied for a number of reasons,
including that her family had not used the land for residential or
commercial purposes.6' Ruling against her equal protection claim,
the court held that, for the purposes of equal protection, recrea-
tional users are not a suspect class.65 Therefore, because the dis-
tinction between recreation and residential or commercial users
was a rational means of carrying out the state's land management
policies, the disparity in treatment was not a denial of equal pro-
tection.6
The court also held, however, that the use of the distinction
between recreational and residential or commercial users was im-
56. See id. at 537. The new EPA rules were published at 40 C.F.R. § 131
(1996).
57. 858 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1993).
58. See Rybachek, 912 P.2d at 540 (citing Cosio, 858 P.2d at 624).
59. Rybachek, 912 P.2d at 540 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.020(10)(A)
(Michie 1996)).
60. See id. at 541.
61. 917 P.2d 1197 (Alaska 1996).
62. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.035(b)(5) (Michie 1996).
63. See Reichmann, 917 P.2d at 1200.
64. See id. at 1199.
65. See id. at 1200.
66. See id.
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proper67 because the criterion in the DNR Procedures Manual on
which the distinction was based was a regulation not promulgated
in accordance with the requirements for regulations under the
Alaska Administrative Procedures Act." Nevertheless, the court
upheld the denial of Reichmann's request because the DNR had
separate, sufficient grounds for the denial. 9
In Thane Neighborhood Ass'n v. City and Borough of Jun-
eau,70 the supreme court held that a city and borough planning
commission impermissibly approved a mining company's large
mine permit application because it imposed a condition that the
project comply with water quality standards without information
sufficient to determine whether the completed project would be
able to adhere to the standards. 7' The City and Borough of Juneau
Planning Commission had approved Echo Bay Alaska, Inc.'s ap-
plication for a large mine permit subject to a set of conditions.
The Commission responded to concerns over the ability of the
mine to meet applicable water quality standards by withholding
approval of portions of the project until further information was
received.73 But, while the Juneau code did allow the Commission
to attach conditions to a permit,74 the court held that it did not
support granting a permit for a project as a whole while excepting
certain interlinked components of the project, as the Commission
had attempted to do.75 Analysis of Alaska case law in the area76 in-
dicated that such "phasing through the use of conditions is prohib-
ited where it is feasible to obtain the information necessary to de-
67. See ic at 1201.
68. See id (citing ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.62.010 et seq. (Michie 1996)). The
Alaska Administrative Procedures Act requires various means of public notice
and consideration for the promulgation of a proposed regulation. See ALASKA
STAT. §§ 44.62.010 et seq.
69. See Reichmann, 917 P.2d. at 1201-02.
70. 922 P.2d 901 (Alaska 1996).
71. See id. at 910.
72. See id. at 903.
73. See id. at 906.
74. See id. (citing CITY AND BUROUGH OF JUNEAU, ALASKA, CODE §§
49.15.330 (general standards for obtaining a conditional use permit), 49.15.330(g)
(allowing the Commission to place any of several enumerated conditions, as well
as any others reasonably necessary, on conditional use permits), 49.65.130(0
(allowing for approval if the Commission determines that the application, with
appropriate conditions, is satisfactory), 49.65.135 (defining primary requirements
for large mine permits) (1989)).
75. See id.
76. See id. at 906-08 (discussing Kuitsarak Corp. v. Swope, 870 P.2d 387
(Alaska 1994); Trustees for Alaska v. State, 851 P.2d 1340 (Alaska 1993); Trus-
tees for Alaska v. Gorsuch, 835 P.2d 1239 (Alaska 1992)).
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termine whether environmental standards will be satisfied before
granting an initial permit, but allowed where it is impractical or
impossible to create detailed development plans without conduct-
ing additional exploration."77 Since information on the project's
water standard compliance was feasibly obtainable, the Commis-
sion's use of conditions to approve the permit application created
an unacceptable danger that the project's cumulative effects would
not be adequately analyzed. 8
C. Administrative Procedure
In Capital Information Group v. State,79 the Alaska Supreme
Court held that the deliberative process privilege, which allows the
state to withhold certain proposals from the public despite the
state's public records statute, applied to each executive depart-
ment's proposals for new legislation sent to the Governor's Legis-
lative Liaison but not to budget proposals sent from executive de-
partments to the Office of Management and Budget.'o Capital
Information Group, a news organization that published periodicals
describing state governmental activities, filed suit to obtain both
sets of documents."'
The court stated that the state's public records statute' has
been broadly construed to further the goal of public access."
However, the court also recognized that, in certain instances, prior
precedent allowed for a deliberative process privilege to keep rec-
ords confidential in order to allow for open and free discourse
among governmental decision makers." The court held that such a
privilege can be successfully invoked where the communication
sought to be protected was pre-decisional and deliberative in na-
ture.' Once an agency demonstrated both of these criteria, the
burden shifted to the party seeking disclosure to demonstrate that
its need for the information outweighed the agency's interest in
preventing disclosure. 6 The court held that the legislative propos-
als were properly withheld under the test it enunciated, but that
the budget impact memoranda were not, since the legislature had
enacted a statute overriding the executive's request for secrecy
77. I at 908.
78. See id. at 910.
79. 923 P.2d 29 (Alaska 1996).
80. See id. at 41.
81. See UtL at 32.
82 See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.100-.220 (Michie 1996).
83. See Capital Information, 923 P.2d at 33.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 34.
86. See id. at 37.
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concerning them."
In In re Trien," the supreme court held that lawyer discipli-
nary proceedings are not criminal in nature and therefore do not
evoke substantive due process protections such as double jeop-
ardy." The court also held that an investigative committee does
not violate a subject's due process rights by acting as both adjudi-
cator and prosecutor by calling and questioning witnesses, as long
as no predisposition of the committee against the respondent is
shown. Furthermore, it is not error to allow consideration of an
attorney's prior disciplinary record in determining and reviewing
sanction recommendations, since independent review provides a
safeguard against any prejudicial impact arising therefrom."
III. BUSINESS LAW
In 1996, the Alaska Supreme Court decided several cases in
business law concerning the interpretation and validity of con-
tracts. The court addressed enforceability of contract terms, the
possibility of the protection of ideas under contract and contract-
like theories, and a buyer's challenge to an outstanding deed of
trust on a purchased property.
In Alaska Travel Specialists, Inc. v. First National Bank of An-
chorage,9 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the bank could not
base a refusal to honor charge card purchases made at Alaska
Travel Specialists ("ATS") solely on language in the merchant
agreement that said it could refuse to pay charges that were
"illegal" or "incomplete," where the contract also specified that
reasonable procedures needed to be set out between the parties for
resolving disputed charges. 3 First National had refused to honor
credit card deposits submitted by ATS that represented sales by
the travel agency of airline vouchers that the bank had discovered
through investigation to be possibly fraudulent. In reversing a
summary judgment for the bank, the court said that First National
had not proven its claim that the voucher scheme was illegal nor
had it set up any "reasonable procedure" by which they could re-
solve disputed charges with ATS9
87. See id. at 41.
88. 929 P.2d 634 (Alaska 1996).
89. See id. at 640-41.
90. See id. at 642.
91. See id. at 644-45.
92. 919 P.2d 759 (Alaska 1996).
93. See id. at 765.
94. See id at 761.
95. Id at 765.
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In Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.,96 the supreme court
held that ideas may be protected under contract and contract-like
theories if all requirements of the applicable contract law are met,
but that the recovery pursued may dictate the manner in which the
requirements are appliedY Reeves contacted Alyeska Pipeline
Service in January 1991 to discuss a tourism idea he had. After
speaking with a regional manager who assured him of confidenti-
ality, Reeves orally disclosed his idea to construct a visitor center
at an existing turnout that provided visitors a view of the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline. Reeves proposed terms of a deal including a
lease of the land from Alyeska to himself. Then, upon the man-
ager's request, Reeves submitted a written proposal outlining his
ideas. After meeting with the manager and receiving several as-
surances that he would be involved in the deal, Reeves was in-
formed that Alyeska was proceeding with the idea and imple-
menting it on its own rather than involving Reeves as originally
planned. Alyeska immediately erected a temporary structure and
completed a permanent log cabin in 1992.9
Reeves filed suit in 1993 claiming that Alyeska had improp-
erly appropriated his idea and alleging a variety of tort and con-
tract claims. He argued, and the supreme court agreed, that the
parties entered into three different express oral contracts: (1) a
confidentiality or disclosure agreement whereby Alyeska agreed
that if Reeves disclosed the idea it would not be used without his
participation; (2) a lease agreement whereby Alyeska agreed to
lease the turnout to Reeves in return for a percentage of profits
from the center's operation; and (3) a memorialization agreement
by which Alyeska agreed to commit the idea to writing." The
Court considered the three contracts individually and found that
the statute of frauds did not apply to the disclosure agreement,
since the disclosure itself constituted performance of Reeves's side
of the contract and Alyeska was to comply by the summer tourist
season."' Therefore, performance would be completed within one
year. Thus there existed a genuine issue of material fact as to the
existence of the disclosure agreement.'0 ' The statute of frauds was
held aplicable to the lease and memorialization agreements, how-
ever.
Addressing the availability of ideas under contract theory, the
96. 926 P.2d 1130 (Alaska 1996).
97. See id. at 1143-44.
98. See id. at 1133-34.
99. See id. at 1136.
100. See id. at 1137
101. See id.
102. See id. at 1139-40.
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court found that the idea need not be novel to get protection under
an express contract theory.'' Because implied-in-fact contracts are
so closely related to express contracts, ideas may also be protected
by an implied-in-fact contract without the idea being novel.'O
However, because the idea was not novel and thus lacked the req-
uisite property-like qualities, Reeves could not be protected under
a quasi-contract theory for the appropriation of the idea itself. 5
The court found, however, that Reeves possibly had a quasi-
contract claim based on unjust enrichment from Alyeska's benefit-
ting from his expertise and services in drafting the proposal, and
remanded the case for further proceedings."'6
In Joyner v. Vitale'' the supreme court held that the holder of
a deed of trust was the third-party beneficiary of a contract be-
tween the seller and buyer of real property, and therefore the
holder of the deed of trust could recover against the buyer."' Vi-
tale held a deed of trust on real property that secured a promissory
note; the property was held in an estate."' Vitale agreed to an as-
sumption of his debt by the purchaser of the property."' However,
after purchasing the property, Joyner, the buyer, challenged the
deed of trust."' The supreme court affirmed the trial court's find-
ing that a valid contract existed between the buyer and the seller of
the property and that the statutory warranty deed expressly stated
that the sale was subject to the deed of trust."' The court further
noted that Joyner could not raise defenses that the seller of the
property could have asserted against Vitale and held that Joyner
must honor his contractual promise to pay Vitale under the deed
of trust."'
IV. CIVIL PROCEDURE
The Alaska Supreme Court faced a variety of procedural is-
sues in 1996. Although many of the cases summarized in this sec-
tion also address important substantive issues, procedural ques-
tions predominate. The case summaries are divided into two
primary categories: timeliness in prosecution and appeal and modi-
103. See id. at 1141.
104. See id. at 1141-42.
105. See id. at 1143-44.
106. See id. at 1144.
107. 926 P.2d 1154 (Alaska 1996).
108. See id at 1157.
109. See id. at 1155.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 1156.
112. See id. at 1156-57.
113. See id. at 1157.
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fication of judgment. Other case summaries dealing with civil pro-
cedure issues appear under the "miscellaneous" heading at the end
of this section.
A. Timeliness of Prosecution and Appeal
In Airoulofski v. State,"' the Alaska Supreme Court held that
the superior court's grant of summary judgment to defendant
based upon implied waiver and estoppel was improper, even
though plaintiff had failed for six years to notify defendant of his
intent to litigate. 5 In September 1987, Airoulofski filed a com-
plaint against the Municipality of Anchorage ("MOA"), among
others, for negligence in connection with two instances of mistaken
arrest." '6 After assignment to the superior court's "fast-track" cal-
endar under Civil Rule 16.1,"' MOA reached an agreement with
Airoulofski giving MOA an unlimited extension to answer the
complaint pending the outcome of settlement negotiations."'
Following dismissal for lack of prosecution of Airoulofski's
claim against another defendant, the case file was administratively
closed but never properly transferred to the inactive calendar un-
der Civil Rule 16.1(g), which requires an actual transfer of the
case, as well as written notice to counsel of the transfer."' Airou-
lofski did not contact MOA regarding the case again until October
1993. MOA's motion to dismiss under Civil Rule 16.1(g) was de-
nied, but its subsequent motion for summary judgment pursuant to
the doctrines of estoppel and implied waiver was granted by the
superior court. On cross-appeal of the superior court's refusal to
dismiss Airoulofski's claim, MOA argued that the superior court
should have dismissed the claim under Civil Rule 16.1(%) despite
the court system's failure to follow the Rule's guidelines.
Relying on its decision in Ford v. Municipality of Anchorage,"
the supreme court disagreed, holding that "[t]he plain language of
Rule 16.1(g) precludes dismissal of fast-track cases without trans-
fer to the inactive calendar and, importantly, notice to the par-
ties."'22 Ford involved a very similar situation, and specifically held
that "[a] litigant should not be penalized for the court's error [in
114. 922 P.2d 889 (Alaska 1996).
115. See id. at 895.
116. See id. at 891.
117. ALASKA R. CIv. P. 16.1 (establishing special procedures for reducing de-
lay in civil litigation).
118. See Airoulofski, 922 P.2d at 891 (citing ALASKA R. Civ. P. 16.1(g)).
119. See id. at 893.
120. See id.
121. 813 P.2d 654 (Alaska 1991).
122. Airoulofski, 922 P.2d at 893.
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failing to place the case upon the inactive calendar].""' Further-
more, as the court had ruled in Ford, Civil Rule 41(e) 24 does not
apply to fast-track cases; instead, Rule 16.1(g) is the exclusive
means by which to dismiss cases once they are placed on the fast-
track.'2
Finally, the supreme court held that the superior court's grant
of summary judgment for MOA was improper since Airoulofski's
delay in prosecuting his claim did not amount to "unequivocal
conduct indicating a purpose to abandon the right," even though
the neglect may have resulted in prejudice to MOA.126 Noting that
the parties had agreed to an unlimited extension pending settle-
ment negotiations, the court held that a reasonable person would
not necessarily conclude that Airoulofski had impliedly waived his
claim against MOA2'7
In Arbelovsky v. Ebasco Services, Inc.,'2 the supreme court
held that the trial judge abused his discretion when he dismissed an
action with prejudice after the plaintiffs failed to comply promptly
with the court's order to pay costs and attorneys' fees. 9 Arbe-
lovsky and Garcia, plaintiffs in this case, had refiled a lawsuit that
had been previously dismissed without prejudice for failure to
prosecute in a timely manner.30
Upon the plaintiffs' refiling of the lawsuit, Ebasco Services
filed motions for awards of previous costs and attorneys' fees,
which the superior court ordered the plaintiffs to pay within thirty
days or be subject to dismissal with prejudice."' Perhaps due to a
misunderstanding involving the denial of their motion to recon-
sider, the plaintiffs tendered payment thirteen days late, after
which Ebasco Services moved for dismissal with prejudice for the
plaintiffs' failure to tender prompt payment.32 After denying the
motions, the court granted reconsideration and scheduled oral ar-
gument on the motions to dismiss. Upon the failure of plaintiffs'
counsel to appear at the hearing, the judge granted the pending
123. Ford, 813 P.2d at 656.
124. ALASKA R. CiV. P. 41(e) (allowing for dismissal of claims for want of
prosecution; nonetheless, even Rule 41(e) requires notice to the plaintiff and an
opportunity to show cause in writing why the action should not be dismissed).
125. See Ford, 813 P.2d at 656.
126. Airoulofski, 922 P.2d at 894 (citing Milne v. Anderson, 576 P.2d 109
(Alaska 1978); Miscovich v. Tryck, 875 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1994)).
127. See id.
128. 922 P.2d 225 (Alaska 1996).
129. See id. at 227.
130. See id. at 226.
131. See id.
132. See id.
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motions to dismiss with prejudice.'33
Despite the fact that the plaintiffs were found to have engaged
in "serious dilatory conduct,"'34 the supreme court held that their
conduct did not rise to the level of misconduct required to dismiss
with prejudice.' Such a severe sanction required a showing of
"'willful noncompliance"' with court orders, "'gross violations'
of the Rules,37 or "'extreme circumstances,""38 as well as a record
indicating "'a reasonable exploration of possible and meaningful
alternatives to dismissal.""3' 9 If such meaningful alternatives were
available, more lenient sanctions had to be imposed instead of the
harsher dismissal with prejudice.' 4 Since payment was made im-
mediately after the denial of the plaintiffs' motion for reconsidera-
tion of the payment order, and since there was no evidence of will-
ful noncompliance by the plaintiffs, the circumstances fell short of
supporting the trial judge's dismissal with prejudice.141 In addition,
the supreme court noted that the trial court failed to consider ade-
quately alternatives to dismissing the case with prejudice.' 42
B. Modification of Judgment
In Sandoval v. Sandoval,'43 a divorce settlement case, the
Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's denial of the
husband's motion to set aside judgment, brought under Civil Rule
60(b)(1),'" because the motion, made almost a year from the en-
tering of the trial court's decree, was not made within a
"reasonable time."'45 Although Mr. Sandoval claimed he had been
unable to attend the divorce hearing due to being involuntarily de-
tained by his overseas job, the superior court found that Mr. San-
doval had been served with the proposed decree, was aware of the
disputed provisions in the decree before the judge entered his final
133. See id. at 227.
134. Id. at 229.
135. See id
136. Id. at 227 (quoting Otis Elevator Co. v. Garber, 820 P.2d 1072, 1074
(Alaska 1991)).
137. Id. (quoting Power Constructors, Inc. v. Acres Am., 811 P.2d 1052, 1055
(Alaska 1991)).
138. Id. (quoting Mely v. Morris, 409 P.2d 979, 982 (Alaska 1966)).
139. Id. (quoting Power Constructors, 811 P.2d at 1055).
140. See id
141. See id.
142. See id. at 229.
143. 915 P.2d 1222 (Alaska 1996).
144. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
145. Sandoval, 915 P.2d at 1224.
1997]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
judgment, and yet took no action until almost a year later.146
In Benedict v. Key Bank of Alaska,147 the supreme court found
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Benedict's motion for relief from a default judgment exactly one
year after entry of the judgment1  The court found that Bene-
dict's motion was not made within a reasonable time under Civil
Rule 60(b)(3),'49 which provides that parties seeking relief from
judgment must make a motion "'within a reasonable time, and in
any case no later than one year after the date of notice of the
judgment."""5
In Ben Lomond, Inc. v. Schwartz,a5 ' the supreme court held
that the superior court's denial of Lomond's JNOV motion was
proper, since the evidence presented at trial adequately su?9orted
the jury's finding of Lomond's breach of fiduciary duty. Lo-
mond's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of fraud was de-
nied at trial. The jury subsequently found that Schwartz had im-
properly converted joint venture funds for his own use and that
Lomond had in turn breached his fiduciary duty to defendant
Railwater. 53
Contesting the reviewability of the superior court's denial of
JNOV, Railwater contended that Lomond moved for a directed
verdict only on the issue of fraud.)4 While a court's denial of
JNOV is not reviewable if the moving party failed to move for a
directed verdict on the issue at the close of evidence at trial,5 the
supreme court found that the issues of fraud and breach of fiduci-
ary duty were effectively merged in this case and therefore the de-
nial of the JNOV motion was reviewable.'56 Since both the parties
and the court treated the two claims as one throughout the litiga-
tion, Lomond's motion for directed verdict on the issue of fraud
preserved its right to move for JNOV or new trial on the issue of
breach of fiduciary duty." Nonetheless, the court held that the
adequacy of the evidence at trial supported the superior court's
146. See id at 1223-24.
147. 916 P.2d 489 (Alaska 1996).
148. See id. at 491.
149. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3).
150. 1& (quoting ALASKA R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3)).
151. 915 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1996).
152. See id.
153. See id. at 633-34.
154. See id.
155. See id (citing ALASKA R. Civ. P. 50(b); Richey v. Oen, 824 P.2d 1371
(Alaska 1992)).
156. See id at 634-35.
157. See id. at 635.
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denial of Lomond's request for JNOV or a new trial.'58
In Denali Federal Credit Union v. Lange, 9 the supreme court
held that denial of a creditor's motion for a writ of execution
against two properties was a final judgment and therefore appeal-
able."W The court explained that, since the effect of the motion was
that the creditor could do nothing further to prosecute the action,
it had the effect of "disposing of the case and ending the litiga-
tion.'.. Therefore, the decision was an appealable final judg-
ment.
62
C. Miscellaneous
In Wasserman v. Bartholomew,'6' the Alaska Supreme Court
held that the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting a non-
party witness's trial testimony as a sanction for her refusal to coop-
erate at a deposition under Civil Rule 37'6' or alternatively as cu-
mulative evidence under Evidence Rule 403 .16 The supreme court
determined that Civil Rule 37 could not be the basis for excluding
testimony for two reasons: first, such an action was not an appro-
priate or effective sanction against a non-party witness under the
rule, and, second, there was no indication that the appellants, who
claimed to be harmed by the exclusion, encouraged or caused the
refusal of the non-party witness to answer the questions posed to
her in the deposition.' As to the trial court's claim that introduc-
tion of the evidence would be cumulative under Evidence Rule
403, the supreme court noted that the trial court made its decision
without knowledge of the contents of the non-party witness's
sealed statement.'" Therefore, exclusion under Evidence Rule 403
was inappropriate. 68 The supreme court remanded to the trial
court to determine whether to reopen the evidence solely to con-
sider the testimony of the non-party witness with or without any
other evidence within the scope of her testimony, or to hold a new
trial.69
158. See id. at 635-36.
159. 924 P.2d 429 (Alaska 1996).
160. See id. at 431.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. 923 P.2d 806 (Alaska 1996).
164. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 37.
165. ALASKA R. EvID. 403; see Wasserman, 923 P.2d at 814.
166. See Wasserman, 923 P.2d at 811-12.
167. See id. at 812.
168. See iL at 814.
169. See id. at 814-15.
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In Landers v. Municipality of Anchorage,' the supreme court
held that the plaintiff did not waive his right to challenge the supe-
rior court's ruling on a motion in limine to exclude evidence, even
though he failed to make an offer of proof.' In an action to re-
cover damages for personal photographs and videotapes disposed
of by the Municipality, Landers sought to include evidence of the
sentimental and emotional value of the items.7  However, the su-
perior court granted the Municipality's motion in limine to exclude
this evidence and Landers failed to respond by offering proof of
their special value. 73
In general, Evidence Rule 103(a)(2)" requires an offer of
proof to preserve error based upon a trial court's ruling excluding
evidence."7 The court noted, however, that in Agostinho v. Fair-
banks Clinic,7 6 the court had reviewed the superior court's exclu-
sion of evidence pursuant to its ruling on a motion for a protective
order and had held that, under such circumstances, it was appro-
priate to examine the protective order itself rather than the events
at trial." Based upon its holding in Agostinho and a determination
that a motion in limine was functionally equivalent to a motion for
a protective order, the court found that Landers did not waive his
right to challenge the superior court's ruling on the motion in lim-
ine merely by failing to make an offer of r of.
78
In Era Aviation, Inc. v. Campbell, 7 the supreme court af-
firmed the superior court's summary judgment decision against air
carriers seeking refunds of landing fees paid to the Alaska De-
partment of Transportation and Public Facilities in accordance
with a regulation subsequently declared illegal."° In the original
action, several air carriers, not including Era Aviation, filed suit
against the Commissioner, the Department of Transportation, and
the state, asserting that Department regulations increasing landing
fees at state rural airports were illegal.' The plaintiffs sought and
obtained injunctive relief and a refund of the fees they had paid
under the regulation, on the court's holding that the regulation
170. 915 P.2d 614 (Alaska 1996).
171. See id. at 614.
172. See id. at 615.
173. See id. at 615-16.
174. ALASKA R. EVID. 103(a)(2).
175. See id at 616.
176. 821 P.2d 714 (Alaska 1991).
177. See Landers, 915 P.2d at 614 (citing Agostinho, 821 P.2d at 717).
178. See id at 617.
179. 915 P.2d 606 (Alaska 1996).
180. See id at 607.
181. See id.
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failed to "comply with the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act
and was thus invalid and unenforceable."'
Just prior to the entry of partial summary judgment for the
original plaintiffs, several other air carriers intervened in the origi-
nal action in order to claim refunds."" Shortly thereafter, Era
Aviation filed a separate lawsuit for a refund of landing fees, which
the court consolidated with the action of the intervenors
(collectively "Air Carriers"). 8"4 The defendants' subsequent mo-
tion for summary judgment was granted."
Acknowledging that the Air Carriers' remedy for relief lay in
a common law action in assumpsit, the supreme court first held
that the requirement under Principal Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
State, Division of Insurance'86 of a formal protest at the time of
payment applies to all actions in assumpsit brought against a gov-
ernment agency!" Such a protest "must not only notify the state
that the payer believes the levy to be illegal, but must also signal
that the payer intends to seek a refund."' Although the Air Car-
riers voiced their opposition to the landing fees before the De-
partment and the legislature, such opposition was insufficient to
notify the state that they intended to seek reimbursement.89 Fur-
thermore, the Air Carriers' attempt to recover based on the suit
filed by the original plaintiffs failed because that lawsuit satisfied
only the original plaintiffs' protest obligation. 1"° Finally, the court
rejected the Air Carriers' contention that their right to equal pro-
tection was violated by denying them reimbursement while reim-
bursing the original plaintiffs.' The court found that a rational
basis existed for the distinction between the protesting and the
non-protesting payers.' 2
In Edwards v. Alaska Pulp Corp. 93 the supreme court re-
jected the superior court's determination that Civil Rule 82' pre-
empts application of the common fund doctrine for reimbursement
of attorneys' fees.'95 Recognizing that the common fund doctrine is
182. Id. at 608.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. 780 P.2d 1023 (Alaska 1989).
187. See Era Aviation, 915 P.2d at 609.
188. Id. at 611.
189. See id. at 612.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 613.
192. See id.
193. 920 P.2d 751 (Alaska 1996).
194. ALASKA R. Cv. P. 82.
195. See Edwards, 920 P.2d. at 756.
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a fee-spreading mechanism, while Rule 82 is a fee-shifting tool, the
court held that "Rule 82 does not preempt the applicability of the
common fund doctrine, wholly or in part."'
In Ahwinona v. State, 9r the supreme court held that a suit for
personal damages resulting from a snowmobile accident was prop-
erly dismissed pursuant to the state's Rule 12(b)(6)19 motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, since the plaintiff had previ-
ously executed a valid personal injury release which was clear on
its face.1" Ahwinona signed a document entitled "Release of All
Claims," which purported to release all defendants from liability
for Ahwinona's injuries in consideration for $6000, receipt of
which was acknowledged.2m In upholding the validity of the re-
lease, the court rejected Ahwinona's contention that he expected
to recover the sum of $6000 from each of the defendants.21
In Sopcak v. Northern Mountain Helicopter Services,2' the su-
preme court held that a determination of lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction by a federal court in Alaska under Article 28 of the War-
saw Convention necessarily precluded subject matter jurisdiction
in state courts in the same matter under the doctrine of collateral
estoppel.2 Plaintiffs filed wrongful death and personal injury
claims in the superior court arising out of a crash in Alaska of a
helicopter operated by Northern Mountain, a Canadian corpora-
tion. Plaintiffs also filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Alaska.25 The district court subsequently
granted Northern Mountain's motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, based on its finding that under Article 28 of the
Warsaw Conventionm to which the U.S. is a signatory, Alaska was
not an available forum.' Northern Mountain then moved to dis-
196. Id..
197. 922 P.2d 884 (Alaska 1996).
198. ALASKA R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
199. See Ahwinona, 922 P.2d at 886.
200. See id at 884-85.
201. See id. at 886.
202. 924 P.2d 1006 (Alaska 1996).
203. See id. at 1008.
204. See id. at 1007.
205. See id.
206. See Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. 876 (reprinted at 49
U.S.C. § 40105 (1994)).
207. See Sopcak, 924 P.2d at 1007 ("Article 28 only allows subject matter juris-
diction in the United States if the United States is the domicile of the carrier, the
carrier's principal place of business, the place of business through which the con-
tract has been made, or the place of destination of the flight." Id. at 1007-08
(emphasis added) (citing Sopcak v. Northern Mountain Helicopter Servs., 859
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miss the state court action for want of jurisdiction and the motion
was granted on the basis of collateral estoppel.'
The supreme court held that, under Alaska case law, collateral
estoppel precludes relitigation of a previously determined issue
where an action is first brought in a federal court and subsequently
brought in state court.' Since the federal district court rendered
its decision before the state court claim was concluded, and the is-
sue of subject matter jurisdiction was the same in this case for both
state and federal courts, the state court was collaterally estopped
from relitigating the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.
In Washington Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Ramsey,21' the su-
preme court found that Washington Insurance Guaranty Associa-
tion ("WIGA"), a non-profit, unincorporated entity formed by
Washington statute for the purpose of protecting the policy hold-
ers of insolvent insurance companies, 212 was subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the superior courtW and was not statutorily immune
from an action for refusal to settle.214 In an underlying action in
which WIGA, in lieu of an insolvent Washington insurer, spon-
sored the defense of a construction company and one of its em-
ployees against an action for negligence, WIGA refused, over the
advice of counsel for the defendants, claimant Ramsey's offer to
settle for $200,000.21 Ramsey and the defendants then entered
into a settlement agreement whereby Ramsey was awarded dam-
ages of $300,000 but covenanted not to seek payment of the judg-
ment from the defendants, and they in turn assigned to Ramsey
their claims against WIGA for the amount of the judgment. 2 6
Ramsey then filed an action for refusal to settle against WIGA.
The jury in that action found for Ramsey and awarded her
$200,000.217
On the issue of personal jurisdiction, WIGA argued that it
had not met the "minimum contacts" standard since its contacts
F.Supp. 1270, 1271-72 (D. Alaska 1992)). The district court found that the desti-
nation of the flight was Vancouver, Canada. See id. at 1008.
208. See id.
209. See id. (citing Campion v. State, Dep't of Community and Reg'l Affairs,
876 P.2d 1096, 1098 (Alaska 1994)).
210. See id. at 1009-10 (stating that "[a]s a federal treaty, the Warsaw Conven-
tion has the force of federal law and preempts inconsistent state law .... Alaska
can only assert jurisdiction if Article 28 can be satisfied.").
211. 922 P.2d 237 (Alaska 1996).
212. See WASH. RBV. CODE §§ 48.32.010 et seq. (1994).
213. See Ramsey, 922 P.2d at 242.
214. See id. at 243.
215. See id. at 239.
216. See id.
217. See id. at 238.
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with Alaska were a result of its statutory duty under the Washing-
ton Insurance Guaranty Association Act and were not voluntary
actions that availed it of the protection of local laws.21" Noting that,
in many jurisdictions, the act of guaranteeing an obligation in the
forum state alone is enough to invoke personal jurisdiction, the
court held that, where a statutory duty requires the establishment
of contacts with a foreign state, and those contacts result in an ac-
tionable claim, as did WIGA's participation in and refusal to settle
the negligence claim, personal jurisdiction is proper.219 The court
reserved the question of whether statutory conduct that does not
result in the injury in question can be relied upon to establish ju-
risdiction.220
On the issue of whether or not WIGA was immune, WIGA
argued that provisions of its chartering act granted it immunity
from suit arising from the performance of its statutory duties.v
2
The court examined the statute and Washington case law and
found that the reasonable settlement of claims was an element of
WIGA's statutory duty. Thus, failure to settle did not count as
performance of statutory duties and therefore did not give rise to
the immunity clause.tm
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In 1996 the Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska Court of
Appeals decided cases in several areas of constitutional law. The
decisions are divided below into four categories: due process, dou-
ble jeopardy, free speech, and the right to jury trial. The court of
appeals also considered the propriety of probation conditions that
impinged on constitutional rights and one void for vagueness issue.
Some overlap exists between these categories and the section of
Year in Review summarizing cases on constitutional protections in
the criminal law.
A. Due Process
In A. Fred Miller, Attorneys at Law v. Purvis,m the Alaska Su-
preme Court held that the limits imposed on appeals from fee arbi-
tration panels by Alaska Bar Rule 40(u) do not constitute a denial
of constitutional due process. Miller's client had invoked the
Alaska Bar Rules' mandatory fee arbitration provisions, and upon
218. See id. at 241.
219. See id at 242.
220. See id. at 242 n.17.
221. See id- at 243.
222. See il at 244.
223. 921 P.2d 610 (Alaska 1996).
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hearing the case, the arbitration panel concluded that a reasonable
fee payment under the circumstances would have been only $8,500,
rather than the $42,000 charged by Miller.24
Miller argued that mandatory arbitration is constitutional only
when there is the opportunity for judicial review on the merits for
instances of "clearly erroneous findings of fact and arbitrary and
capricious application of the law."' Since Alaska Bar Rule 42(u)
does not provide for judicial review of arbitration on the merits,
Miller argued that such fee arbitration was unconstitutional as a
denial of due process, relying heavily on Bayscene Resident Nego-
tiators v. Bayscene Mobilehome Park.m In Bayscene the California
Court of Appeals struck down a city ordinance requiring binding
arbitration for mobile home rent disputes as denying due process,
stressing the failure of the ordinance to provide for judicial review
of the evidence.2m Miller also relied on dictum in State v. Public
Safety Employees" Ass'n,29 in which the Alaska Supreme Court,
noting the heightened standard of review commanded by compul-
sory "interest" arbitration,"0 adopted an "'arbitrary and capricious
standard"' to be applied henceforth "'as a matter of commonlaw.'" 21
Declining to extend the dictum in Public Safety to the creation
of a bright-line rule applicable to all compulsory arbitration, the
supreme court held that the limits on appeals of fee arbitration im-
posed by Rule 40(u) were not a denial of due process.f 2 The court
also noted the lack of any requirement under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that
requires states to provide litigants with a right to appeal adminis-
trative decisions.23 As the court system has the power to control
224. See id at 611.
225. Id. at 612.
226. ALASKA BAR R. 40(u) (allowing either party to appeal the arbitration
panel's ruling to the superior court on the grounds specified in Alaska's Uniform
Arbitration Act, which in turn allows appeals of awards involving fraud, partial or
prejudicial arbitrators, obvious miscalculations of figures, arbitrators exceeding
their power and the like. See ALAsKA STAT. §§ 09.43.120-.180 (Michie 1996)).
Nowhere does the statute allow for an appeal on the merits. See id.
227. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
228. See id. at 636.
229. 798 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1990).
230. "Interest arbitration is a type of arbitration where the arbitrator estab-
lishes new contract terms rather than deciding how disputes arising under existing
contracts should be resolved." Miller, 921 P.2d at 614 n.3.
231. Id. at 614 (quoting State v. Public Safety Employees' Association, 798
P.2d at 1287-88).
232. See id at 618.
233. See id. at 615 (citing In re LiVolsi, 428 A.2d 1268,1276 (N.J. 1981)).
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the fee arrangements between lawyers and clients, it may also de-
termine the procedure for resolving fee disputes.24 The court
noted that further policy considerations specific to attorney fee ar-
bitration favor a definitive resolution in arbitration without appel-
late review on the merits.235
In Snyder v. State,"l6 the supreme court held that a person ar-
rested for driving while intoxicated ("DWI") had a right under the
due process clause of the Alaska Constitution7 to an independent
blood alcohol test whether or not he submitted to the statutorily
mandated breathalyzer test.238 Snyder failed to provide an ade-
quate breath sample for the breathalyzer but requested that he be
allowed to obtain an independent test of his blood alcohol content.
The police denied his request."
The court noted that the need to protect the rights of indi-
viduals arrested for DWI had increased with the rise in public con-
cern about drinking and driving, and the resulting rise in DWI
penalties and enforcement.24 The court held that due process,
therefore, extended beyond allowing defendents to obtain an inde-
pendent blood test to refute the state's breathalyzer evidence, and
vested in the individual the right to obtain such a test as exculpa-
tory evidence regardless of the possession of breathalyzer evidence
by the state: "[W]e are convinced that the opportunity to obtain
evidence of blood alcohol content is a reasonably necessary safe-
guard, essential to the adequate protection of the accused's right to
a fair trial."24' The court reasoned that, although its ruling would
require the state to facilitate the arrestee's access to an independ-
ent test, such a burden was justified because "the objective evi-
dence is inherently evanescent, is potentially presumptively excul-
patory, and can be obtained by the accused by placing only a slight
burden on the state."24 2 The court noted, however, that the accused
could waive his right to an independent test, and the state could be
234. See id. at 615-17 (citing Anderson v. Elliot, 555 A.2d 1042 (Me. 1989); In
re LiVolsi, 428 A.2d 1268,1276 (N.J. 1981)).
235. See id. at 618. Among the considerations mentioned by the court are "the
need for public confidence in the lawyer/client relationship, the difficulty which
clients of limited income may have in procuring an attorney to represent them
against another attorney, and the vulnerability of clients when litigating against
their former lawyers." Id.
236. 930 P.2d 1274 (Alaska 1996).
237. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7.
238. See Snyder, 930 P.2d at 1277.
239. See id. at 1276.
240. See id. at 1278.
241. Id. at 1277 (citing Gunderson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 792 P.2d 673,
676 (Alaska 1990)).
242. Id. (internal references omitted).
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excused from not affording him an attempt to obtain a test if it
were not feasible to do so.
2 1
B. Double Jeopardy
In Todd v. State,2" the Alaska Supreme Court held that the
imposition of consecutive sentences for felony murder and the
predicate felony of robbery did not violate the double jeopardy
clauses of the state and federal constitutions, and, furthermore, the
predicate felony of robbery was not a lesser included offense of
felony murder. 45 The court cited a string of U.S. Supreme Court
cases for the proposition that the double jeopardy clause, in the
context of multiple charges stemming from the same crime, pro-
tects only against punishment inflicted beyond that which was con-
templated by the legislature when it created separate statutes po-
tentially governing the same act.2' The court then concluded that
the Alaska legislature intended to allow for separate convictions
and cumulative punishments for felony murder and for the predi-
cate felony of robbery, and decided to "view felony murder as a
distinct area of the criminal law not governed by traditional lesser-
included offense analysis." 24
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Skagen,2' the court of appeals
held that a default forfeiture of an unclaimed vehicle did not con-
stitute "punishment" within the meaning of the double jeopardy
clause of the U.S. Constitution until the person asserted a legal in-
terest in the unclaimed vehicle and succeeded in reopening the for-
feiture proceedings. 249 As a result of Skagen's failure to enter an
appearance in the Municipality's forfeiture proceeding instituted
under Alaska Municipal Code section 9.28.026C, the Municipality
obtained a default judgment against the unclaimed vehicle.'0 The
court held that Skagen's default amounted to a failure to assert
ownership."' That failure would bar any claim that the forfeiture
of the vehicle amounted to a punishment for purposes of double
jeopardy. 2 Until such time as Skagen chose to assert a legal inter-
243. See id. (citations omitted).
244. 917 P.2d 674 (Alaska 1996).
245. See id. at 681.
246. See id. at 677-78 (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983);
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161,
165 (1977)).
247. Id. at 681.
248. 920 P.2d 284 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
249. See id. at 288.
250. See id. at 284.
251. See id. at 288.
252. See id
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est in the unclaimed vehicle and succeeded in reopening the forfei-
ture proceedings, the court held that Skagen's double jeopardy
claim would not be ripe.' 3
In Aaron v. City of Ketchikan,2 the court of appeals held that
the double jeopardy clause of the Alaska Constitution did not pre-
clude a city from prosecuting a defendant for refusing to submit to
a breath test, even though the Department of Public Safety had al-
ready taken administrative action against defendant's driver's li-
cense based on the same incident.25 The court of appeals had pre-
viously rejected the same double jeopardy argument under the
federal Constitution in State v. Zerkel," but Aaron argued that the
Alaska Constitution afforded greater protection. ' The court held
that Aaron failed to meet his burden of justifying such a diver-
gence. s8 The court of appeals reiterated its conclusion in Zerkel
that a state does not inflict punishment on a driver by suspending
or revoking his license in administrative proceedings upon evi-
dence of violations of the rules governing the licensed activity. 2 9
C. Right to Jury Trial
In State v. District Courtm the Alaska Court of Appeals held
that the mandatory revocation of a driver's license is a punitive
measure giving rise to a right to jury trial and a right to appointed
counsel under the Alaska Constitution.2' The court affirmed the
district court's grant of a right to jury trial and appointed counsel
for minors charged with underage drinking and possession of alco-
hol.22 The court cited Baker v. City of Fairbanks,263 in which the
Alaska Supreme Court stated that the right to jury trial applied to
any prosecutions that "ma result in the loss of a valuable license,
such as a driver's license." The court emphasized the criminal na-
ture of the proceedings under which the defendants' licenses would
be revoked, noting that Alaska Statutes section 28.15.1856 is a pu-
253. See id.
254. 927 P.2d 335 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
255. See id. at 337.
256. 900 P.2d 744 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
257. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 9; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
258. See Aaron, 927 P.2d at 336.
259. See id. at 337.
260. 927 P.2d 1295 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
261. See id. at 1296-97.
262. See id.
263. 471 P.2d 386, 402 (Alaska 1970).
264. District Court, 927 P.2d at 1296 (quoting Baker, 471 P.2d at 402).
265. ALASKA STAT. § 28.15.185 (Michie 1996) (mandating driver's license
revocation (or revocation of their privilege to obtain one) for minors aged 13-17
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nitive measure imposing a specified punishment for persons found
guilty of a particular criminal offense.2f
D. Miscellaneous
In Cook v. Botelho, 7 the Alaska Supreme Court held that a
governor's constitutional authority to reconsider a political ap-
pointment terminated upon the appointee's assumption of office
and that the legislature may confirm an appointment without being
formally notified by the incumbent governor as is required under
Alaska Statutes section 39.05.080.26 Cook was named by Governor
Hickel to the Alaska Public Utilities Commission while the state
legislature was in recess.269 Governor Knowles assumed office be-
fore the legislature reconvened.2 0 Less than a month after the leg-
islature convened, the new governor informed the legislature that
he would not present Cook's name to the body for confirmation
and stated that any consideration of him would "be of no legal ef-
fect."27' The legislature nevertheless voted to confirm the ap-
272pointment. The state attorney general subsequently brought ac-
tion against Cook, in which the legislature intervened as a
defendant.27 3
The court held that the appointment was complete when Cook
assumed office, and at that time the governor's power to recon-
sider the appointment ended.274 Furthermore, while the governor
was statutorily required to present the appointee's name to the
legislature, 5 the relevant statute set the procedural steps for leg-
islative confirmation, not for the substantive elements of the gov-
ernor's act of appointment.276 The governor could not refuse to act
under the statute, and thus, the governor could not remove Cook
from office without following established removal statutes.Y7 The
court also held that the legislature could confirm an appointee,
once the governor's role in the appointment process was complete,
without awaiting the governor to present the appointee to the leg-
convicted of drinking or possessing alcoholic beverages).
266. See District Court, 927 P.2d at 1296-97.
267. 921 P.2d 1126 (Alaska 1996).
268. ALAsKA STAT. § 39.05.080 (Michie 1996).
269. See Cook, 921 P.2d at 1127.
270. See id-
271. Id.
272- See id.
273. See id
274. See id. at 1129.
275. See ALASKA STAT. § 39.05.080(1) (Michie 1996).
276. See Cook, 921 P.2d at 1130.
277. See id.; ALASKA STAT. § 42.05.035 (Michie 1996).
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islature"8 Finally, the court held that Cook was validly appointed
to a full term, finding that the Alaska Constitution and appoint-
ment statutes allow the governor to appoint an Commission mem-
ber to a full term while the legislature is in recess and allow the
legislature to confirm such an appointment. 9
In Carlson v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission,M
the supreme court heard a second appeal from a class action chal-
lenging the state's practice of charging nonresident commercial
fishers licensing and limited entry permit fees that are three times
those charged to resident commercial fishers."' In Carlson Im the
case was remanded so that the superior court could address the
class's Privileges and Immunities Clause claim."3 Specifically, the
issue to be considered on remand was "'whether all fees and taxes
which must be paid to the state by a nonresident to enjoy the state-
provided benefit are substantially equal to those which must be
paid by similarly situated residents when the residents' pro rata
shares of state revenues to which nonresidents make no contribu-
tion are taken into account."'" In making this assessment, the
class proposed a "per capita" formula that computed the contribu-
tion made by each state resident to the cost of maintaining the
commercial fisheries and compared this figure with the fee differ-
ential. The state offered a "pro rata" formula that compared the
total contributions made by state residents with the total fees paid
by nonresidents.2 The superior court accepted the class's per
capita formula, and the state appealed.'
On the second appeal, the supreme court concluded that the
class's per capita formula was the appropriate formula for deter-
mining whether the fee differential violates the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause because it allowed for a weighing of the relative
burden imposed on resident and nonresident commercial fisher-
men.2 Therefore, the case was remanded for application of the
per capita formula. 9
278. See Cook, 921 P.2d at 1130.
279. See id. at 1132.
280. 919 P.2d 1337 (Alaska 1996).
281. See id
282. Carlson v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 98 P.2d 1269
(Alaska 1990).
283. See Carlson, 919 P.2d at 1338.
284. Id at 1339 (quoting Carlson I, 798 P.2d at 1278).
285. See id
286. See id.
287. See id.
288. See id. at 1343.
289. See id. at 1344.
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In Pullen v. Ulmer,290 the supreme court held that wildlife can
be characterized as a state asset subject to appropriation, and that
a proposed initiative compelling a particular allocation of wildlife
among competing users is an appropriation of state property and
therefore contrary to Article XI, Section 7 of the Alaska Constitu-
tion.29' The case concerned a proposed initiative that would pro-
vide that subsistence users, personal users and sport fisheries
would receive a portion of the salmon harvest before the remain-
ing harvestable salmon were allocated to other users.2
The court first held that insofar as the loss, use or exploitation
of wildlife directly affected the state's fish, wildlife is a state asset,
even though other incidents of ownership may not be present in
the state's legal relationship to its asset.29 As such, the state had a
strong interest in salmon migrating within its waters, 294 and this in-
terest prevented appropriation of these fish by initiative. 5
Second, the court held that the proposed initiative was an ap-
propriation of state property.296 Drawing from some of its previous
decisions,297 the court concluded that the constitutional prohibition
embodied by Article XI, section 7 was meant to prevent electoral
majority self-enrichment with state assets and to preserve to the
legislature the power to make decisions regarding the allocation of
state assets.2 8 The court concluded that the proposed initiative
would violate both of these objectives, and, therefore, granted the
requested permanent injunction.'l
In Scudero v. State, " the court of appeals held that a First
Amendment defense to a fishing law violation was a question of
law and was therefore properly decided by the judge.'O Scudero, a
Metlakatlan, claimed that the alleged violation of three fishing
statutes was an act of civil disobedience to protest the state's impo-
sition of fishing regulations on Metlakatlans, and that the civil
disobedience amounted to constitutionally protected free speech .3
290. 923 P.2d 54 (Alaska 1996).
291. See id. at 60, 63.
292. See id at 55.
293. See icL at 59.
294. See id at 60.
295. See id.
296. See id. at 63.
297. See id- at 61-63 (citing City of Fairbanks v. Fairbanks Convention & Visi-
tors Bureau, 818 P.2d 1153 (Alaska 1991); McAlpine v. University of Alaska, 762
P.2d 81 (Alaska 1988); Thomas v. Bailey, 595 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1979)).
298. See id.
299. See id. at 63-64.
300. 917 P.2d 683 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
301. See id. at 685.
302. See id.
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The trial judge ruled that Scudero's actions did not constitute
speech and refused to instruct the jury on Scudero's civil disobedi-
ance defense!"
The court, relying on the Model Penal Code and Alaska Rules
of Criminal Procedure 12(b),' held that although the right to trial
by jury entitled a defendant to have a jury determine whether each
of the essential elements of the crime has been established, that
right did not entitle a defendant to have a jury resolve extrinsic
factual issues that pertain to legal defenses but are not directly
linked to an essential element of the offense.305
In Turney v. State,O the court of appeals held that, for a de-
fendant to be convicted of trespass on publicly owned property
under Alaska Statutes section 11.46.350(a)(2) for failure to leave
public property "after being lawfully directed to do so by the per-
son in charge [of the property], ' '3 7 the defendant's failure to leave
must be contemporaneous with the lawful order to leave."' The
court held that a public official may not permanently ban a person
from a public facility, even if such a ban were contingent on the in-
tent of the person to engage in some prohibited conduct, because
this ban would not be contemporaneous with the person's failure
to leave.3M
The court also held that not all speech protected by the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is exempted from the defini-
tion of "noise" in the disorderly conduct statute.3 10 Rather, the
court construed the statute to exempt only those exercising pro-
tected First Amendment rights, thus preserving the state's preroga-
tive reasonably to regulate the time, place and manner in which
free speech rights are exercised.3 1 The court noted that a blanket
exception in the disorderly conduct statute for all speech protected
by the First Amendment would lead to the irrational result that
loud unruly protests in the middle of the night in quiet neighbor-
hoods would be unregulated by the disorderly conduct statute, as
long as they were of a political nature. The court rejected this out-
303. See id.
304. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(4)(b) (1985); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 12(b).
305. See Scudero, 917 P.2d at 686 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(4)(b)
(1985); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 12(b)).
306. 922 P.2d 283 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
307. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.350(a)(2) (Michie 1996).
308. See Turney, 922 P.2d at 288.
309. See id at 289.
310. See id. at 292; ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.110(a)(2) (Michie 1996) (disorderly
conduct occurs if "in a public place or in a private place of another without con-
sent .... the person makes unreasonably loud noise").
311. See Tumey, 922 P.2d at 292.
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come.
312
In State v. Lawler,"' the court of appeals reversed the district
court's ruling that Alaska Administrative Code title 5, section
27.131(f), a strict liability regulation defining the minimum mesh
size for fishing nets, was so vague that it violated due process un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Lawler was cited for fishing with an undersized gillnet.315 The
court of appeals held that Lawler failed to meet his burden of
proving either that the regulation's definition of mesh size was un-
reasonably vague or that he had made reasonable efforts to act
lawfully.3 Noting that participants in a closely regulated commer-
cial activity such as commercial fishing may be held to a higher
standard of compliance than ordinary citizens,317 the court rejected
Lawler's "tacit assumption that the state was constitutionally re-
quired to give [him] an error-free and mathematically precise way
to determine his net's mesh size before he undertook any commer-
cial fishing activity.
'011
VI. CRIMINAL LAW
The past year brought a wide variety of criminal law cases be-
fore the Alaska Supreme Court and the Alaska Court of Appeals.
These diverse cases have been divided into two main categories,
constitutional protections and general criminal law. These catego-
ries are further divided into more specific areas.
A. Constitutional Protections
1. Search and Seizure. In D'Antorio v. State,319 the Alaska
Supreme Court held illegal a police search of personal papers that
had been sustained by the trial court under the "second glance"
doctrine .3  D'Antorio was arrested in Ohio in compliance with an
321
outstanding arrest warrant, and an Ohio police detective
inventoried the items in his car at the time of his arrest.3u Because
312. See icL
313. 919 P.2d 1364 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
314. See idt at 1366.
315. See id at 1367.
316. See id. (citing State v. Martushev, 846 P.2d 144, 149 (Alaska Ct. App.
1993)).
317. See id. at 1366 (citing Martushev, 846 P.2d at 150).
318. Id.
319. 926 P.2d 1158 (Alaska 1996).
320. See id. at 1159.
321. See id.
322. See id. at 1160.
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there was an outstanding Alaska arrest warrant for D'Antorio, an
Alaska state trooper later took possession of certain papers found
in D'Antorio's car and, without a search warrant, read and copied
them.3"
The supreme court held that under federal and Ohio law, a
detailed search of the personal papers by the inventorying detec-
tive would have exceeded the permissible scope of an inventory
search. Relying in part on United States v. Grill,324 the court of ap-
peals concluded that police officers are allowed a "second glance"
at seized property equal in scope and intensity to their first lawful
view of the property.3" But the supreme court held that, because
the state trooper's detailed examination of the personal papers
greatly exceeded the Ohio police detective's authority to examine
the papers while inventorying them, the State Trooper's search was
not valid.326 According to the court, D'Antorio retained a privacy
expectation in the personal papers that did not evaporate upon
their being inventoried.3" The court reversed D'Antorio's convic-
tion and remanded for a new trial.3"
In State v. Page,329 the court of appeals extended State v.
Glass33° to hold that police in certain instances must obtain a war-
rant before recording people's activities on video.33' Police video-
taped Page delivering cocaine to a police informant while in a pri-
vate residence.3 2 The state conceded that under Glass the
conversation between Page and the informant was protected from
recording and that there were no exigent circumstances that would
have excused the police from obtaining a warrant.33 The court
held that if the conversation would have been protected under
Glass from electronic monitoring, and furthermore if Page had a
reasonable expectation of "visual privacy," then the police had an
obliation to obtain a warrant before videotaping Page's activi-
ties.
In Carter v. State,335 the court of appeals held that a search
323. See id.
324. 484 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1973).
325. See D'Antorio, 926 P.2d at 1166.
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. See id. at 1168.
329. 911 P.2d 513 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
330. 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978) (holding that police must obtain a warrant be-
fore secretly recording people's conversations).
331. See Page, 911 P.2d at 515.
332. See id.
333. See id.
334. See id.
335. 910 P.2d 619 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
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warrant obtained to search a residence was issued without suffi-
cient probable cause and therefore certain evidence should have
been suppressed in superior court.336 Carter had been charged with
one count of misconduct involving a controlled substance for
growing marijuana at his residence.337 The search warrant had
been obtained after the police presented evidence based on
anonymous informants' statements and on evidence of a suspicious
pattern of electrical consumption obtained from utility records.338
The court applied the two-prong test articulated by the U.S.
Supreme Court, in Aguilar v. Texas339 and Spinelli v. United
States,3 O which presently governs a probable cause analysis of Arti-
cle I, sections 14 and 22, of the Alaska Constitution. 1 The test re-
quires that a confidential informant's basis of knowledge and his
veracity be established when a search warrant is based on the in-
formant's hearsay.M2 The court held here that this test had not
been satisfied with regard to the anonymous tips. 43 The addition
of the evidence concerning electrical consumption to the four
anonymous tips was insufficient to establish probable cause to
support a search warrant since unusual electrical consumption has
no inherent incriminatory value.3"
In Lloyd v. State,345 the court of appeals held that a person who
calls "Crime Stoppers" does not automatically qualify as a citizen
informant3 6 since the information relayed by the caller alleging
criminal misconduct by itself does not provide the court issuing the
search warrant with any evidence as to the informant's intrinsic
trustworthiness. 347 The court noted that traditionally, a distinction
has been drawn between police informants and citizen informants,
with more relaxed requirements for establishing the credibility of
the latter.3 " The informant's status must be determined based on
336. See id. at 621.
337. See id.
338. See id-
339. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
340. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
341. ALASKA CONsT. art I, §§ 14,22.
342. See Carter, 910 P.2d at 623.
343. See id.
344. See id. at 625.
345. 914 P.2d 1282 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
346. In order to issue a search warrant based on an informant's information,
the reliability of that informant must be established. To establish the reliability of
a citizen informant, "no showing of prior reliability is required; the police need
only verify 'some details of the information."' Id. at 1286 (quoting Erikson v.
State, 507 P.2d 508, 518 (Alaska 1973)).
347. See id. at 1287.
348. See id- at 1284.
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the specific facts submitted to the issuing court so that it can assess
the informant's probable motivesY9 The court found that the
Aguilar-Spinelli analysis350 formally applies to cases where a search
warrant is issued, and therefore, the evidence presented to the is-
suing court must in itself establish the informant's status as a citi-
zen informant.35" ' The court concluded that the credibility of the in-
formant was not established by independent police corroboration;
since no other evidence of the caller's motive was offered to the
court issuing the search warrant, other than evidence that an in-
formant placed the call to the "Crime Stoppers" line, reliance on
the tip failed the Aguilar-Spinelli credibility prong.352
In Betts v. State,353 the court of appeals upheld the legality of a
warrant that authorized the search of all persons present in a
trailer identified by an informant as the site of drug dealing.34 The
court held that it is proper to authorize the search of all persons
present when the evidence offered to support a search warrant is
sufficient to indicate the likelihood of any person present at a par-
ticular location being involved in the criminal activity that
prompted the warrant. 5  The court appended the opinion of the
superior court to its own opinion, which noted such evidence was
more likely to be sufficient at a private residence than at a large fa-
cility open to the public. 356 In this case, evidence showed that the
residents had a history of involvement with drugs and that a num-
ber of people in the residence had been viewed using drugs within
ninety minutes prior to the issue of the warrant.
In Joubert v. State,38 the court of appeals held that a condition
of probation that requires the probationer to consent to a search of
his house or person at the request of his probation officer does not
serve as prospective consent to a search at any time by the offi-
349. See id.
350. This analysis is derived from Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), and formally governs the determi-
nation of probable cause in Alaska. See State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 324-35
(Alaska 1985).
351. See Lloyd, 914 P.2d at 1287.
352. See id. at 1288, 1290.
353. 920 P.2d 763 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
354. See id. at 765.
355. See id. at 764 (citing State v. DeSimone, 288 A.2d 849, 850 (N.J. 1972); 2
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE; A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 4.5(e), at 345-46 (3d ed. 1996)).
356. See id. at 767-68 (citing People v. Betts, 456 N.Y.S. 2d 278, 279 (N.Y.
App.Div. 1982); DeSimone, 288 A.2d at 850).
357. See id. at 767.
358. 926 P.2d 1191 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
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cer.359 Joubert's probation had been revoked after cocaine was
found in his house by his probation officer. The officer had ob-
tained permission to enter the house from Joubert's daughter, who
lived there, but had not obtained permission to search the house
and had not spoken at all to Joubert, who was not present at the
time of the search.3" On appeal, the court held that, even if a pro-
bationer's rights to Fourth Amendment protection are somewhat
diminished, societal interest in protecting the rights of others who
might be affected by an outstanding right to search a probationer's
house, such as room-mates or family members, outweighed the
state's interest in conducting such searches to monitor probation-
ers."' The evidence obtained by the search of Joubert's house was
thus obtained illegally and should have been excluded. Therefore,
the trial court's order revoking Joubert's probation was reversed.62
In Waters v. State," the court of appeals held that police offi-
cers executing a search warrant were prohibited from searching
personal property of visitors in a personal residence only when
they knew or should have known that the article in question be-
longed to a visitor."' The court held that even a strong suspicion of
ownership by a visitor does not constitute actual knowledge.365
In McClelland v. State,3" the court of appeals held that an odor
of marijuana at defendant's house, combined with evidence of ab-
normally high electrical usage at the residence, was sufficient to
give rise to probable cause to issue a warrant to search defendant's
house for evidence related to a suspected marijuana-growing op-
eration."'
2. Miscellaneous. In State v. Fremgen,"' the Alaska Supreme
Court stated that a refusal to allow the mistake-of-age defense in a
case of statutory rape would violate the Alaska Constitution,
because it would impose criminal liability without criminal
intent.369 The court upheld a long line of cases that established that
to convict a person of a serious crime without the requirement of
criminal intent would be a deprivation of liberty without due
359. See id. at 1194.
360. See id. at 1192.
361. See id at 1193 (citing Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1243 (Alaska 1977)).
362. See id. at 1194-95.
363. 924 P.2d 437 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
364. See id. at 439.
365. See id.
366. 928 P.2d 1224 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
367. See id. at 1226-27.
368. 914 P.2d 1244 (Alaska 1996).
369. See id. at 1246.
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370process of law.
In Javed v. Department of Public Safety, Division of Motor
Vehicles,3" the supreme court held that a statute limiting a license
revocation hearing to issues concerning the reasonableness of an
arresting officer's belief that the person was driving while intoxi-
cated violates due process.3 2 Javed was accused of driving while
intoxicated; his defense was that a friend was driving. At the first
of three hearings for the license revocation proceedings, Javed re-
quested that three eye witnesses to events surrounding his arrest
be subpoenaed.374 The hearing officer subpoenaed the three wit-
nesses after the second hearing.375 None of the subpoenaed wit-
nesses appeared at the last hearing? 6 Nevertheless, the hearing of-
ficer affirmed the license revocation, stating that the law requires
only that the arresting officer have reasonable grounds to believe
that Javed was driving.'
The court held that it was a violation of due process for Javed
to be prohibited from contesting that he was driving.37 It relied
upon Thorne v. Department of Public Safet' for the proposition
that at a revocation hearing, the accused "'must be granted the op-
portunity to fully contest issues of 'central importance' to the revo-
cation decision. "'O The court held that the statute was facially
constitutional and, under the statutory saving clause,38 1 is invalid
only under circumstances-such as in this case-where due process
requires that a defendant have the opportunity to address con-
tested issues other than the reasonableness of the police officer's
belief that Javed was driving while intoxicated.3 2
In West v. State,3  the court of appeals, on an issue of first im-
pression in the state, affirmed a superior court's conclusion that
police communication with a barricaded defendant who was hold-
ing police at bay did not constitute an interrogation requiring a Mi-
370. See id. at 1245.
371. 921 P.2d 620 (Alaska 1996).
372. See id. at 623-24.
373. See id. at 621.
374. See id. at 622.
375. See id.
376. See id.
377. See id.
378. See id. at 624.
379. 774 P.2d 1326, 1331 (Alaska 1989).
380. Javed, 921 P.2d at 623 (quoting Thorne, 774 P.2d at 1331 (quoting Cham-
pion v. State, Dep't of Public Safety, 721 P.2d 131, 133 (Alaska 1986))).
381. See ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.030 (Michie 1996).
382. See Javed, 921 P.2d at 625.
383. 923 P.2d 110 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
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randa warning."l West had communicated with a state trooper for
three and one-half hours by telephone while remaining in his
brother's cabin and threatening to blow up the cabin should the
police approach."5 The court noted that its holding was consistent
with those of all other jurisdictions that had considered the issue.386
In State v. Summerville," the court of appeals held that an
amendment to Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure 16 allowing re-
ciprocal discovery was unconstitutional.' Summerville had been
charged with two counts of first-degree sexual assault and one
count of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor."' The state re-
quested that Summerville provide discovery pursuant to the
amended Criminal Rule 162l" Summerville sought a protective or-
der, claiming that the amendment violated the state constitution's
privilege against self-incrimination.' The court of appeals agreed
with the superior court's conclusion that Rule 16's court-ordered
disclosure by the defense of names, addresses, phone numbers and
statements of potential defense witnesses was expressly prohibited
by the Alaska Supreme Court's holding in Scott v. State.3 Because
the legislation amending Criminal Rule 16 included language stat-
ing that the provisions of the newly enacted rule were not sever-
able, the court of appeals joined the superior court in finding that
the new rule was entirely invalid and that, therefore, the pre-
existing form of the rule would control.3
In Petersen v. State,3 the court of appeals upheld the constitu-
tionality of state stalking statutes against a challenge by three de-
fendants convicted of first- and second-degree stalking. The de-
fendants asserted that the statutory definition of stalking, as
codified in Alaska Statutes section 11.41.270,311 was unconstitution-
384. See iL at 113.
385. See id. at 112.
386. See id. at 113.
387. 926 P.2d 465 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
388. See id- at 467.
389. See id. at 466.
390. See id.
391. See id-
392. See id. at 466-67 (citing Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 786 (Alaska 1974)
(holding that requiring the accused to disclose the names and addresses of wit-
nesses and statements of witnesses violated the accused's state constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination)).
393. See id. at 467.
394. 930 P.2d 414 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
395. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.270 (Michie 1996). The statute defines the crime of
stalking in the second degree as being committed when a "person knowingly en-
gages in a course of conduct that recklessly places another person in fear of death
or physical injury, or in fear of the death or physical injury of a family member."
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ally vague.396 The court of appeals considered this in two parts, as a
substantive due process claim and, alternatively, as an overbreadth
claim because the statutory definition includes innocent conduct
that cannot be properly criminalized.3" Considered alone, the
court noted that the definition of "nonconsensual contact" is
broad; however, the court stated that the statute required the state
additionally to prove the, requisite mens rea of knowing engage-
ment in such contact, that such contact place another person in
fear of injury or death and that the defendant act "recklessly" with
regard to this result. 98
The court noted that, while there were troubling hypothetical
cases that may more strongly, put into contention the constitution-
ality of the statute's definition of stalking, none of the cases before
the court were "borderline" cases.399 The court concluded that the
state's stalking statutes are constitutional and do not on their face
prohibit constitutionally protected speech or conduct.4'
In Williams v. State, 1 the court of appeals held that the trial
court's judgment ordering the defendant to participate in and
"complete" a treatment program offered by the prison did not ex-
ceed a court's statutory authority to order a defendant to "comply
with" a treatment program.' Williams had challenged a court or-
der that, while in prison, he participate in and complete a sex of-
fender treatment program, claiming that the court only had statu-
tory authority to order a defendant to "'participate in or comply
with [a] treatment plan.""' The court of appeals held that order-
ing a defendant "to participate and complete" a treatment pro-
gram was synonymous with ordering him "to participate in or
comply with" such a plan.4 4 Therefore, the court of appeals upheld
the trial court's sentence as within its authority. 5
Id. § 11.41.270(a). The statute further defines "course of conduct" as "repeated
acts of nonconsensual contact involving the victim or a family member," and de-
fines "nonconsensual contact" as "any contact with another person that is initi-
ated or continued without that person's consent, that is beyond the scope of con-
sent provided by that person, or that is in disregard of that person's expressed
desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued." Id. § 11.41.270(b)(1), (b)(3).
The statute goes on to list several examples of "nonconsensual contacts." See id.
§ 11.41.270(b)(3)(A)-(G).
396. See Petersen, 930 P.2d at 424.
397. See id
398. See id at425.
399. Id at 428-29.
400. See id at 431.
401. 924 P.2d 104 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
402. Id. at 106.
403. Id (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.015(a)(10) (Michie 1996)).
404. Id.
405. See id.
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In Close v. Municipality of Anchorage,4 6 the court of appeals
held that a jury can consider a charged offense and a lesser-
included offense in any order without violating the double jeop-
ardy clause.4 Close was charged with reckless driving, but the
jury, upon Close's request, was instructed to consider the lesser-
included offense of careless driving.4°s Although the jury found
him guilty of both offenses, the court of appeals held that, even if
the jury had deliberated on the lesser-included offense before the
charged offense, "[j]ury verdicts have no preclusive effect under
the double jeopardy clause until the trial judge accepts the jury's
verdicts."O In this case, the trial judge had merged the lesser of-
fense with the greater offense for a single conviction of reckless
driving.4
10
In Hathaway v. State,4 ' the court of appeals held that a defen-
dant can be convicted of only one count of arson in the first degree
if he or she is charged with setting only one fire and damaging only
one piece of property.412 Therefore, the court merged into one
count Hathaway's conviction of nine counts of arson, based on the
nine victims who had been placed in danger of serious physical in-
jury due to the apartment building fire he set.4" The court also
held that the double jeopardy clause of the Alaska Constitution
does not prohibit both a conviction of arson and a conviction of as-
sault, since the crime of arson is by origin a property crime requir-
ing intent to damage property, while the crime of assault involves
the defendant placing another person in fear of imminent serious
physical injury. 4
In Samson v. State,415 the court of appeals held that there was
no reasonable expectation of privacy in utility records.4 6 The po-
lice had obtained a search warrant authorizing them to obtain rec-
ords of a power company which showed the history of power con-
sumption at Samson's residence.4 7 Based upon these records, the
police obtained a second warrant to search Samson's home when
406. 911 P.2d 41 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
407. See id. at 43.
408. See id. at 42.
409. Id. at 43.
410. See id. at 42.
411. 925 P.2d 1343 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
412. See id. at 1345.
413. See id. at 1344-45.
414. See id. at 1345-46.
415. 919 P.2d 171 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
416. See id. at 173.
417. See id. at 171.
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they discovered controlled substances.418
Samson argued that the state needed probable cause to ex-
amine his utility records.419 The superior court held that the Sam-
son did not have a subjective expectation of privacy in the records,
and even if he did have such an expectation, that society was not
prepared to consider it a reasonable expectation.
In Perry v. State,42' the court of appeals held that the trial court
should have allowed the defendant to change his plea of no contest
to charges of assault and murder, given that he was under great
time pressure in deciding how to plead and he had difficulty with
his attorney, and that the record showed he was not trying to ma-
nipulate the system by changing his plea." Perry was indicted on
two counts of first-degree assault and one count of attempted mur-
der in connection with an altercation aboard a fishing vessel.4z
Shortly before the trial began, Perry filed a pro se motion to dis-
charge his counsel, alleging that his counsel was not prepared to go
to trial. The trial judge denied the motion and ordered the trial to
proceed as scheduled, even though defense counsel was out of
town at that time.4 Perry then called his attorney to discuss a pos-
sible plea agreement with the state. After several time-restricted
discussions, Perry agreed to plead no contest, but several hours
later he decided to withdraw his plea and immediately contacted
the district attorney's office. The motion to withdraw was not filed
until the day after the scheduled trial date, and the trial judge de-
nied Perry's motion, finding that he was attempting to have the
trial canceled by manipulating the state's ability to procure wit-
nesses and personnel.42 The court of appeals found this argument
unpersuasive. Although the state would clearly be prejudiced by
allowing Perry to withdraw his plea, because the trial would be
held in Undaska, a remote area in the Aleutian chain, the court
found that the prejudice was not so substantial as to justify denying
Perry his right to trial. 6
418. See id.
419. See id.
420. See id. at 173.
421. 928 P.2d 1227 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
422. See id. at 1229-30.
423. See id. at 1227.
424. See id. at 1228.
425. See id. at 1229.
426. See id. at 1230.
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B. General Criminal Law
1. Evidence. In McCracken v. State the Alaska Court of
Appeals held that the trial court properly admitted into evidence
the defendant's statements to a police officer immediately
following the crime, since the defendant did not attempt to invoke
his right to remain silent and because the statements were made
voluntarily.4' The court of appeals also held that a homicide
defendant raising the defense of self-defense should be permitted
to introduce evidence as to the victim's character derived not only
from personal experience but also from what others had told the
defendant about the victim's propensity for violence and what the
victim, himself, had told the defendant about his past violent
actions. 29 The court found that this type of evidence is not
hearsay; rather it helps the jury assess whether the defendant's
actions were reasonable and may also help the jury determine who
was the original aggressor.3 The court of appeals found that the
trial court had erred in limiting McCracken's evidence of the
victim's violent character to that which McCracken had personally
observed, and, therefore, reversed the judgment.43'
In Motta v. State432 the court of appeals found that the supe-
rior court erroneously denied a motion to suppress evidence of
Motta's confession to police.33 The court noted that, under Mi-
randa v. Arizona 43 a defendant was entitled to be advised regard-
ing his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution before being subjected to a custodial interrogation.4 3
The court then found that an interrogation that had begun as vol-
untary and non-custodial436 had become sufficiently confrontational
by the time of Motta's confession that Motta should have been ap-
praised of his Miranda rights.4'
The superior court's denial of the motion to suppress the con-
fession likely would not have been harmless error if the confession
was the only account of the offense to come from Motta, but Motta
testified at trial in his own defense as to a version of events that
427. 914 P.2d 893 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
428. See id. at 897.
429. See id. at 898.
430. See iL
431. See id at 899.
432. 911 P.2d 34 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
433. See id& at 39.
434. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
435. See Motta, 911 P.2d at 37.
436. See id. at 38.
437. See id. at 39.
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closely paralleled his tainted confession."8 The court of appeals di-
rected the parties. to file supplemental briefs to address whether
the court's harmless error analysis should consider whether Motta
might not have testified or might have testified differently if the
superior court had not erred in denying his motion to suppress. 9
In another court of appeals case dealing with a defendant's
confession to police, Cole v. State,"4 the court reversed Cole's con-
viction for second-degree sexual abuse of a minor, finding that
Cole's confession was involuntary and inadmissible because it had
been obtained by psychological coercion or improper induce-
ment." Cole had been interrogated by police for seventy minutes,
during which he confessed to touching his adoptive sixteen-year-
old daughter for his own sexual gratification." r On appeal, Cole
claimed that deceptive interrogation techniques were used and that
the confession should be inadmissible.443 After a detailed factual
inquiry into the interrogation, the court found that the interroga-
tor's ruse regarding the threatened use of a polygraph test and the
interrogator's deceptive claim concerning evidence obtained by a
Glass warrant' were both improper.445 Relying in part on United
States v. Guerrero,6 "the totality of these circumstances" led the
court to conclude that the confession was involuntary and should
have been suppressed. 7
In Brown v. Municipality of Anchorage,0 the court of appeals
held that the superior court had not erred in admitting evidence
that the defendant had shot and killed a dog ten months prior to
his present conviction for shooting a dog."9 The court of appeals
found that evidence of the prior shooting was probative of Brown's
438. See id. at 40.
439. See icL at 41.
440. 923 P.2d 820 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
441. See id. at 832.
442. See id. at 821-22.
443. See id. at 822.
444. State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978) (holding that, under the Alaska
Constitution, police officers must obtain a search warrant before engaging in sur-
reptitious electronic monitoring or recording of conversations without both par-
ties' consent).
445. See Cole, 923 P.2d at 828, 830.
446. 847 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating the test for voluntariness of a con-
fession as being "whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the gov-
ernment obtained the statement by physical or psychological coercion or by im-
proper inducement so that the suspect's will was overborne").
447. Cole, 923 P.2d at 832.
448. 915 P.2d 654 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
449. See id. at 656.
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state of mind, his intent, and the lack of mistake.40 The court also
held that the superior court did not err in its jury instructions that
provided for an affirmative defense of self-defense to the charge of
cruelty to animals.451 Finally, the court held that the jury's verdict
was not inconsistent in acquitting Brown of unlawfully discharging
a firearm while convicting him of cruelty to animals, since the jury
could logically conclude that shooting to frighten the dog was rea-
sonable, but shooting to kill the dog was not reasonable.4
In Williams v. State,453 the court of appeals, in a case involving
four counts of sexual abuse of a minor, held that the introduction
of testimony concerning the behavior of sex abuse victims, con-
ceded by the state to be inadmissible when used to establish that
an alleged victim was in fact abused, was harmless error.4 4 With
regard to one of the two victims, the court reasoned that, since
Williams used a mistaken assailant defense, and essentially con-
ceded that this victim had in fact been sexually abused, the error
had no prejudicial effect.455 With respect to the other victim, Wil-
liams claimed both the mistaken identity offense and, alternatively,
that there was no "sexual contact" as defined in the statute. "
Nevertheless, the court held that the admission of the testimony
was harmless since Williams in essence conceded that someone
had at least attempted to have sexual contact with the victim, and
thus the jury could reasonably conclude that it would be unsur-
prising for the second victim to behave like a sexual abuse victim.45
In Natkong v. State,4 8 the court of appeals affirmed the defen-
dant's convictions of first degree sexual assault of a minor, holding
that prior inconsistent statements of the victim could be introduced
into evidence where the victim effectively denied the truth of the
statements at trial.49 The victim had told several people, including
her mother, a social worker and a doctor, that she had been re-
peatedly sexually assaulted by Natkong, her father.4 At trial, the
victim responded to questions regarding the incident by saying that
she could not remember that the incidents happened." The prose-
450. See id.
451. See id. at 660.
452. See id. at 661.
453. 928 P.2d 600 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
454. See id. at 603.
455. See id at 603-04.
456. See id. at 604.
457. See id,
458. 925 P.2d 672 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
459. See idU at 678.
460. See id- at 673-74.
461. See id. at 674-75.
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cution, over objection, introduced the victim's earlier statements
under Alaska Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(A), which states that, de-
spite the ordinary rule against hearsay, a witness's prior inconsis-
tent statements are admissible to prove the truth of the matters
contained in them.42 The defense asserted, on appeal, that the
statements did not fall under that rule because the witness's non-
responsive testimony did not amount to her having testified at
trial, a requirement under 801(d)(1)(A).463 The court of appeals
held that, under its earlier holding in Van Hatten v. State,4"
"'[w]hen a witness deliberately seeks to avoid testimony by claim-
ing loss of memory in response to specific questions, prior state-
ments of the witness relating to the subject matter
are["]inconsistent["] within the meaning of Evidence Rule[] ...
8O1(d)(1)(A)."' 5 The court also noted that this holding is consis-
tent with the current interpretation of the equivalent Federal Rule
of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A).4'
In Cornwall v. State,67 the court of appeals held that the trial
court committed reversible error when, in a custodial interference
conviction, it excluded testimony by defendant's attorney con-
cerning what he had told defendant about the legal effect of a su-
perior court's custody orders.' The court held that the testimony
was relevant to whether Cornwall had the requisite mental state.
Cornwall's attorney had informed her that the state had improp-
erly taken emergency custody of her daughter and Cornwall could
take her daughter and leave. 70 The court of appeals held that the
Cornwall's conversation with her attorney was relevant, not under
a "mistake of law" defense, but rather to refute the required find-
ing that Cornwall knew that she had no legal right to take or keep
the child from the custodian.471
In State v. Case,47 the court of appeals held that the standard
set forth in Stem v. State' should be used to determine whether
the admission of improper evidence before a grand jury, in the
form of an inadmissible statement, required the dismissal of the
462. See id. at 675-76 (citing ALASKA R. EVID. 801(D)(1)(a)).
463. See id at 676.
464. 666 P.2d 1047 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
465. Natkong, 925 P.2d at 677 (quoting Van Hatten, 666 P.2d at 1051).
466. See id at 677-78 (citations omitted).
467. 915 P.2d 640 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
468. See id at 648.
469. See id. at 647-49.
470. See id. at 643.
471. See id. at 648-49.
472. 928 P.2d 1239 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
473. 827 P.2d 442 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
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defendant's indictment.474 The Stern test requires the superior
court to first subtract the improper evidence from the total case
heard by the grand jury to determine whether the remaining evi-
dence was legally sufficient to indict the defendant. Then, the
court must determine the degree to which the improper evidence
might have unfairly prejudiced the grand jury's decision.45 In ap-
plying the Stern test, the court of appeals found that since the rec-
ord indicated that sufficient admissible evidence, mostly eyewit-
ness testimony, existed to indict the defendant, the inadmissible
statements did not unfairly prejudice the grand jury's considera-
tions.4 6 The court of appeals then found that the trial court had
erred in applying the Chapman v. California test.47 holding that
this test could only be applied if an error of constitutional dimen-
sion had occurred at trial, and therefore the court reversed the
dismissal of the indictment.478
In Johnson v. State,47 9 the court of appeals held that evidence
voluntarily submitted by defendant's sister to police following an
illegal search of his living quarters was sufficiently attenuated from
the illegal search to purge the taint of illegality; therefore, the ex-
clusionary rule did not operate to bar the evidence.4 '0 The court
noted that the test of attenuation does not turn on whether the
challenged evidence would have been discovered but for the illegal
violation!"t
Finally, in Hazelwood v. StatePf the court of appeals declined
to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine to evidence tainted by
being illegally derived, absent a showing that the evidence would
have been otherwise inevitably discovered in light of "either events
already in progress or procedures already in place." '' The court
held that there was insufficient evidence in the record to admit
evidence regarding Hazelwood's blood-alcohol content and Ha-
zelwood's own statements under the inevitable discovery doc-
474. See Case, 928 P.2d at 1241.
475. See Stern, 827 P.2d at 445-56.
476. See Case, 928 P.2d at 1241.
477. 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (requiring courts to apply a harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt standard).
478. See Case, 928 P.2d at 1241.
479. 919 P.2d 767 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
480. See id. at 769-71 (citing United States v. Shephard, 21 F.3d 933, 939 (9th
Cir. 1994) (outlining a three-factor test for evaluating the attenuation of evidence
seized following an unlawful search)).
481. See id. at 769.
482. 912 P.2d 1266 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
483. IME at 1271. The inevitable discovery doctrine allows admission of illegally
obtained evidence if the evidence would have "inevitably" been discovered any-
way using proper police methods. See id.
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trine.'
2. Criminal Procedure. In State v. Gilbert,485 the Alaska
Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's comment on the
defendant's failure to call an alibi witness was harmless error.486 In
rebuttal closing arguments, the prosecutor noted that Gilbert had
failed to call the one alibi witness that could have corroborated his
location at a certain time.4 The supreme court held that, even if
the prosecutor's comments were in error, they were harmless error
and did not shift the burden of proof.""
In Braun v. State,4 9 the court of appeals reversed a conviction
for soliciting the unlawful exploitation of a minor.49' The court de-
termined that prosecution under the relevant statute491 required
evidence that Braun had asked someone else to induce a child un-
der eighteen years of age to engage in one of the listed sexual ac-
tivities.4  In this case, Braun had communicated directly with the
minors.4"3
In Jackson v. State,494 the court of appeals held that if a defen-
dant is released from prison having served his period of imprison-
ment while the case is still on appeal, any subsequent period of
probation is not subject to an automatic stay under Alaska Rules
of Appellate Practice 206(a)(3), which states that "[a]n order
placing the defendant on probation shall be stayed if an appeal is
taken., 491 Jackson was arrested for a probation violation some
weeks after being released following an eighteen-month sentence
in a case in which the appeal was still pending.496 Jackson argued
that he was not actually on probation at the time of his arrest be-
cause his period of probation was automatically stayed under Ap-
pellate Rule 206(a)(3) due to his pending appeal.4 7
The court rejected Jackson's argument. Addressing an issue
of first impression, the court first ruled that a trial court his con-
current jurisdiction with the court of appeals to decide probation
484. Id at 1276.
485. 925 P.2d 1324 (Alaska 1996).
486. See ic at 1329.
487. See iL at 1326.
488. See id. at 1328.
489. 911 P.2d 1075 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
490. See id. at 1083.
491. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.455(a) (Michie 1996).
492. See Brown, 911 P.2d at 1083.
493. See id
494. 926 P.2d 1180 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
495. ALASKA R. App. PRAC. 206(a)(3); see Jackson, 926 P.2d at 1187.
496. See Jackson, 926 P.2d at 1183.
497. See id
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matters in cases that are pending appeal."' The court then exam-
ined the history of Appellate Rule 206(a)(3), and noted that its
predecessor, former Federal Criminal Rule 38,49' applied only to
defendants who received probation but not imprisonment as a sen-
tence from the court5 ° If Rule 206(a)(3) were applied in the same
manner as its predecessor, it would not extend to Jackson, because
he had been sentenced to imprisonment."' The court reasoned
that if probation were stayed in cases where the prisoner's case was
still on appeal, the delayed start of the probationary period might
actually penalize the prisoner by extending government supervi-
sion longer than in a similar case where the appeal had already
been decided."l
In Howell v. State,"3 the court of appeals held that the failure
to give a jury a heat of passion instruction was reversible error."
Howell had argued with the decedent while at Howell's home, and,
as decedent drove away from Howell's trailer, Howell shot twice at
decedent's truck, killing himOsC Howell asserted two affirmative
defenses: (1) he shot out of fear, therefore in the heat of passion;
and (2) he shot out of self-defense!" The court noted that prece-
dent has consistently interpreted the Alaska statute pertaining to
heat of passion to encompass the emotion of fear as well as other
intense emotions."0 Therefore, the court remanded the case for ei-
ther a retrial of the first-degree murder charge or entry of a convic-
tion for manslaughter5 9
In Nelson v. State,"'0 the court of appeals held that although a
trial court's jury instructions omitted any mention of "knowing
conduct," the mention of "recklessness" in the instructions ade-
quately conveyed to the jury the need to find that the defendant
consciously disregarded a risk of harm."' Nelson was convicted of
third-degree assault after she attempted to run down with a truck
two plain-clothes security officers in the parking lot of a Sears
498. See id. at 1185.
499. FED. R. CRIM. P. 38 (amended 1972).
500. See Jackson, 926 P.2d at 1185-86.
501. See id. at 1186.
502. See id. at 1187.
503. 917 P.2d 1202 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
504. See id. at 1211.
505. See id. at 1204.
506. See id. at 1205.
507. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.115(a) (Michie 1996).
508. See Howell, 917 P.2d at 1206.
509. See id. at 1210-11.
510. 927 P.2d 331 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
511. Id. at 334.
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store from which she had stolen merchandise.512
On appeal, Nelson claimed that the jury instructions may have
caused the jury to misunderstand the need for proof that Nelson
was "aware of and consciously disregarded the risk" of harm her
acts caused."3 The court held that no plain error existed in the in-
structions, since they informed the jury of the state's need to prove
that Nelson was aware that her actions might cause injury or instill
fear in others of imminent serious harm, and they did not lead the
jury to believe that she could be convicted if they found that she
was merely driving the truck recklessly.
5 14
In State v. Tinsley,1 5 the court of appeals held that it was an
abuse of discretion to relax Criminal Rule 35(a)'s 120-day time
limit by almost seven years to allow the defendant's motion for re-
duction of his sentence based on his contention that he is now re-
habilitated."' Tinsley had argued to the superior court that the
120-day time limit was too short to allow defendants to show that
they deserved a modification because of their rehabilitation."7
However, the court of appeals held that a judge may relax the time
limit of Criminal Rule 35(a) through the use of Criminal Rule 53
only after a particularized showing that circumstances beyond the
control of Tinsley prevented compliance with the 120-day time
limit.5"8 The court rejected Tinsley's argument that the time limit
was generally insufficient to demonstrate genuine rehabilitation
and thus that it would be unjust to apply the time limit to any de-
fendant achieving rehabilitation after the time period.519
In Bangs v. State,52 the court of appeals held that the superior
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to waive Rule
35.1(h)'s52' requirement that all ground for relief must be raised in
a defendant's first application for post-conviction relief.5 " Bangs
claimed that he had not raised certain issues in his first application
because both his trial counsel and his counsel on appeal ineffec-
tively assisted him.5 However, the court found that Bangs's claim
of ineffective assisstance against his trial counsel was foreclosed
512. See id. at 332.
513. Id. at 333-34.
514. See id. at 334.
515. 928 P.2d 1220 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
516. See id. at 1221, 1224.
517. See id. at 1222.
518. See id.
519. See id. at 1223.
520. 911 P.2d 1067 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
521. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 35.1(h).
522. See Bangs, 911 P.2d at 1071.
523. See id. at 1068.
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because the issue had been raised both in his direct appeal and in
his first application for post-conviction relief.24 As for Bangs's
counsel on appeal, the court noted that Bangs failed to provide any
information regarding which attorney selected the issues and the
statement of points on appeal, "how and why they were selected,
what other issues were considered and reserved, and how counsel
got the impression that [the defendant] wanted him to do more
than pursue the issues already raised."' S  Because this missing in-
formation was presumably within the scope of Bangs's personal
knowledge, and because Rule 35.1(d) requires that an application
for post-conviction relief be supported by "all facts within the per-
sonal knowledge of the applicant,"2' the court found that there was
no ground for concluding that he was proceeding in good faith and
acting with due diligence."
In Kameroff v. State,52 the court of appeals held that, where an
arrestee suspected of driving while intoxicated has requested the
opportunity to contact an attorney before taking a breathalyzer
test, police may not restrict access to the telephone as a means of
controlling the arrestee's behavior. 29 After having been arrested
on suspicion of driving while intoxicated and brought to the police
station, Kameroff became unruly and repeatedly told police that
he would take a breathalyzer test if he could contact an attorney
first.' The police told him that he could call an attorney only if he
would calm down. 3' Kameroff did not take the test and was
charged with refusing to submit to a breathalyzer test pursuant to
Alaska Statutes section 28.35.032(a).532
The court applied the rule of Copelin v. State33 which man-
dates that a prisoner required to take a breathalyzer test under sec-
tion 28.35.032 has the right to be afforded a reasonable opportu-
nity to contact an attorney before taking the test.' The court
ruled that, in spite of Kameroff's unruly behavior, it was unreason-
able for the police to refuse him access to a phone to call an attor-
ney, because it did not appear that to allow the call would endan-
524. See id at 1069.
525. Id. at 1070.
526. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 35.1(d).
527. See Bangs, 911 P.2d at 1070.
528. 926 P.2d 1174 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
529. See id. at 1178.
530. See id. 1176-77.
531. See id.
532. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.032(a) (Michie 1996).
533. 659 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1983).
534. See Kameroff, 626 P.2d at 1177 (citing Copelin, 659 P.2d at 1212).
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ger the police officers or anyone else.535 It is the state's burden to
prove that the denial of the telephone was reasonable and using
such a denial in an effort simply to control a disruptive prisoner
did not meet this standard.536
The court also overturned the trial judge's ruling that Kamer-
off could introduce evidence of a prosecution witness's bias based
on the witness's probationary status only if he could first establish
that the witness's statement had changed (presumably to reflect a
bias toward the state).537 The court noted that the U.S. Supreme
Court had found as a general matter that a witness's status as a
probationer is a potential reason for the witness to be biased to-
ward the state.53 The state argued that, under Alaska Evidence
Rule 403, a court may exclude evidence of a witness's bias if the
probative force of the evidence is outweighed by concerns over its
relevance or necessity. 39 The court of appeals held that this rule
did not permit the judge to establish as a preliminary hurdle for
the introduction of such evidence that the defendant establish that
the potential bias was reflected in inconsistent statements by the
witness." ° The court cited its earlier opinion in Wood v. State, 1
noting the distinction between reasonable limits on inquiry into
possible bias and thejgrohibition of all such inquiry."A2
In Knix v. State, the court of appeals held that a statement is
considered a "sworn statement" for the purposes of Alaska's per-
jury statute,"' even if the public official notarizing the statement
did not actually administer an oath and did not certify that the
statement was signed or sworn to before him." The defendants
argued that the statement did not meet the requirements of a
"sworn statement" under the perjury statute because it was not
certified by a public official as described in Alaska Statutes section
09.63.030(a), which requires that the notarizing officer certify "on
the document that it was signed and sworn to or affirmed before
the officer."' 6  The court rejected this argument, saying that a
statement would be considered a "sworn statement" when it
535. See id. at 1178.
536. See id.
537. See id. at 1180.
538. See id. at 1179 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308,317-18 (1974)).
539. See id.
540. See id. at 1180.
541. 837 P.2d 743 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992).
542 See Kameroff, 926 P.2d at 1180 (citing Wood, 837 P.2d at 746-47).
543. 922 P.2d 913 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
544. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.200 (Michie 1996).
545. See Knix, 922 P.2d at 917.
546. ALASKA STAT. § 09.63.030(a) (Michie 1996).
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amounted to "'a verification on its face of the truthfulness of the
facts contained therein."'" 47 The court, noting that a "sworn state-
ment" could be made under either "'oath or affirmation,"'" cited
the Alaska Supreme Court for the proposition that an affirmation
is a statement that signifies that the testator is bound to act truth-
fully by conscience. 9 Thus, the defendants' statement before a no-
tary and signature under the "penalty of perjury" phrase amounted
to an affirmation sufficient to qualify the statement as a "sworn
statement" under the perjury statute.'5
The court also held that the crime of engaging in a scheme to
defraud requires specific intent on the part of the accused."1 The
defendants argued that the pattern jury instruction given by the
court for the crime of engaging in a scheme to defraud mistakenly
identified the mens rea required for the crime as "knowingly,"
while they contended that the crime required specific intent.552 The
state argued that since the statute in question e does not specify a
required state of mind, the mens rea requirement is set by Alaska
Statutes section 11.81.610(b), which states that if a criminal statute
does not specify a required mental state, the requirement shall be
that the accused knowingly committed the act. , The court re-
jected the state's argument, holding that the plain language of
"scheme to defraud" itself implied specific intent, and therefore
specific intent is an element of the crime."' However, the court
also held the language of the statute conveyed the same intent to
the jury as well.55 Thus, even if the jury instruction did not explic-
itly include a requirement of intent, it did so implicitly, and the
jury could not have found the defendants guilty without having
found specific intent.5"
The defendants also argued that they had not "knowingly, in-
telligently, and voluntarily" waived their right to testify at trial, as
547. Knix, 922 P.2d at 916-17 (quoting Gargan v. State, 805 P.2d 998, 1005
(Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (citing Anchorage Sand and Gravel v. Woolridge, 619
P.2d 1014 (Alaska 1980))).
548. Id. (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.240(2)(A)).
549. See id. at 916 (citing Anchorage Sand, 619 P.2d at 1016; Gargan, 805 P.2d
at 1005).
550. Id. at 917.
551. See id. at 921.
552. See id. at 920.
553. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.600 (Michie 1996) (defining the crime of en-
gaging in a scheme to defraud).
554. See Knix, 922 P.2d at 920.
555. Id. at 922.
556. See id. at 923.
557. See id.
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they claim was required by LaVigne v. State.58 The trial judge
questioned defendants thoroughly about whether they knowingly
waived that right, but the defendants responded only with vague
references to threats supposedly made to them to discourage them
from testifying."9 The judge attempted to elicit further informa-
tion, and offered the resources of the court in resolving any situa-
tion and protecting the defendants, but the defendants did not
clarify their remarks and the judge proceeded with the trialW The
court of appeals held that in such a situation, the most a judge can
do is what the trial court had done, that is, to offer the court's full
cooperation in resolving any threats against the defendants and
allow them either to accept that help or not.56' Because they chose
not to accept that help, the court ruled that the defendants had
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived their right to tes-
tify.562 The court, in a footnote, noted that although the
"knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily" standard could be appli-
cable in this case, it was not clear from LaVigne that it was appli-
cable in every case, and suggested that certain conflicts between
the right to testify and the right to remain silent suggest that such a
standard was not always feasible. 63
In Harrison v. State, 64 the court of appeals held that an affida-
vit could be considered a sworn statement for a finding of perjury,
even though it was not made under oath and did not contain a
statement that a notary or other public official empowered to ad-
minister oaths was unavailable."' Harrison had made false state-
ments in an affidavit that had not been notarized but that included
language indicating the affiant made the statement under penalty
of perjury. The court ruled that, even though Alaska Statutes sec-
tion 09.63.020(a) requires a statement that a notary or other public
official empowered to administer oaths was not available for an
unsworn affidavit to be considered a "sworn statement" under the
perjury statute,5 Harrison's affirmation in the affidavit that he
made the statements contained therein knowingly under penalty of
perjury, along with the basic policy underlying the perjury statute
that substance is favored over form, support the holding that the
558. 812 P.2d 217 (Alaska 1991).
559. See Knix, 922 P.2d at 917-18.
560. See id. at 918.
561. See id. at 919.
562. See id.
563. See id. at 918 n.6.
564. 923 P.2d 107 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
565. See id. at 110.
566. ALASKA STAT. § 09.63.020(a) (Michie 1996).
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affidavit was a "sworn statement."567
In Adams v. State,-" the court of appeals held that Criminal
Rule 24(c)(10),569 which disqualifies jurors who have a guard-
ian/ward relationship with the victim of the crime, applies only
when the guardian/ward relationship is still in existence at the time
of the trial." Therefore, the court of appeals held that Adams was
not entitled to challenge a juror for cause since the juror, the direc-
tor of a children's shelter in which the victim had stayed for a few
days after the crime, did not have a uardian/ward relationship
with the victim at the time of the trial.' The court of appeals also
held that the stringent standard of juror dismissal, established in
Dalkovski v. Glad, " can be applied in a case where the defense is
challenging the credibility of the victim only when the juror had
knowledge of facts that directly bear on the victim's credibility.7 3
Since the record failed to establish that the juror in question had
any knowledge of the material facts of the case, there was no basis
for his automatic dismissal. 4
In Singleton v. State,55 the court of appeals held that the term
"unconditional discharge" in the juror disqualification statute,
Alaska Statutes section 09.20.020,6 should be interpreted accord-
ing to the plain language of Alaska Statutes section
12.55.185(12),Y which states that "unconditional discharge" means
"that a defendant is released from all disability arising under a sen-
tence, including probation and parole....",,s Therefore, the court
held that renewed eligibility for jury service after a conviction is
conditioned upon release from all restrictions directly imposed by
the sentence; jury service is not conditioned upon release from
567. See Harrison, 923 P.2d at 109-110 (citing Anchorage Sand and Gravel v.
Woolridge, 619 P.2d 1014 (Alaska 1980); Knix v. State, 922 P.2d 913 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1996); Gargan v. State, 805 P.2d 998 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991)).
568. 927 P.2d 751 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
169. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 24(c)(10).
570. See Adams, 927 P.2d at 755.
571. See id.
572. 774 P.2d 202, 205 (Alaska 1989) (holding that a juror's personal knowl-
edge of the facts of a case will give rise to a valid challenge for cause unless the
knowledge is of incidental or collateral facts).
573. See Adams, 927 P.2d at 756.
574. See id.
575. 921 P.2d 636 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
576. ALASKA STAT. § 09.20.020 (Michie 1996) (providing that "[a] person is
disqualified from serving as a juror if the person... (2) has been convicted of a
felony for which the person has not been unconditionally discharged").
577. Id. § 12.55.185(12) (Michie 1996).
578. Id.
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collateral restrictions, such as loss of voting or firearm privileges. 79
The court of appeals also held that the police officers' failure
to record the names of bystanders at an arrest scene did not consti-
tute a discovery or due process violation since the officers had "no
obvious basis to believe that other individuals [than the defen-
dants] at the arrest scene had 'potentially exculpatory evidence.""'58
In Plate v. State,58" ' the court of appeals held that Alaska
Criminal Rule 24(b)(2)5" does not authorize a trial judge to substi-
tute an alternate juror for a regular juror once deliberations have
begun."' In this case, the jury had deliberated for four and one-
half hours on a Friday and then had decided to reconvene and con-
tinue deliberations on the following Monday.m Over the weekend
one of the jurors was killed in an accident, and, when the court re-
convened, the trial judge appointed an alternate juror to replace
the deceased jurors5 Plate sought post-conviction relief, con-
tending that the trial judge had committed reversible error by re-
placing the original juror." Looking to the language of Alaska
Criminal Rule 24(b)(2)5 s precedent in other states,5 and federal
court interpretations of the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
248,89 the court concludedthat the trial judge committed plain er-
ror in allowing an alternate juror to replace an original juror once
deliberations had begun.5"
In light of this holding, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's post-conviction relief action that set aside Plate's convic-
tions on five of the six counts.59' The court of appeals also affirmed
the trial court's refusal to set aside Plate's acquittal on Count Five
of the indictment, holding that the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy barred a judge from vacating an acquittal.5"
The court also determined the factors necessary to claim
579. See Singleton, 921 P.2d at 638.
580. Id. at 640 (quoting March v. State, 859 P.2d 714, 716 (Alaska Ct. App.
1993)).
581. 925 P.2d 1057 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
582. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(2).
583. See Plate, 925 P.2d at 1060.
584. See id. at 1057.
585. See id.
586. See id.
587. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(2).
588. See Plate, 925 P.2d at 1057 (discussing People v. Burnette, 775 P.2d 583
(Colo. 1989)).
589. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(c); see Plate, 925 P.2d at 1060 (discussing federal
court interpretations).
590. See Plate, 925 P.2d at 1060.
591. See id. at 1061.
592 See id.
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privilege under Alaska's Evidence Rule 506(a)2)593 which deals
with communications made to a clergy member?9 The court held
that the person claiming privilege must prove (1) that he or she
subjectively believed that the conversation with the clergyman was
being held in private, (2) that this belief was reasonable under the
circumstances, (3) that he or she intended that the communication
not be disclosed to anyone except in furtherance of its purpose,
and (4) that he or she reasonably believed that this intention was
shared by the clergyman.95 In this case, the court of appeals found
that the trial record indicated that Plate had disclosed his crime of
sexual abuse to his clergyman with the belief that the communica-
tion was confidential and that the belief was reasonable under the
circumstances. 9 However, the trial court had not resolved the
third and fourth factors of the privilege requirement, so the court
of appeals held that, if Plate was to be retried, the trial court
should renew its consideration of this issue and should enter find-
ings pursuant to the third and fourth factors of the privilege re-
quirement."
In Ozenna v. State,59 the court of appeals held that a statute
amending an appellate rule to state that appellate courts are not
authorized to allow extensions of more than sixty days in criminal
cases did not impliedly repeal or amend a rule allowing time limits
to be relaxed upon a showing of good cause."' A single-judge or-
der entered by the court of appeals granted Ozenna's motion to
accept his notice of appeal, which was filed late. The state ar-
gued in its motion for full-court reconsideration that Appellate
Rule 502(b), which allows for extensions based on the appellate
court's discretion, should be narrowly construed to authorize ex-
tensions only within the limits of Appellate Rule 521, which, in its
amended form, prevents the appellate courts from authorizing ex-
tensions of more than sixty days in criminal cases' 1
On full-court consideration, the court of appeals noted that
when Appellate Rule 502(b), allowing the court of appeals to ex-
tend any deadline contained in the rules for good cause, was
promulgated by the Alaska Supreme Court, Appellate Rule 521
593. ALASKA R. EvID. 506(a)(2).
594. See Plate, 925 P.2d at 1065.
595. See id.
596. See id. at 1066.
597. See id.
598. 921 P.2d 640 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
599. See id. at 641.
600. See id. at 640.
601. ALASKA R. APp. P. 521 (as amended by 1995 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 79, §
21).
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did not specify time limits on the appellate court's ability to
authorize extensions, so "the Alaska Supreme Court could not
have intended to subject the powers granted [in Rule 502(b)] to
any time limitation stated in Rule 521."'02 The state argued that
chapter 79, section 21 of the 1995 Alaska Session Laws, amending
Rule 521 to disallow the acceptance of appeals filed over sixty days
late, should be interpreted as having impliedly amended Rule
502(b).w The court of appeals rejected this argument, citing prior
supreme court holdings that "a statute dealing with a procedural
matter will not alter a conflicting rule of court unless the statute is
enacted with the stated purpose of changing that rule." ' Since the
legislature did not specifically state an intent to amend or limit
Appellate Rule 502 when it enacted chapter 79, section 21, of the
1995 Alaska Session Laws, the court affirmed the order granting
acceptance of Ozenna's appeal."'
In McRae v. State,w the court of appeals held that it is within a
presiding judge's discretion to assign the adjudicative phase of a
probation revocation proceeding to a resident superior court
judge, rather than the original sentencing judge, and to assign the
dispositive phase to the original sentencing judge.0 The court also
held that McRae was properly prohibited from exercising a per-
emptory challenge against the resident judge, because he had al-
ready used his one peremptory challenge during the proceedings
leading to his original conviction. 6°S
3. Sentencing. In Scott v. State,w' the Alaska Court of
Appeals held that once a defendant enters a knowing and
voluntary no contest plea, the sentencing court is entitled to treat
each element of the offense as having been proven, despite the
defendant's protestations of innocence. O In this case, Scott had
pleaded no contest to a charge of attempted first-degree sexual
abuse of a minor.611 The sentencing judge, therefore, ordered Scott
to participate in a sex offender treatment program as part of his
602. Ozenna, 921 P.2d at 641.
603. See id
604. Id. (citing Nolan v. Sea Airmotive, Inc., 627 P.2d 1035, 1047 (Alaska
1981); Leege v. Martin, 379 P.2d 447,451 (Alaska 1963)).
605. See id.
606. 909 P.2d 1079 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
607. See id- at 1082.
608. See id. at 1082-83 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 22.20.022(d) (Michie 1996);
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 25(d)(1)).
609. 928 P.2d 1234 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
610. See id. at 1238.
611. See id. at 1234.
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prison sentence.61 Scott appealed this order based on the assertion
that he could plead no contest to the charge but maintain his
factual innocence for the purposes of sentencing.613 The court of
appeals found that there is general agreement that a plea of no
contest has the same effect as a plea of guilty in that the defendant
waives his right to challenge the state's proof of the essential
elements of the crime. The sentencing court's order was
affirmed.614
In Wassillie v. State,"5 the court of appeals held that the fact
the victim had been asleep was a permissible aggravating factor in
a conviction for second-degree abuse of a minor.16 The applicable
statute .. provides for an aggravating factor in cases where "the de-
fendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim of
the offense was particularly vulnerable or incapable of resistance
due to advanced age, disability, ill health, or extreme youth or was
for any other reason substantially incapable of exercising normal
physical or mental powers of resistance."61s A trial judge could
properly conclude that a person asleep was particularly vulner-
able.619
In Hampel v. State,620 the court of appeals held that a defen-
dant was not entitled to deduct good time credit in calculating the
mandatory minimum prison term which must be served before the
defendant would be eligible for discretionary parole.62' Before
Hampel was eligible for discretionary parole, he first had to serve
at least the minimum term of imprisonment for first-degree mur-
der.62 Hampel sought to reduce this minimum term by his good
time credit awarded to a prisoner under Alaska Statutes section
33.20.101(a).6' However, the court held that the plain meaning of
section 33.20.010(a) applies the good time credit reduction only to
the original sentence actually received from the court.624
In State v. Hiser,62 the court of appeals vacated part of a sen-
612. See id.
613. See id. at 1236.
614. See id. at 1237-38.
615. 911 P.2d 1071 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
616. See id. at 1073.
617. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155 (Michie 1996).
618. Id. § 12.55.155(c)(5).
619. See Wassillie, 911 P.2d at 1073.
620. 911 P.2d 517 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
621. See id. at 523.
622. See id. at 522; ALASKA STAT. § 33.15.180(b) (Michie 1996).
623. Id. § 33.20.101 (a).
624. See Hampel, 911 P.2d at 522 (finding this interpretation supported by the
legislative history).
625. 924 P.2d 1024 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
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tencing order that required the Department of Corrections to pro-
vide a certain medication for the defendant.62 The court ruled that
although Hiser had the right to pursue a civil action if the Depart-
ment of Corrections did not provide him with adequate medical
treatment, the supreme court's earlier decisions made it clear that
it was not in the power of the superior court to order specific
treatment.6z7
In Putnam v. State,62 the court of appeals held that Alaska
Statutes section 12.55.090(a),62 read together with section
12.55.080,6" allows Alaska courts to suspend either fines or impris-
onment as a predicate to granting probation.631 The court noted
that placing a 'defendant on probation always requires the suspen-
sion of some portion of the sentence.63z However, Putnam con-
tended that when a crime is punishable by both fine and impris-
onment, the second sentence of section 12.55.090(a) allows the
sentencing court to grant probation only when it suspends impris-
onment."' Although the Alaska statute was modeled on 18 U.S.C.
section 3651, which vests federal courts with only very narrow
authority to order split sentences, 64 the Alaska statute in no way
limits the court's authority to order unsuspended incarceration, a
partially suspended fine, and a period of probation.63"
4. Miscellaneous. In Barry v. State,636 the Alaska Court of
Appeals held that, under 18 U.S.C. section 922, a court could, as a
condition of probation, prohibit a convicted felon from carrying
any firearm that has been shipped or transported in interstate or
626. See id at 1026.
627. See id. at 1024-25 (citing LaBarbera v. State, 598 P.2d 947, 949 (Alaska
1979); Rust v. State, 582 P.2d 134, 138, modified on reh'g., 584 P.2d 38 (Alaska
1978)).
628. 930 P.2d 1290 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
629. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.090(a) (Michie 1996).
630. Id. § 12.55.080.
631. See Putnam, 930 P.2d at 1294.
632. See id. at 1291-92 (citing Kelly v. State, 842 P.2d 612, 613 (Alaska Ct. App.
1992)).
633. See id at 1291. The second sentence of section 12.55.090(a) reads: "If a
crime is punishable by both fine and imprisonment, the court may impose a fine
and place the defendant on probation as to imprisonment." Section 12.55.080
states that the sentencing court may "suspend the imposition or execution or bal-
ance of the sentence or a portion thereof, and place the defendant on probation."
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.090(a), .080.
634. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1994).
635. See Putnam, 930 P.2d at 1294.
636. 925 P.2d 255 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
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foreign commerce. 37  Barry admitted that any firearm and
ammunition he might possess would come to Alaska via interstate
or foreign commerce."' The court held that the current statute
"manifests a clear [c]ongressional intent"639 to prohibit felons from
possessing a firearm or ammunition."'
The court of appeals rejected Barry's argument that felons on
probation in Alaska are not subject to this federal statute since
their civil rights are restored upon release from incarceration."
The court, relying on United States v. Andaverde"2 and United
States v. Meeks,"' held that the disqualification of defendants on
probation or parole from serving as jurors means that, for the pur-
poses of federal firearms, laws, Barry's civil rights have not been
restored.6" Finally, the court of appeals held that, even if federal
law did not prohibit Barry from possessing a firearm, the trial
court's imposition of this condition of probation was permissible
because it was "'reasonably related to the protection of the pub-
lic."',"
5
In Kinney v. State,646 the court of appeals held that the state
did not have to prove that the defendant knew he was breaking the
law by arranging a sale of liquor in a local-option community
where, by local vote, the sale of liquor was prohibited.' Kinney
argued that the crime of bootlegging is malum prohibitum,6" and
therefore the state had to prove that Kinney acted with criminal
intent.649 The court of appeals, noting that the distinction between
637. See id. at 257; 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1996). The appellant in this case had been
convicted of criminally negligent homicide committed while he was driving drunk
and was sentenced to five years of imprisonment with three years, three months
suspended.
638. See Barry, 925 P.2d at 256.
639. Id
640. See id. at 257 (citing Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 (1985) (holding
that a convicted felon who had stolen a handgun from a friend's car could be con-
victed of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922 once the government proved the handgun was
previously shipped in interstate commerce)).
641. See id.
642. 64 F.3d 1305 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1055 (1996).
643. 987 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1993).
644. See Barry, 925 P.2d at 257.
645. Id. at 258 (quoting Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1240 (Alaska 1977)).
646. 927 P.2d 1289 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
647. See id at 1290.
648. "[A] crime is termed 'malum prohibitum' if it is 'not inherently evil [but
is] wrong only because prohibited by the legislature."' Id. at 1292 (quoting 1
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScoTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.6(b)
(1986)).
649. Id. at 1291.
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crimes that are "mala prohibita" and those that are "mala in se ' 650
has never been precise, rejected Kinney's contention that a show-
ing that the defendant knew the law and violated it regardless was
necessary."5 The court found that this case could be distinguished
from Steve v. State 52 since the crime in the instant case was one of
commission and not omission; it was common societal knowledge
that the sale of liquor without a license was prohibited and it was
common Alaskan knowledge that some communities prohibit the
sale of alcohol.53
In addition, the court held that the unavailability of the "no
personal profit" defense in local-option communities, although
available for people charged with distributing liquor without a li-
cense, was not a violation of the due process clause of the state
constitution because the legislature had a rational basis for draw-
ing the distinction.64 Because selling alcohol in a local-option
community is illegal under all circumstances, even with a license,
the fact that Kinney did not profit is irrelevant. 55
In State v. E.E., the court of appeals held that a trial court
does not have authority to determine placement and treatment de-
cisions concerning a juvenile delinquent once the child has been
committed to the supervision of the Alaska Department of Health
and Social Services657 Instead, the court's authority in juvenile
cases "arises from, and is limited by, statute. 6 58 In this case,
Alaska Statutes section 47.10.080(b) 5 applied, and the court was
required to select one of the three options in the disposition of the
delinquent child.6" The court chose "'release on probation to the
custody of the department for placement in a nondetention set-
ting."' 61 However, the trial court had further determined that "the
child cannot be moved from his [current] placement.., without a
court order., 662 The court of appeals reversed this decision and
650. "A crime is 'malum in se' if it is 'wrong in [itself], inherently evil."' Id. at
1292 (quoting LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 648, § 1.6(b)).
651. See id.
652. 875 P.2d 110, 122 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994) (stating that when a crime is de-
fined in terms of a failure to act, "one may not be held liable if one does not know
the facts indicating a duty to act").
653. See Kinney, 927 P.2d at 1294.
654. See id. at 1295.
655. See id.
656. 912 P.2d 1 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
657. See id. at 3.
658. Id at 1 (quoting R.I. v. State, 894 P.2d 683, 686 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)).
659. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(b)(3) (Michie 1996).
660. See E.E., 912 P.2d at 1.
661. Id (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(b)(3)).
662. Id.
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found that once the child had been committed to the supervision of
the department, the department, not the court, had the responsi-
bility to determine the child's placement and treatment.
663
VII. ELECTION LAW
In the area of election law, the Alaska Supreme Court heard
cases dealing with the appropriate franchise for elections and ref-
erenda within the state. Another case involving the substitution of
a gubernatorial candidate was held to be moot. The final case
analyzed the Municipality of Anchorage's charter to determine
whether voter approval was necessary for an action taken by the
municipality.
In Cissna v. Stout,6M the Alaska Supreme Court held that ab-
sentee votes of nonresidents, who admitted in writing to election
officials that they no longer resided in that district, were properly
66
rejected.665 According to the Alaska Constitution, voters in state
and local elections must be residents of the district in which they
vote.667 The supreme court also held that an absentee ballot post-
marked after the election date should be rejected, regardless of the
reason for the voter's failure to postmark the ballot on or before
the date of election.65 The court reasoned that public policy pro-
hibits counting votes cast after the polls close. 69
In Price v. Dahl,670 the supreme court held that an application
for a referendum challenging a comprehensive plan approved for a
specific area within a borough was correctly rejected by the bor-
ough clerk because the proposed referendum did not provide for
all borough voters to vote on the referendum.6 Price had filed an
application for a referendum on the Matanuska-Susitna Borough's
plan to develop roads on pre-existing rights-of-way in the Chase
area.6' The application allowed only Chase residents to vote on
the referendum.7 3
The court rejected Price's argument that Alaska Statutes sec-
tion 29.26.130(e) '4 required that only those living in the affected
663. See id. at 4.
664. 931 P.2d 363 (Alaska 1996).
665. See id. at 370.
666. ALASKA CONST. art. V, § 1.
667. See Cissna, 931 P.2d at 367.
668. See id. at 370.
669. See id.
670. 912 P.2d 541 (Alaska 1996).
671. See id, at 544.
672. See id. at 543.
673. See id.
674. ALASKA STAT. § 29.26.130(3) (Michie 1996).
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area could vote on the referendum and held that the subsection in
question applied only to signature requirements for the application
for a referendum, but did not address the issue of who could vote
in such a referendum. 5 According to the court, residents of the
entire borough had the right to vote on a referendum on the Chase
comprehensive plan, therefore, the referendum application was
flawed because it attempted to exclude borough voters residing
outside the affected area from voting.6
In O'Callaghan.v. State," the supreme court held that an ap-
peal challenging the substitution of candidates in a gubernatorial
election was moot because the challenged candidates' terms in of-
fice had ended. 8 The court held that the public interest exception
to the mootness doctrine did not apply because the disputed issues
were not likely to be repeated.79 Also, the court upheld an award
of attorney's fees against O'Callaghan on the ground that his suit
against a co-defendant was frivolous.Y In deciding this question,
the court applied the exception to the rule against assessing attor-
ney's fees against a public interest plaintiff that arises when that
plaintiff's action is frivolous."
In Area G Home and Landowners Organization, Inc. v. An-
chorage,6 the supreme court held that the Municipality of An-
chorage ("MOA") was authorized by its charter to extend its po-
lice service area to include previously unserved sections of the cit!X
without a separate vote by the previously unserved residents.
The city sought to extend the Anchorage Police Service Area
("APSA") to include a section of the city known as the Hillside.6 1
MOA's charter requires that the expansion of any city service area
be approved by the residents of the "area affected."" 5 However,
residents of the Hillside had repeatedly voted not to be included in
the APSA 6
675. See Price, 912 P.2d at 543.
676. See iL at 544.
677. 920 P.2d 1387 (Alaska 1996).
678. See id at 1388.
679. See id at 1389.
680. See id at 1390. O'Callaghan's suit named Campbell, the losing candidate
in the 1990 general election for lieutenant governor, as a co-defendant. The suit
which was filed over two years after the election, charged Campbell only with
submitting his declaration of candidacy two days late. See id.
681. See id.
682. 927 P.2d 728 (Alaska 1996).
683. See id. at 735.
684. See id. at 728-31.
685. Id. at 729 (citing MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE CHARTER art. IX, §
901(a)).
686. See id at 730.
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The supreme court looked to the legislative history of the
MOA charter to determine the interpretation of the phrase "area
affected" and determined that it referred to any area of the city
that stood to be affected by a change in cost or quality of service
due to the expansion.6 The court ruled that MOA had correctly
found that both the Hillside residents and all residents of the old
APSA were in the "area affected" by the expansion of the service
area because the division of cost within the APSA would change
significantly.6 Because the ordinance was subject to the collective
approval by a majority vote of all residents of the old APSA and
the Hillside, the court affirmed the superior court's dismissal of
Area G's suit."9
VIII. EMPLOYMENT LAW
In 1996, the Alaska Supreme Court's employment law docket
was dominated by workers' compensation cases. In this area, the
court ruled on questions of both benefits determination and claims
procedure. However, the court also had the opportunity to turn its
attention to cases concerning employment discrimination and col-
lective bargaining. One such case was French v. Jadon, Inc., ' in
which the supreme court, adopting standards from federal case
law, held that an abusive or hostile work environment could consti-
tute workplace discrimination in the form of sexual harassment.
The court also addressed grievance procedures as well as other
miscellaneous issues.
A. Workers' Compensation
1. Claims Procedure. In Tipton v. ARCO Alaska,69 1 the
Alaska Supreme Court held that Alaska Statutes section
23.30.110(c),"2 the section of the Alaska Workers' Compensation
statute that requires an employee to request a hearing on his claim
within two years of the employer's notice of controversion, does
not apply when a hearing has been canceled after the employee's
initial hearing request.693 Tipton had filed a request for a hearing
on his workers' compensation claim within two years of ARCO's
notice of controversion.694 The scheduled hearing was canceled
687. See id. at 732-35.
688. See id. at 735-38.
689. See id. at 739.
690. 911 P.2d 20 (Alaska 1996).
691. 922 P.2d 910 (Alaska 1996).
692. ALAsKA STAT. § 23.30.110(c) (Michie 1996).
693. See Tipton, 922 P.2d at 913.
694. See id. at 911.
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when it appeared that the parties had reached a settlement that
eventually was abandoned. 5 While Tipton pursued tort claims
against ARCO in superior court, two years passed after the
cancellation of the workers' compensation hearing and ARCO
filed to have the claim dismissed under section 23.30.110(c).6 The
court held that the plain meaning of the statute required only that
the claimant file a request for hearing within two years of the
employer's initial notice of controversion, rejecting ARCO's
argument that the two-year time limit was renewed after a
canceled .hearing.9 The court reasoned that the "defense of
statute of limitations is 'generally disfavored,' 698 and that the law
should not be stretched to accommodate it.
69
In Huston v. Coho Electric,7°0 the supreme court reiterated its
holding in TiptonO' that once an employee has filed a request for a
hearing of his workers' compensation claim within the two-year
time limit set forth in Alaska Statutes section 23.30.110(c), 712 he has
permanently fulfilled the time requirement of that section and may
not be barred under that section from pursuing his claims at any
time in the future.7 3
In Himschoot v. Shanley7 ° the supreme court held that a state
employee who was injured in a car accident caused by a vehicle
driven by another state employee was not limited to workers'
compensation remedies.'0 Shanley sued the state as a third party
for injuries caused by its employee and agent Himschoot, the
driver who caused the accident.7 6 The supreme court held that
when an employee with workers' compensation coverage sues a
particular employer as a third party, the employer may not use the
statutory presumption of compensability found in Alaska's work-
ers' compensation statute to require the employee to establish that
he was within the scope of his employment at the time of the in-
jury. 7 The supreme court upheld the trial court's ruling that the
695. See id at 912.
696. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.110(c); see Tipton, 922 P.2d at 912.
697. Tipton, 922 P.2d at 912-13.
698. Id at 912 (quoting Lee Houston & Assocs. v. Racine, 806 P.2d 848, 854
(Alaska 1991)).
699. See id. at 913 (citing Safeco Ins. v. Honeywell, 639 P.2d 996, 1001 (Alaska
1981)).
700. 923 P.2d 818 (Alaska 1996).
701. 922 P.2d 910 (Alaska 1996).
702. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.110(c) (Michie 1996).
703. See Huston, 923 P.2d at 820.
704. 908 P.2d 1035 (Alaska 1996).
705. See id at 1042.
706. See id. at 1037.
707. See id. at 1041 (citing Alaska Pulp Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l
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state had failed to carry its burden to prove that Shanley was acting
within the scope of his employment at the time of the injury.70,
In Second Injury Fund v. Arctic Bowl,7 9 the supreme court
held that, for purposes of the 100-week time limit under Alaska
Statutes section 23.20.205(f) 0 for reporting compensable injuries
to the Second Injury Fund ("SIF"), time begins to run not when
the employer learns about an injury, but when he learns that an
injury is compensable under section 23.20.205. In this case, the
employer, Arctic Bowl, knew of an operation undergone by its
employee; however, it did not know until approximately two years
later that the employee's surgery, in conjunction with a previous
injury suffered by the employee, met the requirements of the com-
bined effects test of section 23.20.205(a)7 " and qualified Arctic
Bowl for SIF reimbursement."' The court rejected SIF's conten-
tion that "injury" was defined in Alaska Statutes section
23.30.265(17)71 simply as an injury that occurred during the course
of employment.715 The court ruled that section 23.30.265(17) did
not actually define the term "injury" in the statute, but merely de-
limited the injuries to be covered by the statute.1 Since the entire
statute is concerned with the subject matter of injuries that meet
the combined effects test, the requirement in section 23.30.205(f)
that an employer notify SIF of a compensable injury within 100
weeks of learning of the injury does not begin to run until the em-
ployer has knowledge that the injury meets the combined effects
test and is therefore compensable under the statute.717
In Tinker v. Veco, Inc., 78 the supreme court held that a ver-
bally communicated notice of an injury to an employer or other
appropriate supervisor that contains substantially the same infor-
Union, 791 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1990); Ruble v. Arctic General, 598 P.2d 95
(Alaska 1979)).
708. See id. at 1042.
709. 928 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1996).
710. ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.205(t) (Michie 1996).
711. See Arctic Bowl, 928 P.2d at 594-95.
712. This section provides that if an injury occurs during the course of em-
ployment that, in its combined effect with a previous injury of any origin, results
in compensation liability substantially greater than that which would be caused by
the second injury alone, then the employer will be reimbursed by the second in-
jury fund for the portion of its workers' compensation payments to the injured
employee that represent payment beyond 104 weeks of compensation. See
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.205(a).
713. See Arctic Bowl, 928 P.2d at 591.
714. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.265(17).
715. See Arctic Bowl, 928 P.2d at 594.
716. See id.
717. See id. at 594-95.
718. 913 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1996).
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mation as would be contained in a written communication will
usually satisfy section 100(d)(1) of the Workers' Compensation
Act,719 which provides conditions under which failure to supply
timely, written notice of an injury is excusable." The court noted
that the two conditions that must be met to be excused are (1) the
employer or an appropriate agent in charge must have knowledge
of the injury and (2) the failure to notify must not prejudice the
employer. 1 An employer would be prejudiced by the failure to
notify if it was prevented from conducting a timely investigation of
the events incident to the injury or if it was prevented from sup-
plying the employee with appropriate medical treatment.m  In
Tinker, the employee had told his supervisor at the time of his in-
jury that he had suffered frostbite while moving equipment on the
North Slope.7 3 The court held that sufficient written notice need
not have contained any more information than the employee had
provided verbally and that "it would require an exceptional set of
circumstances for this difference in the form by which the informa-
tion was conveyed to prejudice the employer. ' 4
2. Benefits. In Meek v. Unocal Corp.,7z the Alaska Supreme
Court held that, under the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act, 672
a worker was not barred from applying for or receiving permanent
total disability ("PTD") benefits by applying for reemployment
benefits under section 41 of that act.7z The court reasoned that
previous decisions established that the designation of a disability as
"permanent" did not mean that a worker could never rehabilitate
himself to employability.72 Therefore, an employee applying for
reemployment benefits is not necessarily disqualified from
receiving PTD benefits? 9
The court also held that the section's statutory presumption of
719. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.30.070-.270 (Michie 1996).
720. See Tinker, 913 P.2d at 492.
721. See id at 491-92 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.100(d)(1)).
722. See id. at 492 (citing State v. Moore, 706 P.2d 311, 312 (Alaska 1985);
Alaska State Hous. Auth. v. Sullivan, 518 P.2d 759, 761 (Alaska 1974); and Morri-
son-Knudsen Co. v. Vereen, 414 P.2d 536, 537 (Alaska 1966)).
723. See id.
724. Id
725. 914 P.2d 1276 (Alaska 1996).
726. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.30.005-.270 (Michie 1996).
727. See Meek, 914 P.2d at 1279.
728. See id. (citing Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d
264, 266 (Alaska 1974) (holding that there is an educational component to dis-
ability)).
729. See id.
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compensability,730 which places the burden of producing evidence
on the employer, applies to applications for PTD benefits."' In
making this determination, the court relied on its holding in Mu-
nicipality of Anchorage v. Carte 32 that "'the text of [section]
23.30.12(a)(1) indicates that the presumption of compensability is
applicable to any claim for compensation under the workers' com-
pensation statute.' 73 3 The court, in holding that a presumption of
compensability applied to PTD claims, noted that it had previously
applied the presumption to a temporary total disability claim.7m
In Sulkosky v. Morrison-Knudsen7 35 the supreme court held
that rebuttal of a claim of permanent total disability ("PTD") need
not include proof that the worker could obtain "suitable gainful
employment."7 6 The superior court had affirmed the Alaska
Workers' Compensation Board's decision to downgrade Suk-
ovsky's PTD benefits to partial permanent disability benefits based
on evidence that Sukovsky had misrepresented the severity of his
disability at his original hearing before the board.737 Sukovsky
claimed that the "odd lots" doctrine in workers' compensation case
law, which says that a worker may be found permanently totally
disabled if he can find no regular work because of his disability
even if he could obtain sporadic "odd jobs,"7 8 dictated that the
board must find that a worker could obtain regular work before his
status could be downgraded. Sukovsky then defined "regular
work" as "suitable, gainful employment," defined as being "as near
as possible to his average weekly wage as determined at the time of
the injury" under the vocational rehabilitation section of the
Alaska Workers' Compensation Act.74 The court rejected the
combination of these two different elements of workers' compen-
sation law and held that for a worker to be included in the "odd
lots" doctrine, there must be no reasonably stable market suited to
the worker's capabilities.74'
730. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.120(a)(1).
731. See Meek, 914 P.2d at 1279-80.
732. 818 P.2d 661 (Alaska 1991).
733. Meek, 914 P.2d at 1279 (quoting Carter, 818 P.2d at 665).
734. See id (citing Wien Air Alaska v. Kramer, 807 P.2d 471, 474 (Alaska
1991)).
735. 919 P.2d 158 (Alaska 1996).
736. Id. at 167.
737. See id at 160.
738. See J.B. Warrick Co. v. Roan, 418 P.2d 986, 988 (Alaska 1966) (stating
that a worker need not be in a state of "abject helplessness" to be found totally
and permanently disabled).
739. See Sukovsky, 919 P.2d at 167.
740. Id. at 166 (citing ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.30.041(c), .395 (Michie 1996)).
741. See id. at 167.
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In Wagner v. Stuckagain Heights,742 the supreme court held
that under workers' compensation statutes in effect between 1984
and 1988,743 eligibility for permanent total disability ("PTD") bene-
fits precluded eligibility for permanent partial disability ("PPD")
benefits.7" The court found that the language and structure of the
statute, which provided for PPD benefits only where various inju-
ries did not amount to total disability and which effectively made
total disability and partial disability distinct alternatives, did not
support the concurrent award of PTD and PPD benefits.745 The
supreme court also held that public policy arguments against both
unjust enrichment and encouragement of malingering supported
such a construction of the statute.746
In Raris v. Greek Corner,747 the supreme court held that an
employee not living in the state is not exempt from the eligibility
requirements of the reemployment benefits section of the Alaska
Workers' Compensation Act.7" After having been injured while
working as a waitress at The Greek Corner, Raris applied for re-
employment benefits and then moved to Greece.749 The Greek
Corner subsequently offered her a job as a telephone solicitor (a
position not precluded by her injury) for 75% of her pre-injury
wage.7 50 Under Alaska Statutes section 23.30.041(f)(1) of the Act,
such an offer precludes a claimant from eligibility for reemploy-
ment benefits.!" The court rejected Raris's argument that the sec-
tion was not meant to apply to out-of-state claimants. 752 In inter-
preting the statute, the court reasoned that since the legislature
had made the availability of suitable jobs outside the state a poten-
tial bar for state residents to be eligibile for reemployment bene-
fits, the legislature must have contemplated that out-of-state
claimants would be barred by the availability of suitable jobs in
state.753 Although the court did not hold that payment of reem-
ployment benefits to an out-of-state resident was never appropri-
ate, it did note that since the section contemplates ongoing contact
742. 926 P.2d 456 (Alaska 1996).
743. Alaska Workers' Compensation Act, 1983 ch. 70, Alaska Sess. Laws § 7
(current version at ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.190(a)(1)).
744. See Wagner, 926 P.2d at 459.
745. See id. at 458.
746. See id at 458-59.
747. 911 P.2d 510 (Alaska 1996).
748. See id. at 512; see also ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.041 (Michie 1996).
749. See Raris, 911 P.2d at 510.
750. See id. at 511.
751. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.041(0(1).
752. See Raris, 911 P.2d at 512.
753. See id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.041(e)(2), (p)(3)).
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between the claimant and a rehabilitation specialist,M it favors
Alaska residency. 55
In Konecky v. Camco Wireline,"' the supreme court held that
a worker was not eligible for vocational reemployment benefits
under the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act since his injury did
not reduce his physical abilities below the level of ability specified
for his pre-injury occupation by U.S. Department of Labor's Se-
lected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles ("SCODDOT"), even if the actual physical
abilities required by the occupation were greater than as described
in SCODDOT.757 An injury sustained on his job-as a "hoistman"
reduced Konecky's abilities so that he could perform only
"medium" heavy lifting.5 Evidence clearly established that his job
had required that he lift more than 100 pounds, which is classified
as "heavy" lifting.7 9 The court held that, because Alaska Statutes
section 23.30.041(e)' requires that the definition of job require-
ments contained in SCODDOT be dispositive in determining eli-
gibility for reemployment benefits, and because SCODDOT de-
fined "hoist operator" as requiring only medium-lifting ability, the
trial court had been correct in denying Konecky's appeal of a de-
nial of reemployment benefits. 6 The supreme court held that the
clear language of the statute, along with its apparent purpose to
streamline the claims process, precluded Konecky's argument that
the result was unjust and that it was contrary to the legislature's in-
tent.762
In Arnesen v. Anchorage Refuse,763 the supreme court held
that, for purposes of Alaska Statutes section 23.30.041(e), 76 which
defines eligibility of a workers' compensation claimant for voca-
tional reemployment benefits, the occupation of real estate broker
or agent is a job.765 Arnesen had been injured at his former job
with Anchorage Refuse, received disability benefits, and applied
for and was denied reemployment benefits because his physical
754. See id. at 513 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.041(g)-(n)).
755. See id.
756. 920 P.2d 277 (Alaska 1996).
757. See id. at 283.
758. Id at 278-79.
759. Id-
760. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.041(e) (Michie 1996) (covering vocational reem-
ployment benefits).
761. See Konecky, 920 P.2d at 283.
762. See id.
763. 925 P.2d 661 (Alaska 1996).
764. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.041(e).
765. See Arnesen, 925 P.2d at 665.
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capabilities were not below the level of those required of a real es-
tate agent, a job he had held within ten years prior to his injury.""
Appealing the denial of reemployment benefits, Arnesen argued
that because he worked for commission only and was therefore not
eligible for the benefits of the "employer/employee relationship"
such as minimum wage protections, he did not have a job, and
therefore he remained eligible for reemployment benefits.767 The
court rejected this argument, ruling that coverage under minimum
wage statutes was not a necessary element of a job, and that since
"real estate agent" was listed in the U.S. Department of Labor's
Selected Characteristics of Occupations Defined in the Dictionary
of Occupational Titles, it should be construed as a job under the
statute."
B. Workplace Discrimination
In French v. Jadon, Inc.,79 the Alaska Supreme Court held
that Alaska's workplace anti-discrimination statute does encom-
pass a hostile or abusive work environment as a form of sex dis-
crimination.'0 In defining the rule, the court referred to precedent
interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," the federal
counterpart to Alaska Statutes section 18.80.220(a)." Citing Har-
ris v. Forklift Systems,3 the court held that a hostile or abusive
work environment is created when the challenged conduct is
"severe or pervasive enough 'to create an objectively hostile or
abusive environment-an environment that a reasonable person
would find hostile or abusive."'" The court also held, based on
Harris, that "there is no violation 'if the victim does not subjec-
tively perceive the environment to be abusive' because the conduct
'has not actually altered the conditions of the victim's employ-
ment."'' 5  In defining the objective standard, the court again
quoted Harris: "'[W]hether an environment is 'hostile' or 'abusive'
can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances. These
may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its se-
verity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a
mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes"'
766. See id. at 663.
767. Id. at 664 n.5.
768. Id. at 665.
769. 911 P.2d 20 (Alaska 1996).
770. See id. at 32 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (Michie 1996)).
771. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994).
772. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a); see French, 911 P.2d at 28.
773. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
774. French, 911 P.2d at 28 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21).
775. Id. at 29 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22).
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with the work performance of an employee.n'
In Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska),'m the supreme court
held that the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of
marital status in Alaska's anti-discrimination statute 8 does not
preclude an employer from discriminating against an employee
based on the identity of his or her spouse or future spouse, but
only~grohibits discrimination based on the status of being mar-
ried. The court was responding to a certification of that issue
from the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska .7  In de-
ciding between the employees' proposed expansive definition of
"marital status" to include the identity of one's spouse, and BP's
proposed adherence to the ordinary meaning of the term as simply
whether or not one is married, the supreme court looked to the
plain meaning of the statute's words, legislative history, and pur-
pose, as well as to public policy considerations.t ' The court held
that common usage of the term "marital status" limited the mean-
ing of the term to the status of being married or not, and did not
encompass the identity of one's spouse.
In examining the legislative history of the anti-discrimination
statute, the supreme court found that the legislature had not speci-
fied a meaning for "marital status" other than the ordinary mean-
ing.7M The court further found that if it were to give the term the
more expansive meaning proposed by the employees, it would
have to ascribe to the legislature the intent of affecting all anti-
nepotism rules in the state, including several statutes limiting
nepotism in state government service.78 The court held that with-
out some evidence of legislative intent to make such a sweeping
new rule, it could not give the term "marital status" any other but
its ordinary meaning.7' The court also held that the ordinary
meaning of "marital status" supported the legislature's express
purpose in passing the anti-discrimination statute of eradicating
discrimination against a person based on his or her inclusion in a
broad-based category, married or unmarried.7 "6 Furthermore, the
court found that this interpretation protected the state's interest in
776. Id. at 30 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23).
777. 923 P 2d 783 (Alaska 1996).
778. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(1) (Michie 1996).
779. See Muller, 923 P.2d at 784.
780. See id.
781. See id. at 787-88.
782. See id. at 788.
783. See id.
784. See id. at 789.
785. Set id. at 790.
786. See id at 791.
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allowing employers to set reasonable employment policies.7"
C. Collective Bargaining
In Fairbanks Police Department Chapter, Alaska Public Em-
ployees Association v. City of Fairbanks,"' the Alaska Supreme
Court held that section 215(a) of the Public Employment Relations
Act ("PERA"), 7 9 which requires legislative approval of any mone-
tary aspect of a collective bargaining agreement with public em-
ployees, does apply to agreements reached through arbitration un-
der section 200(b) of PERA.7+ When the Fairbanks City Council
failed to fund the monetary award achieved by police department
employees in an agreement reached through arbitration, the em-
ployees sued to enforce the agreement.7" The court relied upon
"the explicit provision that section 215(a) applies to 'any agree-
ment entered into under [sections] 23.40.070-23.40.260,"' in hold-
ing that the agreement was not valid without legislative approval. M
The court also recognized that one purpose of section 215(a) is to
maintain control of public expenditures in the hands of the legisla-
ture.793 The court rejected the argument that the city was equitably
estopped from not honoring the award because the arbitration had
been characterized as binding. 4 In the face of such statutory clar-
ity, the court reasoned, the employees could have placed no reli-
ance on any perceived assertion that the city would waive its right
to refuse to fund the award.795
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Gentile,9 the supreme court
held that, under collective bargaining agreements between the city
and representatives of non-union command staff of the police and
fire departments, retirement medical benefits were not subject to
unilateral reduction by the city.79 Plaintiffs claimed that the Mu-
nicipality of Anchorage ("MOA") breached its contract by reduc-
787. See id. at 791-92.
788. 920 P.2d 273 (Alaska 1996).
789. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.30.070-.260 (Michie 1996).
790. See Fairbanks Police Dep't, 920 P.2d at 275. Section 200(b) of PERA
compels unresolved collective bargaining issues involving certain extremely es-
sential employees to be submitted to arbitration. See ALASKA STAT. §
23.30.200(b).
791. See Fairbanks Police Dep't, 920 P.2d at 274.
792. Id. at 275 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.215(a) (Michie 1996)).
793. See id. (citing Public Employees' Local 71 v. State, 775 P.2d 1062, 1064
(Alaska 1989)).
794. See id. at 276.
795. See id.
796. 922 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1996).
797. See id. at 260.
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ing retirement medical benefits contained in collective bargaining
agreements ("CBAs") with its non-union fire department and po-
lice department command staffs. 98 Since the language of the
agreements was not specific and could support either the plaintiffs'
interpretation that the benefits were vested in retirees for life or
MOA's interpretation that the benefits were vested only for the
duration of the CBAs (typically three years), the court turned to
extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties .7 After
reviewing the negotiation histories of the CBAs and the post-
formation conduct of the parties to the contract, the court con-
cluded that the trial judge's ruling for the plaintiffs on the breach
of contract claim was not clearly erroneous.
In State v. Alaska State Employees Ass'nIAFSCME Local 52,s°'
the supreme court held that the statute transferring employees
from the Alaska Department of Community and Regional Affairs
("DCRA") to the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation
("AHFC") did not entitle the employees to a continuation of
their collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs") after their trans-
fer."03 Despite evidence of legislative intent that the CBA be hon-
ored by AHFC, the court upheld the plain language of the stat-
ute, which delineated exactly what responsibilities and obligations
were to be transferred with the employees. The court also held
that the successor doctrine, which obligates employers to bargain
with the chosen representatives of employees transferred as a
business operation, is effective only if "(1) there [is] substantial
continuity of product, departmental organization, job functions,
and work force after the transfer, and (2) [the bargaining unit] re-
main[s] ... appropriate.., after the transfer."'  Therefore, the
court held that the Alaska Labor Relations Agency failed to con-
sider these two required factors in its analysis of whether the gen-
eral government bargaining unit, of which DCRA employees had
been a part, was still an appropriate bargaining unit for the em-
798. See id at 255.
799. See id- at 257.
800. See id. at 260.
801. 923 P.2d 18 (Alaska 1996).
802. 1992 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 4, § 142(a).
803. See State Employees Local 52, 923 P.2d at 28.
804. See id, at 23-24. The Alaska House of Representatives had adopted a Let-
ter of Intent, later approved by the Senate, stating that it intended that the CBA
be honored by AHFC. See id. at 18.
805. See id.; see also ALAsKA STAT. §§ 44.47.370-.560, .635 (Michie 1996).
806. State Employees Local 52, 923 P.2d at 25 (citing Northwest Arctic Reg'l
Educ. Attendance Area v. Alaska Pub. Serv. Employees Local 51, 591 P.2d 1292,
1295 (Alaska 1979)).
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ployees, and so remanded the case for further consideration on this
issue.'
In Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp.," the supreme court held that
an employee on strike whose position was subsequently filled by a
permanent replacement and whose union was decertified in an
election, was not an employee for purposes of state law in consid-
ering a tort for termination in breach of public policy.o Although
the supreme court noted that it had previously suggested that the
termination of an at-will employee might be illegal if it violated
some fundamental principle of public policy,810 it held in this case
that, even if it were formally to recognize such a tort, it would nec-
essarily be predicated on the presence of a contractual relationship
between the employer and the employee.811 In the absence of such
812a relationship, there can be no breach because there is no duty.
The court then held that, although Sever had been reinstated at
APC under the order of the NLRB, his rights under federal law
did not establish a contractual obligation toward him on the part of
APC under state law. 13 Furthermore, since any collective bar-
gaining agreement had expired when Sever's union was decertified
during the strike, and since the hiring of permanent replacements
terminated the employment relationship between Sever and APC,
there was no contractual relationship between Sever and APC.814
Therefore, Sever's claim of termination in breach of public policy
could not stand.815
D. Grievance Claims
In Alaska Public Employees Ass'n. v. Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation,' the Alaska Supreme Court held that, in
an employment grievance against the state that goes to arbitration,
the arbitrator has the authority to order that the employee be reas-
signed to a position that matches the function of his former posi-
tion, even if the new position differs in title from the original posi-
tion. 17 Noting that the arbitrator had contemplated the possibility
that the employee's new position would be nominally different
807. See id. at 27-28.
808. 931 P.2d 354 (Alaska 1996).
809. See id. at 358-59.
810. See ARCO Alaska v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150 (Alaska 1988).
811. See Sever, 931 P.2d at 357 (citing Akers, 753 P.2d at 1153.).
812. See id. at 358.
813. See id.
814. See id
815. See id at 357-59.
816. 929 P.2d 662 (Alaska 1996).
817. See id.
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from the original,"'8 the court ruled that the arbitrator was within
his authority to reinstate an employee to a different position than
his original position based on a similarity in function. . The court
relied on its holding in Sea Star Stevedore v. Local 302,2 in which it
had referred to an arbitrator the question of whether the arbitrator
had meant to restore an employee to his former job or to his for-
mer job function."" The court noted that "[i]t follows that the arbi-
trator had the authority to define the worker's former job by func-
tion, not just by his former title."'  The court supported its
holding by referring to the broad authority given arbitrators to
fashion any remedy necessary to resolve a dispute. 2
In Voight v. Snowden, 4 the supreme court held that a former
employee of the Alaska Court System could not be excused from
the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies in his griev-
ance for wrongful termination on the ground that administrative
appeal was futile." The court held that the involvement of the
Administrative Director of the Alaska Court System in an investi-
gation into the former employee's job performance, where the
Administrative Director was the ultimate decision-maker in an
administrative appeal of the termination, did not make it certain
that the appeal would end in a decision adverse to the employee,
especially where the involvement of the Administrative Director
was minimal, and appeal procedures provided for an objection to a
biased hearing officer.
In Romulus v. Anchorage School Districtw the supreme court
held that an employee's failure to exhaust contractual remedies in
a dispute with his employer did not automatically bar him from
proceeding in court against the employer if the contractual reme-
dies would be futile and where the employee did not receive notice
of a time limit for exercising such remedies.2s Romulus was sus-
pended without pay from his job as a Reserve Officer Training
Corps instructor at an Anchorage high school after he was accused
818. See id. at 665.
819. See id.
820. 769 P.2d 428 (Alaska 1989).
821. See Alaska Public Employees Ass'n, 929 P.2d at 666 (citing Sea Star Steve-
dore, 769 P.2d at 428).
822. Id..
823. See UdL (citing Board of Educ. v. Ewig, 609 P.2d 10, 12 (Alaska 1980)).
824. 923 P.2d 778 (Alaska 1996).
825. See id. at 783.
826. See id at 781-83.
827. 910 P.2d 610 (Alaska 1996).
828. See id. at 615-16.
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of sexually assaulting two of his students. 9 The manual that gov-
erned Romulus's rights in such a situation provided that his
"appeal of last resort" was to the school district's labor relations
director m The court held that, since it was the district's director
himself who had suspended Romulus, an appeal would be futile
and failure to do so did not bar the action in court. 1 The supreme
court further held that Romulus's action was not barred because
he failed to appeal within the ten-day time limit set by the manual,
because the district had failed to notify Romulus of the deadline. 2
The court also held that Romulus's due process rights were vio-
lated when he was suspended without pay before a hearing took
place, and remanded the case for a determination of the amount of
back pay Romulus was due. 3
E. Miscellaneous
In Stone v. International Marine Carriers,m the Alaska Su-
preme Court held that suits for willful failure to pay for mainte-
nance and cure against private operators of vessels owned by the
United States are precluded under the exclusivity clause of the
federal Suits in Admiralty Act ("SAA"), 5 which states that the
United States is the only available defendant in a suit for which the
SAA provides a remedy against the United States. 6 Stone, a sea-
man, was injured while working aboard a vessel owned by the
United States and operated by International Marine Carriers
("IMC").m Stone sued for IMC's refusal to pay maintenance and
cure.
838
The court initially noted that the tort of willful failure to pay
maintenance and cure traditionally has provided three remedies:
(1) compensatory damages for aggravation of injuries because of
failure to pay; (2) punitive damages; and (3) attorney's fees. 39 The
court held that because IMC was responsible for administering
maintenance and cure claims that were the responsibility of the
829. See id. at 611-12.
830. See id. at 615. The manual was the "Exempt Employees' Administrative
Procedures Manual" of the Anchorage School District. See id.
831. See id.
832. See id at 615-16.
833. See id. at 616-17.
834. 918 P.2d 551 (Alaska 1996).
835. 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1994).
836. See Stone, 918 P.2d at 557.
837. See id- at 552.
838. See id. at 553.
839. See id. at 555 (citing 1 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND
MARITIME LAW § 6-34, at 366-67 (2d ed. 1994)).
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United States under the SAA,' the United States could be held
responsible for compensation for aggravation of injuries caused by
unpaid maintenance and cure under agency theory."1 It held fur-
ther that, under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miles v.
Apex Marine Corp., punitive damages are no longer available in
general maritime law for willful failure to pay maintenance and
cure." 3 Finally the court held that, even though a recovery of at-
torney's fees against the United States was not provided for by the
SAA, because the law makes it clear that it is the United States
who is ultimately responsible for compensation for unpaid mainte-
nance and cure, attorney's fees cannot be sought from a private
operator." Thus, having established that the SAA provided for all
available remedies for Stone in an action against the United States,
the court held that Stone's action against IMC was precluded by
the exclusivity clause of the SAA.' 5
In Metcalfe Investments v. Garrison,846 the supreme court, in
overturning summary judgment for Garrison and her co-
defendants, held that an oral non-competition agreement does not
violate the statute of frauds if there is no clear time limit and that
the lack of a time limit or geographical restriction did not make the
agreement unenforceably vague. Garrison, a real estate broker,
had left her job with Metcalfe Investments and subsequently made
sales to customers from a list generated by Metcalfe at its ex-
pense.m Metcalfe claimed that this violated an oral agreement be-
tween the parties that Garrison, on leaving the firm, would not
take or use any lists of prospective customers."'
The court held that because the promise of the contract could
be completely fulfilled within one year (for example, by the death
of Garrison) the contract did not violate the statute of fraudsY
840. 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1994) (stating that as a vessel owner, the United States is
generally responsible for the same claims as would be available against a private
owner).
841. See Stone, 918 P.2d at 556.
842. 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
843. See Stone, 918 P.2d at 555 (citing Miles, 498 U.S. at 36). The Miles court
held that federal statute now dominates maritime law, and therefore any remedy
not specifically allowed therein is no longer available. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 36.
844. See Stone, 918 P.2d at 556-57.
845. See id. at 557.
846. 919 P.2d 1356 (Alaska 1996).
847. See id. at 1361-62.
848. See id. at 1359.
849. See id. at 1358.
850. See id at 1362 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmt.
b, illus. 9 (1981); ARTHUR L. CORBIN, 2 CORBIN ON CONTRACrS § 453 at 568
(1950)).
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Additionally, the court determined that if a covenant not to com-
pete was otherwise reasonable, a court could define such terms as
time and geographical limits to make the contract enforceable.51
Because the agreement was not a general restraint of trade, but
merely an agreement not to take Metcalfe's customers, it was
therefore subject to an even less stringent test of reasonableness
and did not need to define such terms."'
In Scott v. Briggs Way Co.,53 the supreme court held that an
employee of a fishing business who was injured while working on
land as a maintenance person prior to the fishing season was not a
"seaman" for purposes of invoking the Jones Act at the time of his
injury."4 The supreme court relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's
recent delineation of a two-part test for determining seaman status
under the Jones ActY5  First, the "employee's duties must
'contribut[e] to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment
of its mission.""" Second, "a seaman must have a connection to a
vessel in navigation... that is substantial in terms of both its dura-
tion and its nature."'' The U.S. Supreme Court also emphasized
that "the Jones Act remedy is reserved for sea-based maritime
employees whose work regularly exposes them to 'the special haz-
ards and disadvantages to which they who go down to sea in ships
are subjected. ' ' 'us In this case, the court held that since Scott was
working as a maintenance person on dry land and the salmon sea-
son was more than two weeks away, and since his maintenance du-
ties included no apparent connection to any vessel in navigation,
Scott was not a seaman at the time he was injured for purposes of
recovering under the Jones Act."9
IX. FAMILY LAW
This year, the Alaska Supreme Court handed down several
important decisions in Child in Need of Aid ("CINA") cases ad-
dressing whether a CINA adjudication, which permits the state to
take emergency custody of a neglected or abused child, to seek
851. See id at 1361.
852- See ic
853. 909 P.2d 345 (Alaska 1996).
854. See id at 348. The Jones Act is the federal statute that governs recovery
for the injury to or the death of a seaman. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (Supp. 1997).
855. See Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 115 S.Ct. 2172 (1995).
856. Id at 2190 (quoting McDermott Int'l v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355
(1991)).
857. Id.
858. Id. (quoting Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 104 (1946) (Stone,
C.J., dissenting)).
859. See Scott, 909 P.2d at 348.
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placement out of the home and to petition for termination of pa-
rental rights, can stand if the parent is willing to care for the child.
It also decided cases interpreting various elements of the CINA
statute, including the parental ability to care, imminent and sub-
stantial risk and neglect.
The supreme court decided several child custody cases in
1996, both reviewing trial court custody decisions and deciding
child custody procedural issues. The court also heard child support
cases involving the application of Civil Rule 90.3, which sets the
guidelines for determining the amount of child support in a given
case, as well as cases involving modification of support agreements
and other procedural issues. Finally, the court rendered several
important decisions concerning marital property, including
whether damages from a tort settlement agreement, bonds pur-
chased prior to marriage and individual fishing quotas could be
considered marital property.
A. Child in Need of Aid
In In re S.A.,860 the Alaska Supreme Court held that a child
cannot be adjudicated as a CINA under Alaska Statutes section
47.10.010(a)(2)(A)"6' if the parent or caregiver is willing to care for
the child.6 2 According to the court, the parent or caregiver's abil-
ity to care should not be considered under subsection A; instead,
subsections B through F address the ability to care criteria.863 In so
holding, the court explicitly overruled three prior cases that al-
lowed a subsection A CINA adjudication based on a parent's lack
of ability to care." The court based its decision on the plain lan-
guage of the statute, finding that subsection A covers the
"willingness to care" but not "ability to care." '65 The court also
looked to the structure of the statute and found that the ability to
860. 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).
861. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(2)(A) (Michie 1996). Since this decision,
Alaska Statutes section 47.10.010 has been amended such that subsections
(a)(2)(A)-(F) are now designated as (a)(1)-(6).
862. See S.A., 912 P.2d at 1242.
863. See id.
864. The three overruled cases are: A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995);
In re T.W.R., 887 P.2d 941 (Alaska 1994); In re J.L.F., 828 P.2d 166 (Alaska 1992).
865. S.A., 912 P.2d at 1239. Subsection A allows for CINA adjudication if the
child refuses to accept available care or has no parent, guardian, custodian, or
relative caring or willing to provide care. See ALASKA STAT. §
47.10.010(a)(2)(A). Subsections B through F allow for CINA adjudication if a
parent fails to provide medical treatment, causes or creates a risk of substantial
physical harm, sexually abuses the child, approves of the child's deliquent acts, or
physically abuses or neglects the child. See id. § 47.10.010(a)(2)(B)-(F).
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care is not relevant under subsection A because of the following:(1) considering ability to care under subsection A would permit
CINA adjudications for parenting deficiencies much less severe
than for those covered by subsections B through F; (2) in contrast
to subsection A, subsections B through F provide clear standards
for adjudicating a child CINA based on a parent's inability to care;
and (3) considering ability to care under subsection A would make
subsections B through F superfluous.866 Instead, the court deter-
mined that the better way to interpret and apply subsection A is in
situations where the parent abandons the child, the child runs away
or the child refuses to accept the parent's care.867
The supreme court affirmed the In re S.A. ruling in In re
J.L.F.,"8 holding that subsection A of the statute 69 does not call for
an assessment of a caregiver's ability to careY0 Quoting S.A., the
court stated that "'a child may not be adjudicated CINA [under
subsection A] on the grounds that the child's parent or caregiver is
unable to care for the child if the parent or caregiver is willing to
care for the child.' 1 The court then reversed the superior court's
determination that the children qualified as CINA under subsec-
tion A 2 since the two children in this case had relatives willing to
care for themY3
The court also held that the statute under which a parent's
rights can be terminated when she unreasonably withholds her
consent to adoption 4 did not apply in this case for two reasons.
First, the statute may be applied only to the remedial phase of a
CINA proceeding. Since the CINA determination was found to be
erroneous, the statute could not be appliedY5 Second, the statute
applies only to parents who do not have custody. Here, because
there was no court order depriving the mother of visitation rights,
she did not lack custody within the meaning of the statute. 6
Similarly, in R.R. v. State,"' the supreme court held that a par-
ent's "ability to care" is not relevant in deciding if a child is a
866. See S.A., 912 P.2d at 1239-40.
867. See iL at 1240.
868. 912 P.2d 1255 (Alaska 1996).
869. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(2)(A).
870. See J.L.E, 912 P.2d at 1260.
871. Id. (quoting S.A., 912 P.2d at 1235).
872. See id- at 1265.
873. See id, at 1261-63.
874. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.180(c)(2) (Michie 1996).
875. See J.L.F., 912 P.2d at 1264.
876. See icL at 1264-65.
877. 919 P.2d 754 (Alaska 1996).
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CINA under subsection AY The court stated that the legislature
intended the state to assume custody of minors only to remedy se-
vere parenting deficiencies and prevent significant harm to chil-
dren." The court held that its finding in In re S.A.m applies to
cases where there is a relative willing toprovide care, since the
terms "parent" and "relative" are parallel. In this case, since the
child was not without a "parent, guardian, custodian, or relative
caring or willing to care" for her, the superior court's CINA find-
ing was vacated.'
The supreme court also held that, in applying CINA Rule
15(g),m which requires the state to make reasonable efforts to pre-
vent removal of a child from his or her parents, the trial court need
only make a finding that the state's treatment plan for the child is
reasonable.' R.R., whose four children were removed from her
care due to her personality disorder, claimed that since the supe-
rior court's findings mentioned "only in passing" that reasonable
efforts were made to prevent removal of the children from her
home, the findings did not meet the CINA Rule 15(g) require-
ments."5  The supreme court found this claim to be without
merit."'
In F.T. v. Department of Health and Social Services," the su-
preme court affirmed the trial court's determination that R.T.,
daughter of F.T., was a CINA pursuant to subsection A,M since she
refused F.T.'s care."9 Evidence was presented from the child's
therapists, social workers and mother that she feared her father,
became extremely upset when the possibility of returning to his
care was mentioned and explicitly refused visitations with him.'
The court also held that the trial court's decision to deny com-
pletely F.T.'s visitation rights until he progressed in his treatment
programs was supported by clear and convincing evidence that
878. Id at 757.
879. See id.
880. 912 P.2d 1235 (Alaska 1996).
881. R.R., 919 P.2d at 757.
882. Id
883. ALASKA R. CINA P. 15(g).
884. See R.R., 919 P.2d. at 756.
885. Id. at 754.
886. See id.
887. 922 P.2d 277 (Alaska 1996).
888. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(2)(A) (Michie 1996). Under the statute, a
child may be adjudicated a CINA for "being habitually absent from home or re-
fusing to accept available care, or having no parent, guardian, custodian, or rela-
tive caring or willing to provide care, including physical abandonment.... ." Id
889. See F. T., 922 P.2d at 280.
890. See id. at 280-81.
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such visitations would result in serious harm to the child."9 '
In TB. v. State,9 the supreme court reversed the trial court's
CINA adjudication pursuant to Alaska Statutes section 47.10.010
(a)(2)(A), (C) and (F)."' First, the court held that one isolated in-
cident in which T.B. yelled at and threatened the child did not es-
tablish an "'imminent and substantial risk"' that the child would
suffer substantial physical harm as required under subsection C.' 4
Second, the court held that T.B.'s concern for her child's health
and safety provided a justifiable reason for her withdrawal of the
child from school for three months, so that "'substantial ... ne-
glect"' was not established as required under subsection F."
Third, the court held that the requirements of subsection A had
not been met since, although T.B.'s parental rights to the child had
been terminated at an earlier date, the child's guardian had legally
appointed T.B. as custodian of the child and T.B.'s two and one-
half years of caring for the child qualified her as a custodian
"'caring and willing to provide care"' for the child."6
In D.H. v. State,8 the supreme court held that the state pro-
vided ample evidence for the trial court to properly adjudicate
T.H. a CINA under Alaska Statutes section 47.10.010(a)(2)(F) 98
when it showed that the mother was a drug addict, failed to estab-
lish a parent-child relationship with her daughter, T.H., and was
not available to provide for her daughter's daily care.'" The court
further held that the state's attempts to assist the mother in en-
rolling and completing drug rehabilitation programs adequately
fulfilled the state's duties under CINA Rules 15(g) and 17(c)(2),'
which require the state to pursue efforts to prevent removal of a
child from her parents and make reasonable efforts toward reunifi-
cation.Y However, the court held that the state failed to provide
sufficient evidence that T.H. would suffer serious emotional or
physical damage if left in the mother's custody, as is required un-
891. See id. at 282. When visitation rights are actually or constructively termi-
nated, the clear and convincing evidence standard is applied. See In re D.P., 861
P.2d 1166, 1167 (Alaska 1993).
892. 922 P.2d 271 (Alaska 1996).
893. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(2)(A), (C), (F) (Michie 1996); see T.B., 922
P.2d at 276.
894. T.B., 922 P.2d. at 274 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(2)(C)).
895. Id. at 274-75 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(2)(F)).
896. Id. at 275 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(2)(A)).
897. 929 P.2d 650 (Alaska 1996).
898. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(2)(F).
899. See D.H., 929 P.2d at 654.
900. ALASKA R. CINA P. 15(g), 17(c)(2).
901. See D.H., 929 P.2d at 654.
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der CINA Rule 17(c)(2) when the child is a Native Alaskan. '
Therefore, the court remanded the decision to the trial court for it
to make explicit findings on the issue of whether or not there
would be any such damage.m
In In re J.B.,9 4 the supreme court held that the state had the
authority to seek a determination of paternity in a case that raised
substantial questions concerning parentage.' 5 In making its de-
termination as to the appropriate caregiver for a child adjudicated
as a CINA, the superior court found that the paternity of the
child's presumptive father was an important consideration.' The
supreme court, relying on precedent set in Utah and California,
affirmed the superior court's authority to grant the state's motion
for a finding that the presumptive father was not the child's father
based on evidence from a paternity test.9s
B. Child Custody
In Rooney v. Rooney,9 the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed
the superior court's decision to award primary physical custody of
Morgan Rooney to Thomas Rooney, the former husband of Mor-
gan's biological mother.! The supreme court upheld the superior
court's broad discretion in determining custody questions and
found that, while Thomas was not Morgan's biological parent, the
court did not err in applying the best interests of the child as the
deciding standard.91' The supreme court then held that since the
mother had not made a claim to a biological preference right over
Morgan in the Rooney's 1987 divorce decree, the principle of col-
lateral estoppel precluded her from now asserting such a claim.912
The supreme court also found that the superior court did not abuse
its discretion in considering the relevant statutory factors of conti-
nuity, child's preference and cultural needs. 913 In particular, the
902 See id. at 656.
903. See id.
904. 922 P.2d 878 (Alaska 1996).
905. See id. at 880.
906. See id.
907. J.W.F. v. Schoolcraft, 763 P.2d 1217, 1221 (Utah App. 1988), rev'd on
other grounds, 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990); In re Lisa R., 532 P.2d 123, 127-28
(Cal.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1014 (1975).
908. See J.B., 922 P.2d at 881.
909. 914 P.2d 212 (Alaska 1996).
910. See id. at 216.
911. See id.
912. See id.
913. See id. at 216-18 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c), (c)(3), (c)(5)
(Michie 1996)).
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court determined that, although Morgan expressed a preference to
share his time equally with his mother and Thomas (who lived in
different cities), a preference that results entirely from the child's
desire to satisfy his parent's wishes does not fall within the man-
dates of the statute. r4 Finally, the supreme court held that the su-
perior court is not required to follow a guardian ad litem's recom-
mendations.915 As long as the court's reasons for rejecting the
custody investigation are not clearly erroneous, the court does not
abuse its discretion. 6
In Vachon V. Pugliese,1 7 the supreme court held that the trial
court erroneously weighed the statutory custody factors in award-
ing custody to Pugliese when it discounted the continuity and sta-
bility factors.1 After living together for three years in Alaska and
having a child, Vachon and Pugliese separated.99 A year after the
separation, Vachon returned to her family's home in Massachu-
setts with the child.m Pugliese petitioned the Alaska superior
court to establish paternity, custody, visitation and support. ' The
court subsequently awarded custody to Pugliese and denied
Vachon's claim for child support.9
On appeal, the supreme court reversed the child custody or-
der, returning custody to Vachon. The court found that the trial
court had erred in concluding that Vachon's conduct of moving
with the child to Massachusetts was wrongful and constituted cus-
todial interference.' The supreme court found that Vachon did
not conceal the child's location, violate a court custody order or
make threats that Pugliese would never see the child again.m Fur-
thermore, Vachon complied with all the court's orders and facili-
tated visitations between Pugliese and the child.26 The court con-
cluded that the statutory best interest factors indicated that
Vachon should have custody, given that she was the primary care-
giver and the child's sole custodian after the parties separated and
therefore the award of custody to Vachon would foster the interest
914. See id. at 217-18.
915. See id. at 219.
916. See id.
917. 931 P.2d 371 (Alaska 1996).
918. See id. at 379.
919. See id. at 374.
920. See id.
921. See id.
922. See id
923. See id. at 380.
924. See id. at 376-79.
925. See id. at 378.
926. See id.
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of continuity and stability.'
In Hayes v. Hayes,' the supreme court held that a decision by
the custodial parent to move the children away from their previous
home does not need to be supported by clear and convincing evi-
dence that such a move is in the children's best interests. 929 In-
stead, it must be shown that it is in the children's best interest to
remain in the custody of the present custodial parent given the
proposed move.93 The supreme court also affirmed the trial
court's denial of the husband's motion to require the wife to repay
the Permanent Fund Dividend ("PFD") money she borrowed from
the children, basing its decision on prior case law and the legisla-
ture's silence as to what parents must do with PFD money received
on behalf of unemancipated minors.93
In Kelly v. Kelly,9 the supreme court held that a divided cus-
tody award, in which the child would alternately live with each
parent for six months until the child began kindergarten, was not
an abuse of discretion since no evidence indicated that this ar-
rangement would be harmful to the child.933 The supreme court
also held that the permanent custody order, which awarded the
mother custody of the child for the school year and the father cus-
tody during vacations, was not supported by the record since find-
ings indicated a preference for the father as the primary custodian
but no findings were made to support awarding primary custody to
the mother.9  Therefore, the supreme court vacated and re-
manded the permanent custody order.935
In Mariscal v. Watkins,936 the supreme court vacated the supe-
rior court's orders in a child custody case that neither parent ex-
pose the child to inappropriate sexual behavior, use alcohol in the
child's presence or drive with the child within twelve hours of
having consumed alcohol.937 The superior court had made no
findings with respect to the parent's sexual conduct and had spe-
927. See icL at 380.
928. 922 P.2d 896 (Alaska 1996).
929. See id. at 899.
930. See id. at 899-900 n.5 (citing House v. House, 779 P.2d 1204, 1208 (Alaska
1989)).
931. See id. at 900-01 (citing Lee v. Cox, 790 P.2d 1359 (Alaska 1990) (holding
that "there is no law in [Alaska] requiring parents to set aside their children's
permanent funds")).
932. 926 P.2d 1168 (Alaska 1996).
933. See id. at 1168-69.
934. See id.
935. See id
936. 914 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1996).
937. See id. at 221-22.
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cifically found there to be no evidence of alcohol abuse.938 The su-
preme court cautioned the superior court to consider only proper
factors in making custody decisions and stated that the court
"[should] not unnecessarily impose its moral values upon a liti-
gant. 939
In R.F. v. S.S.,9" the supreme court held that a father con-
victed of murdering his wife did not have custody of his child and
could not reasonably withhold consent to the child's adoption by
his deceased wife's parents.941 The child's grandparents had physi-
cal custody of the child from the time of his mother's murder and
were granted custody pending adoption of the child.942 Under
Alaska Statutes section 25.23.180(c)(2), 3 a court may issue an or-
der terminating a parent and child relationship where "'a parent
who does not have custody of the child is unreasonably withhold-
ing consent to adoption, contrary to the best interest of the minor
child... ."944 The supreme court rejected R.F.'s contention that
his refusal to consent was not unreasonable until all appeals were
exhausted. The court found that R.F.'s chances for success were
very slight and that leaving the child in limbo while R.F. pursued
all possible post-conviction remedies would not advance the best
interests of the child.945
In Bird v. Starkey,946 the supreme court held that the trial court
must articulate the reasons for its child custody decision where
those reasons are not apparent from the record.9' Since the par-
ents of Justin, who shared joint custody of him, could not agree on
which school he should attend, Justin's mother filed a motion in
superior court for an order allowing Justin to attend her school of
choice.9" The court issued an order for Justin to attend this school
without any accompanying explanation.49 In remanding this deci-
sion, the supreme court explained that, when making such deci-
sions, "'the trial court must provide adequate findings of fact.., so
that a reviewing court may clearly understand the grounds on
938. See id.
939. Id.
940. 928 P.2d 1194 (Alaska 1996).
941. See id. at 1197-98.
942. See id. at 1194-95.
943. ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.180(c)(2) (Michie 1996).
944. R.F., 928 P.2d at 1195 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.180(c)(2)).
945. See id. at 1197-98.
946. 914 P.2d 1246 (Alaska 1996).
947. See id. at 1249.
948. See id. at 1247.
949. See id. at 1248.
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which the lower court reached its decision."' 950
In McDow v. McDow,95 the supreme court affirmed the supe-
rior court's holding that it did not have jurisdiction to hear a child
custody case since Washington was the home state of the child and
was the state where the original custody decree was entered. 2
Bobbie McDow had entered a complaint seeking custody of her
sister's child based on alleged neglect and abuse. The sister lived
in Washington and had been awarded custody of the child after her
divorce; however, the sister had sent the child to live with Bobbie
for the six months preceding this action.9M In resolving the jurisdic-
tion issue, the court looked to the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act955 and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,956 and
found that the Alaska superior court could not modify the Wash-
ington custody decree because the Washington court retained con-
tinuing and exclusive jurisdiction to modify the decree.9" The
court also looked to Washington law to make this determination,
applying Greenlaw v. Smith9 to hold that a "'court which enters a
child custody decree continues to have jurisdiction to modify that
decree so long as one of the parties remains in the state and so long
as the child's contact with the state continues to be more than
slight."959
In Jones v. Jones,96 the supreme court held that the
"reprehensibility standard,"96' which applies when a party has ab-
ducted or retained physical custody of the child in order to gain a
custody decree, 962 should also apply when similar behavior is ex-
hibited in order to modify a custody decree of another state.963
Applying this standard to Mr. Jones's actions of filing a motion in
950. Id. (quoting Waggoner v. Foster, 904 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Alaska 1995)).
951. 908 P.2d 1049 (Alaska 1996).
952. See id. at 1053.
953. See id at 1050.
954. See id
955. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1996).
956. ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.30.010-.910 (Michie 1996).
957. See McDow, 908 P.2d at 1053.
958. 869 P.2d 1024 (Wash. 1994).
959. McDow, 908 P.2d at 1052 (quoting Greenlaw, 869 P.2d at 1027).
960. 925 P.2d 1339 (Alaska 1996).
961. The court concluded in Stokes v. Stokes, 751 P.2d 1363 (Alaska 1988) that
the reprehensibility standard applies when the conduct is "so objectionable that a
court... cannot in good conscience permit the party access to its jurisdiction." Id.
at 1366.
962 See Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, ALASKA STAT. §
25.30.070(b) (Michie 1996); Kimmons v. Heldt, 667 P.2d 1245 (Alaska 1983).
963. See Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, ALASKA STAT. §
25.30.070(b); Jones, 925 P.2d at 1342-43.
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Alaska courts to modify the California child custody decree and of
keeping his children in Alaska after their visitation period in viola-
tion of the decree, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's
award of attorney's fees under section 25.30.070(c)9" to Mrs.
Jones.965
C. Child Support
In Berkbigler v. Berkbigler,9" the Alaska Supreme Court re-
manded the superior court's modification of a child support award
because the court failed to make specific findings supporting its
variation of the award from that required by the calculations of
Civil Rule 90.3.967 The superior court had denied Judy Berkbigler's
request to increase the award when Randall Berkbigler's transfer
to England resulted in increased income.m The superior court de-
nied the increase because it concluded that Randall's cost of living
and the cost of transporting his children to England for visitation
had also increased.96 9 However, the superior court failed to make
explicit findings regarding Randall's adjusted annual income,
failed to specify the amount of support required by Rule 90.3 and
failed to make specific findings in support of its variation from the
formula in Rule 90.3. 9'0 The supreme court remanded for these
findings, holding that specific findings are necessary in order to re-
view the decision on appealY
The court further held that a non-custodial parent who expe-
riences an increase in income cannot be excused from paying addi-
tional support by showing that the children's needs are already
being met by the current support award . In addition, the court
held that the non-custodial parent's "fair share" of child support is
the amount fixed by the guidelines of Rule 90.3 and should not be
reduced due to personal debt unless the parent can show his or her
expenses to be "extraordinary" as defined by 90.3(c)(1)(A) 3
964. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, ALASKA STAT. § 25.30.070(c).
965. See Jones, 925 P.2d at 1343.
966. 921 P.2d 628 (Alaska 1996).
967. See id. at 631 (citing ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3(c)(1)).
968. See id. at 630.
969. See id.
970. See id. at 631.
971. See id.
972. See id. at 631-32 (citing ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3 commentary II, which
states that Rule 90.3 "operates on the principle that as the income available to
both parents increases, the amount available to support the children also will in-
crease").
973. See id at 632 (citing ALASKA R. CIV. P. 90.3 commentary II; ALASKA R.
Civ. P. 90.3(c)(1)(A)).
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In Turinsky v. Long,' the supreme court held that, when
there is no material factual dispute regarding child support, the
court may calculate the child support without a hearing." How-
ever, the court remanded the calculation of child support because
the superior court erroneously relied on the amount of visitation
actually exercised, instead of the visitation ordered by the court, to
calculate support arrearages. 6 The court also remanded the child
support calculation because the superior court based its calcula-
tions on Rule 90.3(a),m indicating one parent had sole or primary
custody of all the children during the entire period of dispute,
when, in fact, custody status changed between the first custody or-
der and the second order entered four years later. 78 The court
stated that the most accurate way to calculate support in such a
situation was to calculate it for each interim period independ-
ently. 
9
The court also stated that if a custody order did not give either
parent sole or primary physical custody of all the children and also
did not give both parents shared custody of all the children, then a
"hybrid" calculation authorized by Rule 90.3(c) should be made,
applying Rule 90.3(a) for children in one parent's sole or primary
custody and Rule 90.3(b) for children whose custody is shared, and
then offsetting or adding the results to determine the net obliga-
tion for each period."' Finally, the supreme court affirmed the su-
perior court's visitation order as sufficiently detailed, even though
the order was orally issued and not recorded."'
In Richmond v. Pluid," the supreme court held that the ruling
in Cox v. Cox,"' which held that child support waivers are not valid
or enforceable unless reviewed and algroved by a court pursuant
to the requirements of Civil Rule 90.3, should be aplied retroac-
tively to the date when Civil Rule 90.3 was enacted. The parties
974. 910 P.2d 590 (Alaska 1996). The parties in this case have been before the
Alaska Supreme Court once before concerning the same divorce and child cus-
tody issues. See Long v. Long, 816 P.2d 145 (Alaska 1991).
975. See Turinsky, 910 P.2d at 594 (distinguishing Adrian v. Adrian, 838 P.2d
808 (Alaska 1992) as requiring an evidentiary hearing only when there is a dis-
pute, such as when one party contests the other's income statement).
976. See id. at 595.
977. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3.
978. See Turinsky, 910 P.2d at 595-97.
979. See id.
980. See id. at 596.
981. See id. at 593.
982. 925 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1996).
983. 776 P.2d 1045 (Alaska 1989).
984. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3.
985. See Richmond, 925 P.2d at 255. Civil Rule 90.3 was enacted August 1,
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had entered into a side agreement partially waiving Pluid's child
support obligations.96 The court found that retroactive application
did not violate the four conditions established in Plumley v. Hale9.7
to determine whether a judicial ruling should solely be applied
prospectively.9" First, while the Cox decision was a case of first
impression, it was foreshadowed by the adoption of Civil Rule
90.3."99 Second, justifiable reliance on an alternative interpretation
of law did not exist at the time when Richmond and Pluid pre-
sented their agreement to the court, since the Cox holding was de-
cided two weeks prior to the parties' hearing.9" Third, undue hard-
ship would not occur from retroactive application.99' Finally, the
court decided that broad, retroactive application of the Cox deci-
sion would best accomplish the purpose of Civil Rule 90.3 to en-
sure adequate child support.9"
In Taylor v. McGlothlin,93 the supreme court reversed a supe-
rior court decision to modify retroactively a child support agree-
ment formed in 1976 because, even though it had not been judi-
cially approved, the agreement was legally enforceable at the time
it was made.94 Following an earlier decision," 5 the court then
found that a child support agreement created before Rule 90.3 was
enacted is immune to retroactive modification. 6
The supreme court further held that the superior court did not
err in setting Taylor's prospective child support payments at an
amount less than the Rule 90.3 calculations required.99 The supe-
rior court had correctly found that "substantial hardship" would
occur to Taylor's "subsequent children" if a deviation from the
Rule 90.3 level of support was not made.998 However, the court
remanded this portion to the superior court to reconsider in light
of the fact that retroactive modification of the child support would
1987.
986. See id. at 252.
987. 594 P.2d 497 (Alaska 1979).
988. See Richmond, 925 P.2d at 254. The parents did not present this side
agreement to the court when seeking approval of the settlement agreement. See
id. at 251.
989. See id. at 254.
990. See id.
991. See id. at 255.
992. See id.
993. 919 P.2d 1349 (Alaska 1996).
994. See id. at 1352-53.
995. See Malekos v. Yin, 655 P.2d 728 (Alaska 1982).
996. See Taylor, 919 P.2d at 1353.
997. See id. at 1353-55.
998. Id. at 1349 (citing ALASKA R. Crv. P. 90.3(c)(3)).
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not occurn9
In Neilson v. Neilson," the supreme court vacated and re-
manded a superior court modification order pursuant to Civil Rule
90.3, because the superior court had erred in accepting the Mas-
ter's erroneous child support calculation.""' The Master had dis-
allowed approximately $7,020 worth of Robert's claimed business
expenses, in part because the Master had relied on the wife's
"unsubstantiated" review of Robert's expenses.", The supreme
court held that the determinative factor as to whether a claimed
expense is deductible under Rule 90.3 is "whether it is an 'ordinary
and necessary expense required to produce the income' and
whether the allowance of such an expense would defeat the goals
of Civil Rule 90.3. "103
In Boone v. Gipson,"' the supreme court narrowly construed
the exception to the general prohibition on modifying child sup-
port payments retroactively, holding that it applies both to in-
creases and decreases in child support00 Boone challenged the
superior court's retroactive application of increased child support
payments upon Gipson's motion for reconsideration, arguing that
granting the motion without affording him an opportunity to re-
spond was a violation of Civil Rule 77(k)(3)." ° Rule 77(k)(3) pro-
vides that "[n]o response shall be made to a motion for reconsid-
eration unless requested by the court, but a motion for
reconsideration will ordinarily not be granted in the absence of
such a request."' The supreme court held that "in the absence of
an explanation of a compelling reason for it not to request a re-
sponse, the superior court abused its discretion in granting Gip-
son's motion for reconsideration" without allowing Boone to re-
spond."l3
The court also held that former Civil Rule 90.3(h)(2),'00 which
prohibits retroactive modification of child support -payments, ap-
plies to decreases as well as increases in payments.""' Therefore, it
limited the application of the increased payments to the date when
999. See id- at 1355.
1000. 914 P.2d 1268 (Alaska 1996).
1001. See id. at 1274.
1002. Id.
1003. Id. at 1273 (quoting ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3).
1004. 920 P.2d 746 (Alaska 1996).
1005. See id. at 748.
1006. See id. at 747; see also ALAsKA R. CIv. P. 77(k)(3).
1007. Boone, 920 P.2d at 748.
1008. Id.
1009. Former ALASKA R. Civ. P. 90.3(h)(2) (amended effective July 15, 1995).
1010. See Boone, 902 P.2d at 749.
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Boone was served with a motion for modification.1 11
In State v. Demers,"" the supreme court held that the plain
language of the statutory provisions for the execution of judg-
ments, Alaska Statutes section 09.35.010,0 does not give the court
discretion to decide whether to issue a writ of execution once a
valid judgment for the payment of the money has been entered. °4
Furthermore, the statutes controlling parental support payments
confine the court's discretion to determining whether judgment
should be granted."15 Once the court determines the amount of
money owed, it has no power to restrict or condition the execution
of the judgment.1 6 The supreme court concluded that since the
legislature has created a child support system in which the courts
are without power directly to forgive or modify child support pay-
ments after they become due and unpaid, courts should also be
without power to do so indirectly by restricting executions of those
judgments. 17
In Van Alfen v. Van Alfen '0 8 the supreme court held that the
plain terms of a marriage dissolution agreement determine the ef-
fective date when child support payments can be increased.0 9 The
agreement in this case contained two grounds for self-executing in-
creases in support payment, one following an annual review on
September 1 to make adjustments if the divorced father's income
had increased, and the other upon the occurrence of the father's
"graduation and his employment in a new position at a higher rate
of pay."'m The superior court had authorized an increase in pay-
ments on February 1 due to the father's new employment. How-
ever, since the father had not in fact graduated, the supreme court
held that it was error to rely on the second ground to increase the
support payments."' 1 Nevertheless, the supreme court remanded
for entry of the increased payment order to begin September 1,
1993, when the annual review would have accounted for the in-
crease in the father's income."°
1011. See id.
1012. 915 P.2d 1219 (Alaska 1996).
1013. ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.010 (Michie 1996).
1014. See Demers, 915 P.2d at 1219 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.010).
1015. See id at 1220 (citing ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.27.225-.226 (Michie 1996)).
1016. See id
1017. See id
1018. 909 P.2d 1075 (Alaska 1996).
1019. See it at 1077.
1020. Id.
1021. See id. at 1077-78.
1022. See id. at 1078.
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In State v. Carrick,1° the supreme court held that the Child
Support Enforcement Division ("CSED") must provide further in-
formation regarding the procedural steps necessary to redirect to
the CSED the monthly payments the defendant currently receives
from the Department of Veteran Affairs ("DVA") and uses to
meet part of his child support obligation, so that the CSED is re-
imbursed for its public assistance to the child's mother."124 Since
CSED had provided the child's mother with public assistance, it
had a right to all subsequent support paid to her.'m However, the
court held that, until CSED demonstrates that it is legally feasible
to redirect the payments by the DVA so that they are paid to
CSED instead of to the mother, Carrick is entitled to have the
payments to the mother credited against his monthly child support
obligations.'0° 4
In DeVaney v. State,1 the supreme court held that the trial
court was entitled to correct a clerical error in the stated amount of
child support sua sponte pursuant to Civil Rule 60(a).'01 In this
case, the court and both parents had agreed that DeVaney would
pay $175 per child per month in child support to his former wife,
but the court's order mistakenly stated the child support as $175
per month."°2 Despite the error, DeVaney paid the full $175 per
child per month, but neither party informed the court of the mis-
take."'0 Seven years later, while reviewing the files to respond to
DeVaney's recent petition for reduction in his child support obli-
gation, the court discovered the error and amended the order to
reflect the court's original decree.0 3' DeVaney appealed this
amendment, claiming a violation of due process and the inapplica-
bility of Rule 60(a) in this situation. 1 3 2 The court concluded that
DeVaney could not show an interest of sufficient importance to
warrant due process protection, and, because the error was prop-
erly characterized as a clerical one, Rule 60(a) allowed the court to
correct the error sua sponte.1
033
1023. 923 P.2d 803 (Alaska 1996).
1024. See id at 806.
1025. See i& at 805.
1026. See id
1027. 928 P.2d 1198 (Alaska 1996).
1028. See id. at 1200; ALASKA R. Civ. P. 60(a).
1029. See DeVaney, 928 P.2d. at 1199.
1030. See id.
1031. See id.
1032. See i at 1199-1200.
1033. See i at 1200.
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D. Marital Property
In Hatten v. Hatten,'O the Alaska Supreme Court held that the
designation or structuring of damages in a tort settlement agree-
ment does not control whether divorce action proceeds are sepa-
rate or marital property.1035 The court acknowledged that under
Bandow v. Bandow,ns "'to the extent a tort recovery compensates
for losses to the marital estate, it is marital property. To the extent
the recovery compensates for losses to a spouse's separate estate, it
is his or her separate property."" °  However, the court held that
this test does not preclude the superior court from reclassifying
damages. 38 The court then remanded the case for a determination
of whether the spouse's proceeds from the settlement of a wrong-
ful termination claim is marital property."°9 The court also af-
firmed the superior court's decision to divide prospective proceeds
from a pending litigation as of the date of the domestic trial in-
stead of the couple's separation date because the now-objecting
spouse effectively waived his argument against this date during
trial.'m
In Lundquist v. Lundquist,0 4' the supreme court held that "an
award of punitive damages should be apportioned in the same
manner as the underlying compensatory damages award" when di-
viding property in divorce proceedings.' 42 The court, by analogy,
also followed the Bandow v. Bandow0 43 rule. The court rejected
possible per se rules that punitive damages be treated always as
separate property or always as marital property."
In Gardner v. Harris, 45 the supreme court held that bonds
purchased prior to marriage and then transferred to a couple's
joint account during the marriage for the purpose of gaining credit
for marital use were correctly considered separate, pre-marital as-
1034. 917 P.2d 667 (Alaska 1996).
1035. See id at 673.
1036. 794 P.2d 1346 (Alaska 1990)
1037. Hatten, 917 P.2d at 672 (quoting Bandow, 794 P.2d at 1350).
1038. See id. at 672-73.
1039. See id
1040. See id. at 672.
1041. 923 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1996).
1042. Id. at 51.
1043. 794 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Alaska 1990) (providing that when compensatory
damages compensate for losses to the marital estate, they are marital property,
and when they compensate for losses to a separate estate, they are separate prop-
erty).
1044. See Lundquist, 923 P.2d at 50-51.
1045. 923 P.2d 96 (Alaska 1996).
[Vol. 14:1
YEAR IN REVIEW
sets by the trial court."" Harris had purchased the bonds prior to
the marriage and later transferred the bonds into the couple's joint
"Cash Management Account" against which both spouses wrote
checks and made credit card transactions.1 47 The couple used the
interest from the bonds for joint expenses and used the bonds as
collateral to refinance jointly-owned real estate.' ° However, the
trial court found that the "corpus of the bonds remained intact
throughout the marriage, and matured as it would have even if the
parties had never married; nor had [the parties] ever placed them
in a joint account.""49 Therefore, Harris retained the money left
from the bonds after they had been deemed his separate prop-
erty. 05
0
In Ferguson v. Ferguson,0 5' the supreme court held that an in-
dividual fishing quota ("IFQ") created a property interest which, if
marital, was subject to division in a divorce proceeding. 52 The
court found that an IFQ had independent value because it granted
the holder the right to compete in a limited access industry.To' The
court also found that for the purposes of a divorce proceeding, the
IFQ qualified as marital property only to "'the extent that it is at-
tributable to work performed during the marriage.""0 4 Therefore,
the court reversed the trial court's holding that the entire interest
in the IFQ was marital property, and instead held that, because the
husband had possesed the IFQ for several years prior to the mar-
riage, the value of the IFQ attributable to the work performed
prior to the marriage qualified as separate property.'
In McCoy v. McCoy,'0 56 the supreme court held that the trial
court did not clearly err in declining to apply a rescission remedy
in dividing property in a divorce proceeding because it found that
1046. See i at 100.
1047. See id. at 97.
1048. See id.
1049. Id. at 98-99. In determining the nature of the property, the trial court
considered the following factors: (1) evidence that both spouses have actively par-
ticipated in the ongoing maintenance and management of the property; (2) evi-
dence of an oral or written agreement to convert pre-marital property to, or keep
it separate from, marital property; and (3) although commingling is not automati-
cally indicative of intent to join property, "'placing separate property in joint
ownership is rebuttable evidence that the owner intended the property to be
marital."' Id. (quoting Chotiner v. Chotiner, 829 P.2d 829, 833 (Alaska 1992)).
1050. See id.
1051. 928 P.2d 597 (Alaska 1996).
1052. See id. at 599-600.
1053. See id.
1054. Id (quoting Chotiner v. Chotiner, 829 P.2d 829, 832 (Alaska 1992)).
1055. See id. at 600.
1056. 926 P.2d 460 (Alaska 1996).
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the couple had significantly commingled their assets during the
marriage." The supreme court also held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in declining to invade the premarital prop-
erty in fashioning an equitable distribution between the couple.
According to the court, because the spouses had shared domestic
responsibilities, there was no need to invade Mrs. McCoy's pre-
marital property in order to compensate Mr. McCoy for any non-
pecuniary services that benefitted the property.
10 58
In Musser v. Johnson,59 the supreme court reversed the supe-
rior court's award of attorney's fees in a divorce settlement be-
cause the court had not relied on relevant considerations when
awarding the fees.' m Although the court has broad discretion to
award attorney's fees in a divorce action, prior decisions have held
that the court must consider "'the relative economics situation and
earning power of each party"' and the conduct of each party.3 6" If
"'a party has acted in bad faith or engaged in vexatious conduct,"'
then fees may be awarded.' 2 Since the parties' economic situa-
tions were equal and the husband's conduct was not vexatious, the
court's award of attorney's fees to the wife was found to be an
abuse of discretion.103
The supreme court affirmed the remaining portions of the di-
vorce decree, holding that the superior court did not err in refusing
to enforce the property settlement agreement, since the wife did
not "'understand fully the nature and consequences"' of her ac-
tions.' The court further held that the superior court may treat
the property division after a marriage of short duration as an ac-
tion in the nature of a rescission restoring the parties to their status
quo1 65 Finally, the superior court did not err in denying the hus-
band's motion to recuse as untimely since he waited six months to
file his motion after being notified of the presiding judge. 66
In Notkin v. Notkinl.7 the supreme court upheld a superior
court's set-aside of a prior property settlement agreement that was
1057. See id at 462.
1058. See idt at 464.
1059. 914 P.2d 1241 (Alaska 1996).
1060. See idt at 1243.
1061. Id. (quoting Streb v. Streb, 774 P.2d 798, 803 (Alaska 1989)).
1062. Id. (quoting Kowalski v. Kowalski, 806 P.2d 1368, 1373 (Alaska 1991)).
1063. See id.
1064. Idt at 1241-42 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.230(a)(1), (2) (Michie
1996)). The wife testified that she had been confused about the Agreement's
terms when she signed it. See idt
1065. See id at 1242 (citing Rose v. Rose, 755 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Alaska 1988)).
1066. See id (citing ALASKA R. Civ. P. 42(c)(3)).
1067. 921 P.2d 1109 (Alaska 1996).
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entered into before a divorce proceeding."° Although the agree-
ment had been filed with the superior court, the court had not ap-
proved it, nor had the court incorporated the agreement into a di-
vorce decree.' 9 The supreme court cited Kerslake v. Kerslake'01"
for the proposition that a separation agreement should be control-
ling absent evidence that it was entered into involuntarily or with-
out full understanding.Y"" In this case, the court stated that the
wife, originally from Thailand and not fully conversant in English,
did not possess a complete understanding of the nature and conse-
quences of that agreement at the time she entered into it.1"' 2 The
supreme court upheld the superior court's set-aside despite the fact
that testimony in the lower court suggested the wife "knew in a
general way that she was accepting an unfair arrangement in ex-
change for some immediate cash and finality."' ' 3
E. Miscellaneous
Other family law cases decided by the Alaska Supreme Court
in 1996 include cases involving restriction of visitation rights and
rehabilitative alimony. In J.EE. v. J.A.S.,' 74 the supreme court
held that in the absence of a finding that photographs and video-
tapes taken by the father of his unclothed child were lewd, sala-
cious, or evinced sexual abuse, there was not sufficient evidence to
restrict the father's visitation privileges.' °" The court held that the
photographs and video tapes in question were too innocent and in-
nocuous to support the trial court's order for supervised visitation
rights, finding that they were typical of baby pictures taken by non-
abusive parents and that there was no legal basis for the court to
condemn the tapes as inappropriate in themselves.'O"
The court further held that a visitation order created pursuant
to Alaska Statutes section 25.20.060(a) 0"" is to apply the "best in-
terest of the child" standard in determining the nature of the or-
der; when such an order requires supervised parental visitation, it
must be accompanied by findings, pursuant to Alaska Statutes sec-
tion 25.24.150(c),"' that specify how unsupervised visitation will
1068. See id. at 1111.
1069. See id.
1070. 609 P.2d 559 (Alaska 1980).
1071. See Notkin, 921 P.2d at 1111 (citing Kerslake, 609 P.2d at 560 n.1).
1072. See id.
1073. Id.
1074. 930 P.2d 409 (Alaska 1996).
1075. Seeid. at411.
1076. See id.
1077. ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060(a) (Michie 1996).
1078. Id. § 25.24.150(c).
1997]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
adversely affect the child's physical, emotional, mental, religious
and social well-being. "'
In Myers v. Myers,1 w the supreme court held that an award of
rehabilitative alimony, granted to minimize the economic effects of
a divorce on a spouse who has few job skills and little earning ca-
pacity, is proper when the spouse has a specific plan to pursue a
graduate degree after completing her undergraduate studies and
has identified a potential career goal; she does not need to enter
the job market immediately upon completion of her undergraduate
degree."" Furthermore, the supreme court held that the spouse's
full-time student status during the marriage did not preclude her
from receiving rehabilitative alimony.1m
X. INSURANCE LAW
The Alaska Supreme Court decided several cases in the insur-
ance law area in 1996. These cases discussed issues including the
efficient proximate cause rule, coverage of Rule 82 attorney's fees,
uninsured motorist liability and the statute of limitations for filing
a personal injury claim against a decedent's estate.
In State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Bongen, 3 the Alaska
Supreme Court held that an insurance policy provision excluding
from coverage any loss resulting from earth movement, regardless
of the cause, was enforceable. The Bongens had filed a claim for
the destruction of their home due to a mudslide induced by heavy
rains. State Farm denied coverage based on the exclusionary lan-
guage contained in the Bongens's policy.'' 5 The Bongens argued
that, because the mudslide was caused by the city of Kodiak when
it undermined the soils above their home, and because their policy
did not exclude loss caused by the city's negligence, their loss
should be covered under the efficient proximate cause rule, which
states that if the initial, precipitating cause of a multiple-cause loss
is covered by an insurance policy, the insurer is liable for the loss
even if subsequent causes are not covered by the policy.'O6 The
court rejected this argument, holding that the efficient proximate
cause rule did not apply in cases where the policy plainly excludes
1079. See J.F.E., 930 P.2d at 412-13.
1080. 927 P.2d 326 (Alaska 1996).
1081. See id. at 328.
1082. See id. at 329.
1083. 925 P.2d 1042 (Alaska 1996).
1084. See id. at 1048.
1085. See id. at 1043.
1086. See id. at 1043 n.1 (citing Schroeder v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 770 F.
Supp. 558 (D. Nev. 1991)).
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the type of damage that actually caused the loss. " Noting the su-
perior court's finding of apparent agreement among both parties
that "the policy terms as written exclude coverage in the present
case,"1 m the supreme court held that, since the policy terms were
unambiguous,' the earth movement exclusion in the Bongens's
policy was enforceable.'m
In Safety National Casualty Corp. v. Pacific Employers Insur-
ance Co.,'O' the supreme court held that excess insurers are not li-
able for contribution to primary insurers to cover attorney's fees
payable under Alaska Civil Rule 82'" when the total amount paid
does not exceed the policy limits of the primary insurer.'0 93 Safety
National Insurance Corporation acknowledged that it provided
unlimited primary coverage for Rule 82 fees, but claimed that Pa-
cific Employers Insurance Company was a co-insurer for such
payments." The supreme court rejected Safety's alleged distinc-
tion between Rule 82 attorney's fees and primary liability pay-
ments, and held that since the total settlement amount was within
Safety's policy limits, Pacific had no liability for contribution to
Safety.109
In Russell v. Criterion Insurance Co.,1 6 the supreme court
held that an insurance policy's language limiting the insurer's li-
ability for attorney's fees awarded against itself provided the clear
disclosure required where it disclosed the limitation by reference
to a percentage schedule as well as the insured's potential liability
for any fees awarded beyond the limitation." Under title 3, sec-
tion 29.010(a) of the Alaska Administrative Code," insurers may
limit their liability for attorney's fees awarded against their in-
sureds if the limit is not "less than the amount which would be al-
lowed under Civil Rule 82(a)(1) to the prevailing party in a con-
tested case if the amount recovered were equal to the liability limit
of the policy."' Section 29.010(d) requires that, if the insurer
wants to impose such a limit, it "must clearly disclose to its insured
1087. See id. at 1044-45.
1088. Id. at 1044.
1089. See id. at 1046.
1090. See id. at 1048.
1091. 927 P.2d 748 (Alaska 1996).
1092. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 82 (providing for award of attorney's fees).
1093. See Safety National, 927 P.2d at 751.
1094. See id. at 750-51.
1095. See id. at 751.
1096. 917 P.2d 664 (Alaska 1996).
1097. See id. at 667.
1098. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 29.010(a) (Michie Supp. 1997).
1099. Russell, 917 P.2d at 665 (quoting ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, §
29.010(a)).
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the limitation and the insured's potential liability for attorney fees
if judgment exceeds the liability limits of the policy."'1'n
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Harring-
ton,"O' the supreme court held that an agreement to settle an in-
sured's claim under uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage
("U coverage") for policy limits must include applicable Rule 82
attorney's fees and pre-judgment interest in addition to the facial
limits of the policy.10 Under Alaska Statutes section
21.89.020(c)(1),"" automobile liability insurance policies must pro-
vide U coverage limits equal to the limits voluntarily purchased to
cover the liability of the person insured for bodily injury or
death."' The court cited precedent establishing that "policy lim-
its" are construed to include not only the facial limits of the policy,
but also "such other sums as are payable in addition to facial lim-
its.""0 ' The court reasoned that since the evident purpose of sec-
tion 21.089.020(c)(1) was to provide for the insured the same bene-
fit in the event of a claim under U coverage as that for which he
would be liable under a claim against him, the inclusive construc-
tion of "policy limits" applied to U coverage as well as personal li-
ability coverage." 6
In Victor v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,"' the supreme
court held that, according to the insured's policy language, unin-
sured motorist ("UM") benefits for injuries caused by an unin-
sured tortfeasor and another joint tortfeasor were to be deter-
mined by deducting settlement payments by one tortfeasor from
the insured's total damages rather than from the UM policy lim-
its."" Victor was in an automobile accident involving two other
drivers, one of which was found by arbitrators to be 25% at fault
and the other, who was uninsured, was found to be 75% at fault."O"
Victor settled with the insured driver for $50,000. His insurer,
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. ("State Farm"), sought to deduct
that amount from Victor's UM coverage limit of $100,000.'0
State Farm argued that the liability limiting language in clause
1100. Id. (quoting ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 29.010(d)).
1101. 918 P.2d 1022 (Alaska 1996).
1102. See id2 at 1025-26.
1103. ALASKA STAT. § 21.89.020(c)(1) (Michie 1996).
1104. See Harrington, 918 P.2d. at 1025 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 21.89.020(c)(1)).
1105. Id. at 1026 (citing Hughes v. Harrelson, 844 P.2d 1106 (Alaska 1993);
Schulz v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 754 P.2d 265 (Alaska 1988)).
1106. See id.
1107. 908 P.2d 1043 (Alaska 1996).
1108. See id. at 1045.
1109. See id. at 1044.
1110. See id.
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7 of Victor's policy, "any amount payable under this coverage," re-
ferred to the limit of policy liability under clause 1, which in Vic-
tor's case was limited to $100,000. Victor, however, argued that
the limiting language referred instead to the language of the gen-
eral insuring clause of the policy under the Section III heading
"Coverage U," which in this case was found by an arbitrator to to-
tal close to $300,000.1112 In finding for Victor, the court found that
clauses 1 and 7 both modify the Coverage U insuring clause in-
stead of modifying or subordinating one another."" In addition,
the court noted that the underlying purpose of such reduction
clauses is to prevent double recoveries, which would not be fur-
thered by State Farm's interpretation requiring a reduction from
policy limits where total damages exceed the policy limits."'
4
In Hamilton v. Blackman,"'5 the supreme court held that the
four-month limitation period for filing claims against a decedent's
estate' 6 does not apply where the plaintiffs submitted a timely
claim with decendent's insurer that did not exceed the limits of in-
surance."' The court also held that the two-year personal injury
limitation statute was suspended by Alaska Statutes section
13.16.455.'. for the four months following the decedent's death."' 9
Finally, the court held that a plaintiff bringing a claim against a de-
cedent's estate covered by liability insurance is required to obtain
court appointment of a personal representative and bring suit
against the decedent's personal representative." °
1111. Id at 1045.
1112. Id.
1113. See id. at 1046.
1114. See id.
1115. 915 P.2d 1210 (Alaska 1996).
1116. See id. at 1214 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.460 (Michie 1996)). Subsec-
tion (a) states that "all claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the
death of the decedent ... are barred against the estate ... unless presented ... (1)
within four months after the date of the first publication of notice to creditors."
ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.460(a).
1117. See Hamilton, 915 P.2d at 1214 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.460(c)(2)).
The court stated that this was the first time the court directly addressed this par-
ticular subsection. See id.
1118. ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.455.
1119. See Hamilton, 915 P.2d at 1215.
1120. See id. at 1215-16 (basing its holding on ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.015(a)(11)
(Michie 1996) which provides that Alaska courts have jurisdiction over actions
against a decedent's personal estate representative to enforce claims against the
decedent, as long as the court would otherwise have had jurisdiction over the de-
cedent if still living).
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XI. PROPERTY
The Alaska Supreme Court decided a number of cases in the
property area in 1996. For example, two of the cases dealt with
right-of-way issues, several others concerned easements, and one
addressed issues regarding a city zoning and planning code. Also,
one professional malpractice case involving negligently overlooked
restrictions on real property was decided as a case of first impres-
sion in Alaska.
In Fitzgerald v. Puddicombe,"' the Alaska Supreme Court
held that proof of a "generally followed route across the land in
question" sufficed to demonstrate a public right-of-way pursuant
to former 43 U.S.C. section 932.1" Although Congress repealed
former section 932 in 1976, it still governs claims of federal grants
of rights-of-way from before that date."" Following the rule as set
forth in Hamerly v. Denton,"" the court held that, for the grant to
occur, there needs to be evidence either that appropriate public
authorities of the state have acknowledged through a positive act
that the state accepted the grant or that there was a public user
"for such a period of time and under such conditions" as to indi-
cate that the state accepted the grant." 5
While the court agreed with the superior court that there was
no evidence proving that the state had accepted the statutory grant
through a positive act of its public authorities, the court held that
there was a sufficient showing of pre-entry use to establish a grant
under former section 932."2' The court found sufficient the fact
that there had been several trails across the property, at least one
of which was several decades old; it did not require the precise
path of one of the trails to be provenY"
In Parker v. Alaska Power Authority,112 the supreme court
held that the Alaska Power Authority ("APA"), by acquiring a
right-of-way across real property, had not affected any mining
right property interests such that the holder of the mining interests
was not entitled to compensation for a taking accomplished by
eminent domain. 29 The state had issued the APA a right-of-way
permit to build two power line towers on state-owned land over
1121. 918 P.2d 1017 (Alaska 1996).
1122. See id. at 1021-22; 43 U.S.C. § 932 (repealed 1976).
1123. See Fitzgerald, 918 P.2d at 1019.
1124. 359 P.2d 121 (Alaska 1961).
1125. Fitzgerald, 918 P.2d at 1019 (quoting Dillingham Commercial Co. v. City
of Dillingham, 705 P.2d 410, 413 (Alaska 1985)).
1126. See id. at 1019-20.
1127. See id. at 1021-22.
1128. 913 P.2d 1089 (Alaska 1996).
1129. See id. at 1091.
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which Parker held a mining claim.1 ° Parker contended that the
permit amounted to a taking of a part of his property interest, and
therefore that he was entitled to just compensation under Alaska
Statutes section 09.55.400.31
The court held that a mineral rights owner's surface fights are
statutorily limited and are subject to reasonable concurrent usage
because Alaska law reserves minerals from every land grant.
Therefore, the state, as possessor of the surface rights, was permit-
ted to convey its interests as it did in this case, and such convey-
ance did not grant the APA an interest in or possession over
Parker's mining interests."33
In Groff v. Kohler,M the supreme court held that in cases of
mutual mistake, a deed to property may be reformed."" Further-
more, the court held that the party seeking reformation must
clearly and convincingly show that "'both parties [had] an identical
intention as to the terms to be embodied in [the] proposed written
conveyance.., and [the] writing executed by them is materially at
variance with that intention..' ' ' .36 In this case, an admitted "clerical
error" by the title insurance company resulted in the omission of
one of the two easements intended by Groff to be in the deed."'
However, since Kohler testified that he was unaware of Groff's in-
tention that he had a second easement, the supreme court affirmed
the trial court's holding that since Kohler did not share Groff's be-
lief regarding the existence of two easements, no mutual mistake
had occurred; therefore, the deed could not be reformed. 8
In Mount Juneau Enterprises v. City and Borough of Juneau, 9
the supreme court held that the city of Juneau's reliance on the
validity of an easement transferred to it by Alaska Electric Light &
Power was a sufficient good faith belief in the integrity of its claim
to the easement to support an inverse condemnation of the prop-
erty."' For an inverse condemnation to apply, a government must
take possession of property in good faith, but with the mistaken
belief that the taking does not require the exercise of eminent do-
1130. See id. at 1089.
1131. See id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.400 (Michie 1996)).
1132. See id. at 1090-91 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.255 (Michie 1996)).
1133. See id. at 1091.
1134. 922 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1996).
1135. See id. at 874.
1136. Id. (quoting Martin v. Maldonado, 572 P.2d 763, 768 n.12 (Alaska 1977)
(citing REST. OF CONTRACrS § 504 (1943))).
1137. See id. at 871.
1138. See id. at 874.
1139. 923 P.2d 768 (Alaska 1996).
1140. See id. at 773.
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main. 14' The court also held that the city was not required to com-
pensate Mount Juneau Enterprises ("MJE") for the inverse con-
demnation, because although MJE's principal had owned an op-
tion to purchase the land over the easement when the taking took
place, MJE could not produce the option or recall its terms."' The
court held that there was no evidence to support MJE's claim that
the value of the option was reduced, therefore no compensation
was due."43
In Bear Fritz Land Co. v. Kachemak Bay Title Agency, Inc.,"
4
the supreme court held that property designated as wetlands by the
Army Corps of Engineers did not have encumbrances or defects in
title resulting from such designation."45 Bear Fritz Land Company
had allegedly purchased land without knowing that it had been
designated as wetlands by the Corps a year prior to the pur-
chase."4 Bear Fritz sued the title insurers for failure to disclose
this information concerning the wetlands designation and a wet-
lands permit that the prior owners had received from the Corps
but which had expired before Bear Fritz's discovery of the wet-
lands designation. " Bear Fritz claimed that the non-disclosure of
the permit in the title insurance policy and the preliminary agree-
ment for title insurance on the property amounted to a breach of
contract and negligence upon which Bear Fritz reasonably re-
lied. 4
The court held that the permit and classification in question
did not affect title to the property in any manner. 49 The permit
and classification affected only the market value of the title, and
not the marketability of title. 1 Drawing a parallel to Domer v.
Sleeper,"" which dealt with building and fire codes, the court held
that an encumbrance was not present because the permit and clas-
sification neither gave a third party a right or interest in the prop-
erty nor burdened the property with a lien or servitude. 52 The
court also held that the language within the policy excepting cov-
1141. See id. (citing Dept. of Highways v. Crosby, 410 P.2d 724, 728-29 (Alaska
1966)).
1142. See id. at 774.
1143. See id. (citing San Diego v. Miller, 532 P.2d 139, 143 (Cal. 1975)).
1144. 920 P.2d 759 (Alaska 1996).
1145. SeeiL at763.
1146. See id. at 760.
1147. See id
1148. See id.
1149. See id at 761.
1150. See iL
1151. 533 P.2d 9 (Alaska 1975).
1152. See Bear Fritz, 920 P.2d at 761.
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erage for governmental regulation was reasonably "clear and un-
ambiguous.'.153 Therefore, the general theory that interpretation
of insurance policy language should be interpreted in favor of cov-
erage was inapplicable 154
In Griswold v. City of Homer,"5 the supreme court held that
an amendment by the Homer City Council to the city's zoning and
planning code did not constitute spot zoning when the amendment
was consistent with the comprehensive city plan, the amendment
served the interests of the general community rather than primar-
ily the interests of private citizens and the relative size of the re-
zoned area was not unreasonably small.156
Griswold sued the city to challenge an amendment that al-
lowed motor vehicle sales and services in the city of Homer's cen-
tral business district ("CBD"), claiming that the rezoning consti-
tuted spot zoning, which is an arbitrary exercise of legislative
power with no substantial public purpose and is thereby illegal.'1
The court found that the rezoning was consistent with the city's
comprehensive plan, which intended for the CBD to be subject to
business and commercial use.""5 The court gave deference to the
City Council as legislative policy maker in accepting its reasoning
for adopting the amendment as not arbitrary or capricious, and it
found that the council was ultimately motivated by community
benefits rather than any benefits incidentally conferred on any pri-
vate owners." 9 Finally, the size of the area rezoned was not suffi-
cient in itself to command a finding that the council's decision was
a result of prejudice or improper motives."1 6'
In Breck v. Moore,11 6rthe supreme court explored for the first
time the appropriate measure of damages to be applied in a pro-
fessional malpractice case involving restrictions on real property
negligently overlooked.' 2 The Moores had hired Breck, an attor-
ney, to assist them in closing a real estate transaction. Although
Breck had received a letter from a title guaranty company indi-
1153. Id.
1154. See id.
1155. 925 P.2d 1015 (Alaska 1996).
1156. See id. at 1022-25.
1157. See id. at 1019. The court defined spot zoning as "'the process of singling
out a small parcel of land for a use classification totally different from that of the
surrounding area, for the benefit of the owner of such property and to the detri-
ment of other owners."' Id. at 1020 (quoting ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN
LAW OF ZONING § 5.12, at 358 (3d ed. 1986)).
1158. See id. at 1021.
1159. See id. at 1023-24.
1160. See id. at 1025.
1161. 910 P.2d 599 (Alaska 1996).
1162. See id. at 607.
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cating that the property in question was governed by restrictions in
the subdivision plot, Breck never asked for or obtained a copy of
the plot, and he failed to advise the Moores that there might be ti-
tle restrictions on the property."" Some time after closing the
transaction, the Moores discovered that the plot did in fact contain
significant no-dwelling and sewage facility restrictions" '
After affirming that the Moores were damaged by Breck's
negligence, 65 the court held that the Moores were entitled to re-
ceive the property as they expected it, and, therefore, that the ap-
propriate measure of damages is the lesser of the cost of curing the
defect (in this case, the no-dwelling restriction) or the diminution
of the property value caused by the restriction.11 The case was
remanded to the trial court for recalculation of damages.""
XII. TAX LAW
In CH Kelly Trust v. Municipality of Anchorage, Board of
Equalization,"6 the Alaska Supreme Court held that it was im-
proper for the Board to ignore recent sales prices in appraising the
value of property for tax purposes."" CH Kelly had purchased
four lots at a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation land liquida-
tion auction several months before the Board's appraisal, for
prices significantly lower than the appraised values." The court
found that the Board had not considered the recent sales prices in
its appraisal and held that, without such consideration, the ap-
praisal was arbitrary"7' and represented the application of a
"'fundamentally wrong principle of valuation. The supreme
court noted that the statutory goal of such appraisals is to find the
fair market value of property 3 and that, while recent sales prices
are not dispositive, they must be considered."7 4
1163. See iL at 602.
1164. See id.
1165. See id. at 606-07.
1166. See id. at 608.
1167. See id. at 609.
1168. 909 P.2d 1381 (Alaska 1996).
1169. See id. at 1382.
1170. See id. at 1381.
1171. See id. at 1382.
1172. Id. (quoting North Star Alaska Hous. Corp. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough
Bd. of Equalization, 778 P.2d 1140, 1143-44 (Alaska 1989)).
1173. See id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.110(a) (Michie 1996)).
1174. See id. The court noted that there were conditions under which the sales
price might not reflect the fair market value of the property in question, such as,
in this case, if the FDIC were seeking only to recoup specific losses, or, in any
case, where characteristics of the sales transaction would make it less than be-
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XIII. TORT LAW
In 1996, the Alaska Supreme Court addressed questions of
duty of care, failure to warn and various procedural issues regard-
ing tort claims. The court also addressed scope of employment as
a material issue in a defamation action and disapproved future use
of the sudden emergency doctrine.
In Chokwak v. Worley," 5 the Alaska Supreme Court held that
a state statute which provided civil immunity to social hosts who
serve alcohol also provided hosts who serve to minors protection
from civil liability from injuries resulting from the minor's intoxi-
cation.u7 In examining the statute at issue, Alaska Statutes section
04.21.020,11" the court found that legislative history supporting the
conclusion that hosts who serve to minors should be held liable
was not strong enough to require that the plain meaning of the
statute, which immunizes all hosts from liability, be narrowed.
11 78
In Smith v. State, 79 the supreme court held that an issue of
material fact as to the precise nature and duty of care assumed by
the state in voluntarily undertaking to fix a defective fluoride
pump precluded summary judgment for the state in a negligence
action.""O In May 1992, Smith died as a result of a fluoride poi-
soning incident in Hooper Bay, the cause of which was traced to
abnormally high fluoride levels in the water system owned and op-
erated by the township."8 In April 1992, in response to elevated
fluoride levels in water samples, the state had made repairs on the
fluoride pum and had further plans to replace the pump in the
near future."
After being sued by Smith's estate, the state conceded only
that it assumed a duty to use reasonable care in performing the re-
pairs to the pump, and that, since there was no evidence that the
work was negligently performed, it was not liable for Smith's
death."83 Smith's estate argued that the state undertook the more
extensive duty of actually taking care of the fluoride problem, and
thus it should be held liable if it was negligent in failing to com-
tween two equal parties negotiating at arm's length, as in a special relationship
between buyer and seller. See id.
1175. 912 P.2d 1248 (Alaska 1996).
1176. See id. at 1254. In this case, a minor, who had been served alcohol by the
hosts of a party he attended, was injured in an automobile accident caused by in-
toxication.
1177. ALASKA STAT. § 04.21.020 (Michie 1996).
1178. See Chokwak, 912 P.2d at 1254.
1179. 921 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1996).
1180. See icL at 635.
1181. See id. at 633.
1182. See id. at 633-34.
1183. See id. at 634.
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plete this task and if such failure was a cause of Smith's death. '
The supreme court concluded that the superior court's reliance on
the duty arising from what the state actually did (a question of
law), as opposed to the duty arising from what it undertook to do
(a question of fact), was misguided, and thus the existence of a ma-
terial fact (what exactly the state undertook to do) precluded
summary judgment." 5
In Waskey v. Municipality of Anchorage,1  the supreme court
held that the arrest of Waskey pursuant to a facially valid arrest
warrant for Waskey's brother did not constitute false imprison-
ment."1 ' The court found that the arresting officer did not have a
duty, enforceable in tort, to perfectly identify a person arrested. '
The court relied on Stephens v. State. 9 in holding that the police
officer did not have a duty of care to proceed without error in his
legal action against Waskey's brother. m
In Trigg v. City of Nome,"" the supreme court held that
Alaska Statutes section 09.65.070(d)"..2 conferred immunity from
liability on municipalities for failure to warn of hazards of which
the municipality is aware. 93 The Triggs were seriously injured
while riding on their snow machines when they collided with a
pipeline owned by the U.S. Air Force."' The Triggs then brought
suit against Nome, claiming that Nome was liable for their injuries
for failing to warn them of the pipeline by use of reflectors, lights
or other markings.' 95
The Triggs argued that the statute only confers immunity for
failures to inspect or abate a hazard, but that it does not conferimmunity for failure to warn of a hazard."96 Affording the statute
its plain meaning, the supreme court disagreed, finding that any
failure by the city to place warning markers on the pipeline was a
failure to abate a hazard, and thus came within the plain meaning
of the statute, conferring immunity upon the city of Nome.'
1184. See id.
1185. See id. at 635.
1186. 909 P.2d 342 (Alaska 1996).
1187. See id at 343.
1188. See id. at 344.
1189. 746 P.2d 908 (Alaska 1987).
1190. See Waskey, 909 P.2d at 344.
1191. 929 P.2d 1273 (Alaska 1996).
1192. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.070(d) (Michie 1996).
1193. See Trigg, 929 P.2d at 1274.
1194. See L at 1273.
1195. See i
1196. See id. at 1274.
1197. See id.
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In Maddox v. River & Sea Marine, Inc.,"" the supreme court
held that summary judgment was improper when material issues
existed as to foreseeability and obviousness of the danger giving
rise to a tort claim.199 Maddox was injured when he attempted to
detach from his truck a boat and trailer purchased from River &
Sea Marine, Inc.'m After finding that the tongue-jack supplied
with the trailer was broken, Maddox injured his back while at-
tempting to lift the trailer with his back under the bow of the
boat.' Maddox claimed that River & Sea was negligent in selling
him an improperly matched boat and trailer and a broken tongue-
jack.12
Noting the general tort rule that one's duty extends no further
than foreseeable consequences, the supreme court found that,
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Maddox, the trial re-
cord contained evidence suggesting that it was foreseeable that in-
dividuals might try to lift the boat-trailer combination by hand.'m
Furthermore, the court found that while the risk of injury associ-
ated with such lifting may have been obvious to Maddox, River &
Sea still had a duty to inform Maddox of the weight of the boat-
trailer combination; without such information, it may have been
unreasonable to expect Maddox to realize the hazards associated
with lifting the trailer." Under these circumstances, the court
held that summary judgment should have been denied.'Y5
In McConkey v. Hart,'2 the supreme court held that prejudg-
ment interest under Alaska Statutes section 09.30.07012 accrued
from the date at which defendant received actual notice of plain-
tiff's claim and applied only to past damages.'m Future damages
were discounted to the date of trial.'O McConkey was admittedly
negligent in diagnosing and performing laser surgery on Hart's eye
condition in November 1990. After a trial, the jury returned a ver-
dict of $69,592 against McConkey, including past and future eco-
nomic and non-economic losses. The future losses were not dis-
counted to present value. The trial court entered judgment for this
1198. 925 P.2d 1033 (Alaska 1996).
1199. See id. at 1040.
1200. See id. at 1034-35.
1201. See id. at 1035.
1202. See id.
1203. See id. at 1036-37.
1204. See id. at 1037-39.
1205. Id. at 1040.
1206. 930 P.2d 402 (Alaska 1996).
1207. ALASKA STAT. § 09.30.070 (Michie 1996).
1208. See McConkey, 930 P.2d at 405-06.
1209. See id. at 406.
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amount plus prejudgment interest on the entire award accruing
from March 24, 1992, the date Hart met with McConkey in his of-
fice.21
0
The supreme court held that the prejudgment interest should
not have been applied to the future losses, unless those losses were
discounted to their value before the time of the trial, since the
"purpose of awarding prejudgment interest to a plaintiff is to make
a plaintiff whole by compensating her for the use of money right-
fully hers between the time of the injury and the trial.' 21' To allow
prejudgment interest on future losses would give Hart a wind-
fall.121
2
In Smith v. Thompson,213 the supreme court held that equita-
ble estoppel did not bar Thompson from asserting a statute of limi-
tations defense against Smith's personal injury claim arising out of
an automobile collision, despite Smith's assertions that
Thompson's insurer misled her as to the validity of a release." 4
The court also held that the statute of limitations was not equitably
tolled due to the insurer's alleged misrepresentation as to the re-
lease, since Smith was not pursuing any alternative legal remedy
when negotiating the settlement and release.
215
In Howarth v. State, 6216 the supreme court held that an individ-
ual whose intentional criminal acts resulted in incarceration cannot
receive damages from another whose negligence may have con-
tributed to the incarceration.1 27 Howarth brought a legal malprac-
tice action against the public defender who represented him on a
charge of first-degree sexual assault.2 8 Howarth entered a plea of
nolo contendere to the charge and served seven years of a ten-year
sentence before the superior court granted Howarth's motion to
withdraw his plea based on its finding that Howarth's public de-
fender ineffectively counseled him.12'9- The public defender had
failed to discuss certain evidence with Howarth, and, as a result, he
pled nolo contendere to a charge of second-degree sexual as-
sault.'m Howarth then brought an action for malpractice against
1210. See id. at 404.
1211. Id. at 405.
1212. See id. at 406.
1213. 923 P.2d 101 (Alaska 1996).
1214. See id. at 104-05.
1215. See id. at 105.
1216. 925 P.2d 1330 (Alaska 1996).
1217. See il at 1335-36.
1218. See id. at 1331.
1219. See id.
1220. See id.
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his attorney."'
The supreme court found that Howarth's intentional criminal
acts, for which he was convicted, were a legal cause of his seven-
year term of imprisonment.' 2 Furthermore, Howarth was collat-
erally estopped from denying that he committed the acts essential
to the crime charged to which he pled nolo contendere.'m Finally,
even though the public defender's conduct may have been negli-
gent and may have contributed to Howarth's incarceration, How-
arth had no civil remedy for incarceration damages caused by his
intentional criminal conduct. 24
In Jaso v. McCarthy,'2 the supreme court held that, in an ac-
tion to recover damages resulting from an automobile accident, the
admission of evidence of claimant's insurance coverage for a pre-
vious accident was harmless error, since the trial record otherwise
supported the jury's verdict.'2 Furthermore, the trial court was
not required to give a curative instruction regarding the admission
of such evidence when McCarthy failed to request one at the end
of trial as the court had suggested. m 1
In Lyons v. Midnight Sun Transportation Services,'m the su-
preme court held that the trial judge's "jury instruction regarding
the sudden emergency doctrine"' was harmless error but disap-
proved future use of the doctrine.'2 0 Lyons argued that the driver
of a truck owned by Midnight Sun was negligent in causing the
death of his wife. 3' The court instructed the jury that, if a defen-
dant is acting in response to a sudden emergency, he is not ex-
pected "to exercise the same judgment and prudence the law re-
quires of a person in calmer and more deliberate moments."'2
The jury found that, while the truck driver was in fact negligent, his
negligence was not a legal cause of the accident." 3 The supreme
court held that, because the jury found the driver not liable based
1221. See id.
1222. See id. at 1333.
1223. See id.
1224. See id- at 1335-36.
1225. 923 P.2d 795 (Alaska 1996).
1226. See id. at 799.
1227. See id. at 800.
1228. 928 P.2d 1202 (Alaska 1996).
1229. The sudden emergency doctrine states that "a person confronted with a
sudden and unexpected peril, not resulting from that person's own negligence, is
not expected to exercise the same judgment and prudence the law requires of a
person in calmer and more deliberate moments." See id. at 1203-04.
1230. See id. at 1204-06.
1231. See id. at 1203.
1232. Id. at 1204.
1233. See id. at 1203
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on issues of causation instead of negligence, the sudden emergency
instruction was harmless.1m However, the court went on to explic-
itly disapprove of further use of the sudden emergency instruction,
finding that it added nothing to the established duty of care owed
by all to act reasonably under the circumstances.'3 5
XIV. TRUSTS AND ESTATES
In Barber v. Barber ("Barber IP'),'26 the Alaska Supreme
Court held that the superior court's termination of a trust was not
set aside by an earlier supreme court decision to remand the case
concerning the sale of real property held in trust.'2 In the earlier
case, Barber v. Barber ("Barber P'),28 the supreme court had held
that, because an objecting non-income beneficiary of the property
was not given personal notice of the settlement proceeding, the su-
perior court had erred in overruling his objection, and the case was
remanded for further proceedings."
On appeal, the issue was whether the superior court's termina-
tion of the trust in 1990 was set aside by the supreme court's deci-
sion in Barber L 20 The supreme court ruled that the termination
of the trust was not set aside because of the remand.24 On re-
mand, the superior court was simply required to hear the non-
income beneficiary's objections and determine whether the trust
termination was an abuse of discretion by the trustee.1242
J. Catherine Bramlage
Peter M. Lee
Benjamin E. Waller
Richard T. Welch
1234. See id. at 1204.
1235. See id. at 1204-06.
1236. 915 P.2d 1204 (Alaska 1996).
1237. See id at 1206.
1238. 837 P.2d 714 (Alaska 1992).
1239. See Barber 11, 915 P.2d at 1207.
1240. See id at 1208.
1241. See id
1242. See id
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APPENDIX
CASES OMITTED FROM 1996 YEAR IN REVIEW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Geczy v. State, 924 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1996)
(holding that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing Geczy's appeal of a denial by Department of Natural
Resources of a leasehold claim for want of prosecution or in re-
fusing to reinstate it when Geczy offered no sufficient explana-
tion for her failure to comply with a court order).
Gunderson v. University of Alaska, Fairbanks, 922 P.2d 229
(Alaska 1996)
(refusing to overturn the award of a contract to provide coal and
hauling services to the University of Alaska, Fairbanks).
Kimble v. Department of Commerce and Economic Development,
Board of Nursing, 928 P.2d 1201 (Alaska 1996)
(holding that when the Board of Nursing adopts in its entirety a
proposed decision of a hearing officer, it need not prepare a
transcript of the hearing).
Matthews v. University of Alaska, Fairbanks, 925 P.2d 1052
(Alaska 1996)
(holding that the University of Alaska, Fairbanks grievance
council did not abuse its discretion in denying Matthews's re-
quest for a hearing as untimely, when Matthews filed his request
more than two months past the filing deadline and gave no ex-
planation for the delay).
Northern Timber Corp. v. Department of Transportation and
Public Facilities, 927 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1996)
(holding that Northern Timber Corporation was not entitled to
relief on its claim that the Department of Transportation and
Public Facilities had altered the terms of a contract for im-
provements to the Hoonah Airport).
BUSINESS LAW
Bowers Office Products, Inc. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough
School District, 918 P.2d 1012 (Alaska 1996)
(holding that summary judgment was appropriate where the
claims raised were resolved in a prior appeal of the same case).
Ilardi v. Parker, 914 P.2d 888 (Alaska 1996)
(holding that a superior court's failure to support its decision de-
nying a homestead exemption with sufficient findings of fact and
conclusions of law warranted remand).
Young v. Hobbs, 916 P.2d 485 (Alaska 1996)
(reviewing an alleged settlement contract and holding that, al-
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though the parties appeared to have reached a preliminary
agreement on several related issues, they failed to reach a final
agreement that encompassed all the material terms regarding the
particular dispute at issue).
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Waage v. Cutter Biological Division of Miles Laboratories, Inc.,
926 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1996)
(holding that factual questions of fraudulent misrepresentation
and concealment, reasonable reliance on such misrepresenta-
tions, and exercise of due diligence on the part of the plaintiff
precluded summary judgment for the defendant on grounds that
the action was time barred).
CRIMINAL LAW
Ewers v. State, 909 P.2d 373 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that evidence obtained by a state trooper on board de-
fendant's vessel did not violate the defendant's Fourth or Fifth
Amendment rights and therefore could be used against the de-
fendant on a charge of possession of a firearm by a felon).
Splain v. State, 924 P.2d 435 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that the imposition of consecutive sentences for a total
composite sentence of five years imprisonment with one and
one-half years suspended was appropriate for convictions on one
count of third-degree assault and two counts of second-degree
assault stemming from an accident in which several people were
injured and in which the defendant was driving while intoxi-
cated).
Starn v. State, 925 P.2d 668 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that a search warrant affidavit supported only by a po-
lice informant's assertions that defendant was growing marijuana
was invalid, since such assertions failed to provide sufficient rea-
son to believe that the informant was a credible person).
Weist v. Municipality of Anchorage, 929 P.2d 668 (Alaska Ct. App.
1996)
(holding that the trial court's failure to inquire into whether the
defendant's decision not to testify was knowing and voluntary as
required under Alaska Criminal Rule 27.1(b) was harmless er-
ror).
EMPLOYMENT LAW
Hale v. Anchorage School District, 922 P.2d 268 (Alaska 1996)
(holding that the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board cor-
rectly decided to deny a claim for certain medical expenses in-
curred by an injured employee of the school district based on the
fact that the treating physician had not filed a timely treatment
plan so that the plaintiff was not entitled to any payment for
treatment she received in excess of the amount normally ren-
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dered for her injury under Alaska Statutes section 23.30.095(c)).
Foster v. City of Fairbanks, 929 P.2d 658 (Alaska 1996)
(holding that an arbitration award in an employee grievance
claim filed by Foster against the city of Fairbanks was not am-
biguous because the arbitrator's true intent was apparent and
that, because Foster failed to correct the factual errors in the ar-
bitrator's opinion, she was estopped from arguing them on ap-
peal).
Stephens v. FIT/Felec Services, 915 P.2d 620 (Alaska 1996)
(holding that when considering whether there is sufficient evi-
dence to show whether a work-related injury occurred, the
Alaska Workers' Compensation Board must specify findings
adequate to demonstrate that the Board had weighed the evi-
dence presented by both parties).
FAMILY LAW
In re J.W., 921 P.2d 604 (Alaska 1996)
(holding that clear and convincing evidence that the father was
exposing his two children to hazardous and unsanitary conditions
and that the father's substance abuse was likely to continue sup-
ported the trial court's CINA adjudication based on neglect).
State v. Fry, 926 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1996)
(holding that Social Security children's insurance benefits
("CIB") should be treated as earned income of the parent in de-
termining child support payments and that ongoing child support
obligations of parents should be offset by CIB payments made to
their children, including children who have received Aid to
Families with Dependent Children).
INSURANCE LAW
Great American Insurance Co. v. Bar Club, Inc., 921 P.2d 626
(Alaska 1996)
(holding that the "implied insured" doctrine does not apply in a
suit against a landlord by the tenant's insurance company).
PROPERTY LAW
Tenala v. Fowler, 921 P.2d 1114 (Alaska 1996)
(holding that adverse possession without any permanent im-
provements to the land adversely possessed nor any other ac-
tions which would put the owners of the land on notice of a claim
of a possessory interest entitled the adverse possessor only to a
prescriptive easement rather than fee title).
TORT LAW
Taranto v. North Slope Borough, 909 P.2d 354 (Alaska 1996)
(holding that the determination of whether an employee is acting
within the scope of employment is a fact-specific issue requiring
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case-by-case determination, thus summary judgment is pre-
cluded in a tort action for defamation raising such a question).
